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Abstract 
 
This thesis introduces and defends a new hypothesis concerning autism: 
Semantic Feature Dissociation (SFD). The claim is that some autistic people only 
store information about strong correlations in semantic memory. I begin by 
arguing the most promising theories of autism currently on offer are Bayesian 
theories. However, these omit important details, especially about the underlying 
format of world knowledge, and its role in social cognition. The SFD hypothesis 
bridges this gap, linking autism traits explicitly to research on concept structure. 
After critically reviewing key literature, I defend the hypothesis in two ways. 
First, I report a methodologically novel qualitative study of autism 
autobiographies, from which the hypothesis was abducted. This reveals that it 
can potentially account for many real-world autism traits. Crucially, most social 
and language differences can be attributed to general changes in the structure of 
world knowledge, without implicating a specialised mechanism for identifying 
mental states. Second, I show SFD is better than other accounts at predicting 
important lines of experimental evidence concerning social cognition, language 
and perception in autism. I conclude by tentatively suggesting SFD might 
reconcile the two leading Bayesian accounts of autism: HIPPEA and weak priors.   
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Introduction 
 
In 1978, Lorna Wing and Judith Gould conducted a groundbreaking study of 914 
children in London. Their work provided the first clear evidence for an autism 
syndrome: a group of correlated traits1 including social difficulties, atypical language, 
and a tendency to prefer order, repetition and routine. More recently, other 
researchers have argued that distinctive perceptual differences, and some cognitive 
advantages, are also part of the picture. These findings raise a question which Uta Frith 
(1989) famously called the “enigma” of autism: why do these traits tend to occur 
together, in the same individuals? Over the years, a tremendous amount of time and 
effort has been spent on this question. Ultimately, the hope is that an answer will make 
it easier to provide autistic individuals with more appropriate forms of assistance and 
support. 
As part of these efforts, autism researchers have introduced a wide variety of 
different theoretical constructs. These include, but are not limited to:  
 
1. Theory of mind deficits (Baron-Cohen et. al. 1985, Baron-Cohen 1997a). 
2. Systemising strengths (Baron-Cohen, 2009). 
3. Weak central coherence (Frith 1989, Happé and Frith, 2006). 
4. Executive function deficits (e.g. Hill 2004, Craig et. al., 2016). 
5. Enhanced perceptual discrimination (e.g. Mottron et. al. 2006). 
6. Weak Bayesian priors (e.g. Pellicano and Burr, 2012). 
7. High, inflexible precision of prediction errors (e.g. van de Cruys 2014).  
  
Each of these different ideas can plausibly explain some autism traits. Each can also 
explain some relevant experimental findings. As I will argue, however, two limitations 
are common to them. First, most are not sufficiently broad to account for the full range 
of autism traits. Second, all fail to specify important details of the mechanisms they 
posit. As a result, they can sometimes be difficult to evaluate; it can also be difficult to 
understand how they might be related. 
The problem is well illustrated by the most well-known hypothesis: that autism 
involves a theory of mind or empathy deficit. On this proposal, autistic people have 
                                               
1. Out of respect to people who prefer not to conceptualise their own autism as a disorder, I 
prefer the neutral term “trait” to the term “symptom.” For related reasons, I say “autistic 
person” rather than “person with autism”. A survey by Kenny et. al. (2016) indicates that 
autism-diagnosed people in the UK are more likely to endorse this wording. 
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specific difficulties with representing mental states. This is meant to account for many 
real-world social and language difficulties. It is also positioned as an explanation of 
many experimental findings: especially that, in some conditions, autistic people find it 
harder to predict how other people will act. However, there are many open questions 
about the mental state representations involved. For example, what is their basic 
format? Are they characteristically different to other sorts of mental representations? 
If so, how? And how exactly do they influence language processing and action? In light 
of these ambiguities, it is hard to say exactly what kinds of real-world social difficulties 
are predicted by this proposal. It is also hard to be sure whether key experimental 
findings are being interpreted correctly. 
Broadly similar points can be made about most of the other suggestions listed 
above. For instance, one component of executive functioning is cognitive flexibility: 
roughly, the ability to switch rapidly from one task to another. Autistic individuals are 
widely reported to have difficulties in this area, possibly contributing to their 
preference for order and routine. However, the mechanisms of cognitive flexibility are 
still up for debate, and it is not always defined consistently (Dajani and Uddin, 2015). 
Again, this also makes it hard to know how experimental findings might relate to real-
world autism traits.  Similarly, the weak central coherence account relies on a 
distinction between “local” and “global” processing that is rarely spelled out 
mechanistically, and is not always defined consistently (Simmons and Todorova, 
2018). 
In recent years, Bayesian inference theories of autism have gone some way 
towards improving the situation. On Bayesian inference accounts of cognition, the 
brain weighs new sense data against prior knowledge about the statistical structure of 
the world, to estimate the most likely states of its current environment. In autism, it 
has been suggested, this works differently. One suggestion in particular, the High, 
Inflexible Precision of Prediction Errors in Autism (HIPPEA) proposal (van de Cruys et. 
al., 2014) may be the most mechanistically precise account of autism to date, since it is 
built on one of the most powerful explanatory frameworks in neuroscience: predictive 
coding (Friston, 2010). However, even HIPPEA omits important details. Notably (as I 
will argue) it underspecifies the representational format of world knowledge, making 
its implications unclear in a number of areas. 
The main goal of this thesis will be to develop and defend an original 
hypothesis addressing many of the gaps and ambiguities in current theories: Semantic 
Feature Dissociation (SFD). The claim is that some autistic people only store 
information about strong correlations in semantic memory. I will argue that SFD 
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improves on existing theories of autism in three ways. First, it is more consistent with 
autism traits as they appear outside the lab, especially as described by autistic 
autobiographers. Second, it is a more precise fit for key experimental findings. Third, it 
specifies the underlying mechanisms in more detail. Alongside these advantages, I will 
also argue that it can help to reconcile HIPPEA with the other leading Bayesian account 
of autism, weak priors. 
I defend this proposal in the course of four chapters. In chapters 1 and 2, I 
prepare the ground by critically reviewing research on autism and on concept 
structure. In chapter 3, I introduce the hypothesis itself. I present findings from a 
methodologically novel qualitative study, showing that it can potentially account for 
many of the distinctive experiences of autistic autobiographers. Finally, in chapter 4, I 
explore how SFD might account for key lines of experimental evidence. I argue that it 
can neatly explain many findings concerning social cognition, perception, and language 
in autism. I conclude by suggesting that SFD might help to reconcile HIPPEA with its 
leading Bayesian alternative, weak priors. 
The rest of this introduction will describe the line of argument in more detail. 
Chapter 1 reviews current theories of autism. It argues that these theories are mostly 
unsatisfying, and motivates the line of argument I pursue in the rest of the thesis. The 
chapter is split into 5 parts. In part 1, I set the scene by describing the traits which 
autism researchers have attempted to explain. I do so by focusing on three key 
historical phases. First, I outline the observations made by Kanner, who first described 
autism in 1943. Second, I turn to the period from 1978 to 1987, when Wing and Gould’s 
work set the stage for standardised diagnosis, allowing systematic autism research to 
get off the ground. Third, I describe the most important changes in our understanding 
of autism from the 1980s to today. 
 In parts 2–4, I move on to the three classic families of autism theories: social-
first theories, perception-first theories, and executive dysfunction theories. I argue that 
theories in all of these families face serious difficulties. Social-first theories, including 
the theory of mind deficit theory and its variants, are the worst off. For one thing, the 
theory of mind framework on which they are based is deeply problematic: it rests on 
the dubious assumption that mental states are distinctively unobservable, and key 
supporting studies seem to presuppose the abilities they purport to test. In autism 
specifically, studies are also undermined by inappropriate language controls. 
Furthermore, social-first theories have serious problems of scope, providing little more 
than a descriptive account of the link between social difficulties and other autism traits. 
 Perception-first theories, especially the weak central coherence (WCC) theory, 
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fare slightly better. In particular, WCC has broad explanatory power, plausibly 
accounting for social difficulties and language differences alongside the perceptual 
differences which are its main emphasis. Unfortunately, it has been difficult to evaluate 
WCC against competing perceptual theories, especially Enhanced Perceptual 
Functioning (EPF). I argue this is mainly because the core concepts employed by these 
theories (local and global processing) are insufficiently precise. As well as leaving the 
relationship between perceptual theories and wider psychology unclear, this makes it 
difficult to obtain decisive evidence. 
Executive dysfunction theories likewise seem well placed to account for a range 
of autism traits, especially the preference for routine and order. Autistic people also do 
worse on many experimental measures of executive functioning. Again, however, I note 
there is limited agreement about the underlying mechanisms. This makes the evidence 
hard to interpret, especially in the context of perceptual differences. Furthermore, 
deficits found experimentally may not correlate with the real-world difficulties they 
are supposed to explain. Nor can executive deficits explain perceptual differences, so 
they cannot account for the full syndrome. 
 Finally, in part 5, I turn to Bayesian theories. After briefly covering some 
theoretical background, on Bayesian inference and the predictive coding framework, I 
consider the two leading proposals, HIPPEA and weak priors. Overall, I argue that 
these theories are promising developments, but that they share a common problem. On 
both accounts, autism involves changes in the structure of world knowledge, but 
neither adequately specifies the underlying format of that knowledge. For instance, the 
weak prior hypothesis does not distinguish between structural (long-term) and 
contextual (short-term) priors. Meanwhile, HIPPEA makes questionable predictions by 
relying on a false analogy between human and machine learning. There are also some 
important findings, especially concerning language processing, which neither proposal 
attempts to explain. I conclude by arguing that research on concept structure is well 
placed to address these gaps. I also suggest that more serious attention to qualitative 
data might provide a useful constraint on theorising, in a domain where experimental 
findings are consistently equivocal. 
 In Chapter 2, therefore, I turn at length to the literature on semantic memory, 
especially on concept structure. I argue that semantic memory is best understood as a 
network-based model of the world, which directly underpins perception, inference, 
language comprehension, and action. The chapter is divided into 8 parts, each outlining 
the contribution of a different theoretical perspective to the overall picture.  
In the first four parts, I mainly consider the nature of the knowledge stored in 
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semantic memory. In part 1, I acknowledge the core insight of the classical view of 
concepts: that we are often able to reason analytically, employing definitions and strict 
category criteria. In part 2, I contrast this with the core insight of prototype view: most 
of the time, we do not do this. Instead, typically, category boundaries are blurry, and 
membership criteria are statistical, not strict. This extends to many different kinds of 
categories, including events, emotions, and situations, as well as objects. In part 3, I 
build on this picture by considering exemplar models. These highlight that we also 
store organised knowledge about subcategories and instances. As I note, later 
prototype models were able to integrate this idea, improving their explanatory power. 
In part 4, I explore the view that concepts resemble scientific theories. Here, I sideline 
some peripheral claims to foreground one crucial point: that we store organised 
knowledge about the structural and causal properties of category members, not just a 
shopping list of typical features. Knowledge about these relationships is also mostly 
statistical. 
In the second half of chapter 2, I focus mainly on how this knowledge is 
organised and deployed. Part 5 introduces parallel-processing models, beginning with 
connectionist models before turning to some later developments in the same vein. In 
these models, the conceptual system is represented by a network of units, 
corresponding roughly to features of category members. The strengths of the 
connections between these units encode knowledge about how often they occur 
together, and so serve as a statistical model of the world. I describe how such models 
can implement the knowledge structures described in the first four parts of the 
chapter, and how they can learn from the errors they make.   
In part 6, I consider Barsalou and colleagues’ view of concepts as simulators. 
This supplements the network view with the claim that feature representations are 
anchored in the perceptual and motor systems. It also argues that concepts are situated 
and embodied: they store knowledge about the typical context in which category 
members are found, and about how we typically interact with them. Significantly, the 
fact that concepts are situated helps refute one of the most influential objections to 
statistical theories of concepts: the charge that statistical concepts cannot combine to 
produce new ideas. I conclude by briefly sketching Barsalou’s approach to language 
comprehension. 
In part 7, I revisit predictive coding theories. I begin by observing that the 
predictive coding framework is broadly consistent with the research reviewed in the 
previous sections, but provides important extra details. In particular, sense input is 
weighted to reflect its expected information value, so that learning only occurs when 
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there is actually something to learn. I then turn especially to the predictive coding 
account of action: active inference. Roughly, on this account, I am programmed to 
anticipate remaining in the sensory states best compatible with my continued survival. 
I then infer the actions which I will take from this innate “knowledge” about the world. 
On this view, learning and action can be understood as complementary ways of 
minimising sensory surprise. 
 Finally, in part 8, I consider dual-process theories of cognition. These 
approaches distinguish consciously controlled, rule-based processing from the 
automatic inferences which are the usual stock-in-trade of the conceptual system. This 
allows the insight discussed in part 1—that we are often able to engage in rule-based, 
syllogistic reasoning—to be reconciled with a thoroughly statistical view of cognition.  
Moving on, chapter 3 reports a methodologically novel exploratory qualitative 
study of 8 book-length autism autobiographies, conceived to investigate how the 
semantic network might be different in autism. For maximum clarity, I structure this 
chapter upside-down, summarising the results first. The main result is the SFD 
hypothesis itself, abducted during the course of the analysis. Drawing on the account of 
concepts developed in chapter 2, I link this hypothesis to the two main analytical 
categories employed in the study. Although not logically distinct, it is useful to separate 
them for the purposes of description. Both follow as a logical consequence of SFD.  
The first category is concept narrowing (CN). This encompasses evidence that 
when autistic autobiographers deploy a concept, they often miss automatic inferences 
which neurotypicals would be likely to make. Inferences based on weak correlations 
seem especially likely to get missed. SFD predicts this because those correlations are 
no longer stored in memory. The second category is concept specialisation (CS). This 
encompasses evidence that autistic autobiographers often do not activate concepts at 
all, unless strict criteria are specified. SFD predicts this because only a small number of 
highly reliable cues will be associated with any given concept. 
Having introduced these two categories, I briefly contrast the predictions of 
SFD with those of HIPPEA and weak priors. According to HIPPEA, autistic individuals 
are supposed to end up with noisy, overfitted conceptual models of the world, 
including many erroneous parameters. This would predict erroneous inferences. By 
contrast, SFD predicts missing parameters and missing inferences. Meanwhile, the 
weak priors hypothesis predicts missing inferences of all kinds. By contrast, SFD would 
only affect inferences based on weak correlations. 
After reviewing the study methodology, I move on to the results, breaking these 
up into four parts. First, I describe the contribution of CN to social difficulties. In 
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particular, a narrowing of situation schemas would lead to a less nuanced sense of 
what action is most appropriate in a given context. Consistent with the SFD hypothesis, 
autistic autobiographers tend to report specific difficulties in social situations 
governed by malleable and intersecting norms, and are relatively at home in situations 
like formal meetings, where there are clearer rules of conduct. 
Second, I describe the implications of CN for language comprehension. Building 
on my account of social difficulties, I note that autobiographers often experience 
questions and instructions as incomplete, apparently because they do not draw on 
relevant situation knowledge. For the same reason, they also report difficulties with 
understanding figurative language in context. Significantly, however, and at odds with 
a common claim in the autism literature, I found no evidence for difficulties with 
figurative language per se. To the contrary, autobiographers employed a great deal of 
figurative language and analogy, with three autobiographies including vivid figurative 
poetry. 
Third, I turn to evidence for CS. I begin by noting that two autobiographers 
report intriguing difficulties with categorising objects. Both describe losing the ability 
to recognise category members when key cues are removed. However, consistent with 
the claim that knowledge about weak correlations is lost first, most autobiographers 
reported more difficulties with categories harder to define in terms of predictable 
concrete features: especially emotions, facial expressions, and situations. This 
accounted for a high level of uncertainty in unfamiliar environments, which some 
autobiographers explicitly linked to a preference for routine and order. A few also said 
they relied on figurative language and analogy as a strategy for understanding less 
predictable domains in concrete terms. 
Fourth, I consider contributions of CN and CS to distinctive sensory 
experiences. Here, the overall picture was of heightened sensory sensitivity, sometimes 
pleasant, but often painful, especially when sensations were chaotic and unpredictable. 
Often, autobiographers linked these experiences to behaviours which might be 
characterised as restricted or repetitive. I explain this picture by drawing on a core 
tenet of the predictive coding framework: that we suppress new sense input which we 
can accurately predict. Meanwhile, CS and CN would each make sensory experience 
less predictable, implying less suppression, especially in busy or unfamiliar 
environments. Autistic autobiographers also reported many idiosyncratic preferences 
which were consistent with CN: a reduced sensitivity to the contextual significance of 
tastes, textures, and smells which might otherwise be unpleasant. 
Finally, after reviewing the results, I reflect on whether SFD can be considered 
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an intersubjective account of autism. As I argue, missing inferences must be defined 
intersubjectively, relative to the inferences usually made by neurotypicals. Moreover, 
some of the social difficulties experienced by autistic people occur purely because they 
do not coordinate their social expectations with neurotypicals. However, SFD can also 
have consequences which are not intersubjective in any interesting sense (like 
difficulties with distinguishing edible and inedible objects). 
Lastly, chapter 4 argues that SFD is also a good fit for the experimental 
literature. In part 1, I discuss social cognition in autism. I begin with the robust finding 
that autistic children often struggle with joint attention, arguing that both CN and CS 
could cause problems here. Furthermore, difficulties with joint attention might 
contribute to difficulties with theory of mind tests (which they strongly predict). 
Moving on, SFD would explain why autistic people are more resistant to the 
stereotype-driven conjunction fallacy, and display less implicit bias. Lastly, the 
hypothesis is also directly supported by a few studies which have looked at social event 
knowledge in autism. 
 In part 2, I turn to language comprehension in autism. I first point out that SFD 
would undercut standard ways of framing discussion in this area, especially 
assumptions about a clear semantic/pragmatic distinction. I then turn to research on 
linguistic context effects. As I argue, most studies reveal normal context effects in 
autism when suitable controls are used. In most studies, however, the context is 
(intentionally) a strong predictor of the target. Meanwhile, SFD only predicts reduced 
context effects when the context is relatively weak. On this basis, not only is SFD 
consistent with the data, it resolves a paradox, because difficulties with context are 
ubiquitous in autobiographical and clinical accounts of autism. I follow up with a 
similar interpretation of figurative language data. Again, with suitable controls, most 
studies do not find difficulties. Again, however, most studies provide a strong context, 
which can be used to identify the figurative meaning. Again, therefore, SFD reconciles 
the findings with the qualitative picture. Finally, I conclude the section on language 
speculatively, arguing that extreme CS might make it impossible to acquire language. 
 In part 3, I consider perception in autism. I begin by reiterating that it is 
unhelpful to interpret these findings in terms of local and global processing. I then 
contrast SFD with the weak priors hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, prior 
knowledge is less likely to influence perception in autism. However, the best evidence 
indicates that only some priors are unaffected. As I argue, SFD amounts to a more 
specific version of the weak priors hypothesis, which can better accommodate the data. 
Moving on, I consider face perception in autism, showing that CS can account for 
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difficulties in this domain. To conclude the section on perception, I relate my account of 
altered sensory sensitivity to evidence from caregiver survey data, questioning some of 
the assumptions underlying standard questionnaires. 
 In part 4, I consider the relationship between SFD and HIPPEA. Roughly, 
according to HIPPEA, autistic people are unable to disregard sensory noise. Instead, 
they treat it as learnable, so they end up with overfitted models of the world: they 
expect random co-occurrences to repeat. As I argue, however, this would be a relatively 
weak, short-term effect.  Over the long term, the main consequence would be an 
inability to learn anything other than predictable rules. In other words, HIPPEA 
actually predicts SFD, not overfitting. Since SFD is a specific version of the weak priors 
hypothesis, this would also reconcile the two competing Bayesian accounts of autism. 
Calling the joint proposal SFDH, I move on to consider some outstanding findings on 
prototype learning and visual search in autism.  
Finally, in parts 5 and 6 I return to the bigger picture. In part 5 I reflect briefly 
on a general strategy for testing SFD the hypothesis, sensitive to the possibility that 
there be no one universal explanation of autism. In that case, SFD might turn to account 
for a subset of cases. This strategy is appropriate since very few studies have found 
traits which are strictly associated with autism diagnosis. In part 6 I then describe how 
SFD would relate to the three traditional families of autism theories I discussed in 
chapter 1. In each case, I argue that SFD explains a wider range of findings, and 
provides further detail about the mechanisms involved. 
 Overall, the main contribution of this thesis is to introduce, develop, and 
defend the SFD hypothesis. I argue that SFD is more consistent with qualitative 
evidence than existing theories of autism, and is better at predicting key experimental 
findings. Along the way, the thesis also makes a few secondary contributions. First, it 
highlights important ambiguities in Bayesian theories of autism, not previously 
discussed in the literature. Second, it introduces a novel methodology, where a 
hypothesis about cognition is abducted from a qualitative study. Third, it presents new 
data, showing that changes in concept structure can account for a wide range of autism 
traits outside the lab. Fourth, it helps make new sense of complex experimental 
findings, accommodating some findings that otherwise seem to contradict the 
autobiographical and clinical picture of autism. Finally, fifth, it indicates a way to 
reconcile the two leading Bayesian theories of autism, HIPPEA and weak priors.   
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Chapter 1: Current Theories of Autism 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I review some of the most important attempts to explain the enigma of 
autism. In part 1.1, I introduce the syndrome itself, considering the development of the 
diagnosis from 1943–present, and describing specific autism traits. In parts 1.2–1.4, I 
review the three most influential families of theories: social-first theories (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 1997a), perception-first theories (e.g. Frith, 1989; Mottron et. al., 2006); and 
executive dysfunction theories (e.g. Russell, 1997). In each case, I outline the 
theoretical background and core claims, before turning to important objections. 
Finally, in part 1.5, I consider Bayesian theories (Pellicano and Burr, 2012; van de 
Cruys et. al., 2014).  
Overall, I argue that none of the current theories are satisfying. This is mainly 
for two reasons. First, most theories cannot account for the full range of autism traits. 
Second, most theories rely on ambiguous or contested theoretical constructs. As a 
result, many key lines of evidence are equivocal. I conclude that Bayesian theories are 
currently the most promising, but that they remain ambiguous in a key respect: they 
posit changes in the structure of world knowledge, but they underspecify the format of 
that knowledge. This sets the scene for the rest of the thesis, which draws on semantic 
memory research, especially on concept structure, to bridge the gap. Since 
experimental findings are often equivocal, I also suggest that qualitative data should be 
taken more seriously as an additional constraint on theorising. 
 
1.1 The Development of the Autism Diagnosis 
 
The term “autism” was originally introduced by Bleuler (1908) to describe highly 
withdrawn patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. The modern usage, however, can be 
traced back to work by Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1938, 1944).2 Of these, Asperger 
was the first to describe autism, but his influence was marginal until Wing (1981) drew 
new attention to his work. Consequently, Kanner’s 1943 paper is the primary point of 
departure for autism research.  
                                               
2. Sukhareva (e.g. 1926) also used the term ‘autistic’ in something like the modern sense, but 
her work received relatively little attention and has only been re-discovered recently. 
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Kanner’s paper described 11 children who had been referred to his clinic, and 
who he thought had some distinctive traits in common. Three of his observations are 
especially important. First, he was especially struck by a distinctive pattern of social 
difficulties. All of the children were unusually detached or socially aloof: they often 
acted if other people were not in the room with them at all, or were no more significant 
than inanimate objects like tables and chairs.  When he was interrupted during play, 
Kanner wrote that one child: 
 
was never angry at the interfering person. He angrily shoved the hand 
away or the foot that stepped on one of his blocks, at one time referring 
to the foot on the block as “umbrella.” Once the obstacle was removed, 
he forgot the whole affair. 
 
More generally, Kanner observed that the children seemed to actively prefer being 
alone. They rarely joined other children in play, and made little effort to seek out 
company. Additionally, though they were all able to use language, they often did so 
without any communicative intention. For instance, they might continually repeat the 
same word or phrase, even when alone. Kanner concluded that they shared a pervasive 
difficulty in establishing a connection with other people, characterising autism as a 
fundamental disturbance of “affective contact.” 
Second, alongside social difficulties, Kanner observed what he described as an 
“insistence on sameness.” Concretely, this meant that the children engaged in repetitive 
actions like rocking back and forth or spinning things around, that they reacted 
dramatically to small changes (e.g. in the layout of rooms), and that they strongly 
preferred predictable routines. Moving to a new home, one child “was acutely upset 
until the moment when... he saw the furniture set up exactly as before.” Similarly: 
 
 “the sight of a broken crossbar on a garage door on his regular daily 
tour so upset Charles that he kept talking and asking about it for weeks 
on end… another child, seeing one doll with a hat and another without a 
hat, could not be placated until the other hat was found and put on the 
doll’s head.” 
 
Overall, Kanner concluded that whenever the children experienced had experienced 
something a certain way, they needed it to be exactly the same in future. He also 
characterised this as a difficulty with making generalisations.  
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Finally, third, Kanner noted that the children used language in unusual ways, 
especially exhibiting what he described as a “tendency to be literal.” Importantly, none 
of his observations have much do with more recent suggestions that figurative 
language comprehension is impaired in autism (Happé, 1995a). Instead, what Kanner 
mainly had in mind was idiosyncratically precise word use, which he thought might be 
related to the preference for sameness elsewhere. For instance, one child refused to 
agree that pictures were “on the wall;” instead, they were “near the wall.” Another 
child’s father asked him to say “yes” if he wanted to be put up on his shoulders. For a 
long time, the child took this to be the only meaning of the word “yes”. 
Kanner also identified a number of other language differences. For example, 
several children repeated things which people said to them verbatim, either 
immediately or much later on (a tendency he dubbed “echolalia”). Often, they 
associated whole phrases or sentences with specific cues. One child said “peter-eater” 
whenever he saw a saucepan (his mother once dropped a saucepan while singing those 
words). Another common tendency was pronoun reversal: many of the children would 
not adjust pronouns appropriately when speaking, referring to themselves in second or 
third person. 
Later, these three groups of observations—social difficulties, language 
differences, and a preference for sameness and order—would become the core 
diagnostic criteria for autism. However, Kanner made a handful of further observations 
that remain relevant. In spite of their difficulties, he observed that all the children 
seemed to be highly intelligent, performing well on all the intelligence tests he was able 
to administer. In particular, they had exceptional rote memory, especially for patterns 
and details. They were capable of memorising and replicating complex arrangements 
of patterns of toy blocks, sometimes days after they were last seen. Some also 
memorised lengthy quotes, like encyclopaedia entries, and “the twenty-third psalm and 
twenty-five questions and answers of the Presbyterian Catechism”. Kanner also 
observed that they were often more sensitive to certain sensations: many were unable 
to tolerate specific foods, and they were often greatly disturbed by loud sounds and 
sudden movements (especially ones they could not control). 
In summary, Kanner’s picture of autism put a difficulty with relating to other 
people at the forefront, but encompassed other traits, including atypical language, 
stereotyped behaviours, relatively high intelligence, and high sensory sensitivity. 
Unfortunately, despite Kanner’s careful descriptions, scientific developments over the 
next couple of decades were slow. No major theories of autism were proposed during 
this time; nor did researchers make much progress in identifying possible causes. This 
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is partly just because cognitive studies of children with developmental disorders did 
not begin in earnest until the end of the 1960s (e.g. Hermelin and O’Connor, 1967, 
1970). However, there were a number of other obstacles to early autism research. 
 Above all, Kanner had done no more than describe a few children, who 
apparently had some interesting traits in common. As yet, nobody had shown that 
these formed a predictable syndrome, rather than occurring together by chance. As a 
result, there were no standardised diagnostic criteria until the release of the DSM-3 in 
1980, and these remained extremely brief until the 1987 revision. This made it hard to 
be sure if different studies of autism were actually looking at similar groups of people 
(Volkmar and Reichow, 2013). Complicating things further, autism was not yet 
distinguished from childhood schizophrenia: a condition also defined, in part, by a 
tendency to be socially withdrawn (Wing and Gould, 1979).  
Given these confounds, it is not worth reviewing developments prior to 1979 at 
much length here. Still, it may be worth noting the most significant controversy from 
this period, about etiology. This debate took place between those who viewed autism 
as innate from birth, as Kanner had originally suggested (e.g. Rimland, 1964) and those 
who saw it as a result of cold and distant parenting, a view most famously defended by 
Bettelheim (1967) and sometimes tentatively endorsed by Kanner (e.g. 1949). The 
popularity of the latter view waned slowly over the 1960s and 70s, partly as a result of 
political pressure from parents (Silverman, 2013), and eventually in response to 
evidence from early twin and family studies (e.g. Folstein and Rutter, 1977). Despite 
relatively low concordance rates compared to recent studies (in this case, 36%3), these 
findings were treated as welcome evidence that autism was likely to be innate and 
inherited (Silverman, 2013).  Since the beginning of the 1980s, this has been the 
consensus view. 
Wing and Gould’s (1979) population study was the decisive step towards a 
standardised autism diagnosis. The study assessed 914 children registered with 
psychiatric services in Camberwell for the three groups of traits described by Kanner: 
difficulties with social interaction; language differences; and a set of behaviours and 
interests characterised as restricted and repetitive. Wing and Gould’s findings 
transformed the autism literature by providing the first strong evidence for a statistical 
syndrome. Specifically, they found that all the children with social difficulties also 
                                               
3. As Silverman (2013) points out, changes in concordance rates follow changes in diagnostic 
criteria and practice. Folstein and Rutter used relatively narrow criteria, directly adapted from 
Kanner (1943). By contrast, using more inclusive criteria based on the work of Wing and Gould 
(1979), Steffenberg et. al. (1989) reported a concordance rate of 90%. 
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exhibited restricted and repetitive behaviours, and the vast majority used language in 
atypical ways. These three traits soon became known as the “triad of impairments,” 
and became standard diagnostic criteria with the DSM-III-R (1987). Broadly speaking, 
this framework has been in place ever since, though the DSM-V (2013) now groups 
social difficulties and language differences under a single heading.  
Of course, an adequate account of autism will not predict these traits in just any 
form. It must predict (e.g.) language difficulties of the sort which actually occur. It is 
therefore important to say something about how Wing and Gould defined these. Most 
notably, they construed social difficulties in a much broader way than Kanner.4 As I 
noted, Kanner described autistic children as “aloof”, largely unresponsive to social 
advances. Wing and Gould identified two other distinct subgroups. The second group, 
who they described as “passive,” made no effort to seek out social contact, and 
generally seemed to regard others with indifference, but they would interact if others 
initiated. Meanwhile, the third group, who they characterised as “odd,” were actively 
interested in pursuing social interaction. However, they had little understanding of 
appropriate behaviour, and they would often violate social norms.5  
Concerning language differences and repetitive behaviour, Wing and Gould did 
not update Kanner’s account much, but they grouped traits into organised 
subcategories for the purposes of assessment. They assessed four kinds of language 
differences: lack of speech; echolalia; pronoun reversal; and idiosyncratic word use. 
Meanwhile, they grouped repetitive behaviours and interests into two categories: 
repetitive motions like rocking, hand-flapping, and so on; and partially constructive 
repetitive behaviours like clearing the table and washing the dishes, but always 
predictably followed by a return to some repetitive behaviour. Overall, it can be said 
that Wing and Gould’s picture of autism is quite descriptively thin. The triad 
framework therefore only places weak constraints on theorising. Ideally, a satisfying 
theory of autism should be answerable to a much more detailed qualitative 
characterisation of the condition. 
Wing and Gould’s framework also omits some important recent developments. 
I will briefly note six of these. First of all, since the end of the 1990s (e.g. Ermer and 
Dunn, 1998) evidence has accumulated to support Kanner’s original claim that sensory 
differences are common in autism. Indeed, these are now reported in as many as 95% 
                                               
4. One important indirect consequence of the study was, therefore, a broadening of diagnostic 
criteria, probably contributing to autism’s increasing prevalence over time (Mundy, 2016, p.6). 
5. The subgroups were not stable over time; many children moved from one to another at 
follow-up. However, the vast majority continued to experience social difficulties (Shah, 1986). 
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of autistic individuals (Ben-Sasson et. al., 2009). This prominently includes heightened 
sensory sensitivity, sometimes experienced as painful, but sometimes as entrancing or 
engrossing. Many studies also report diminished sensory sensitivity, often in the same 
individuals (but see chapter 4 for some reasons to be sceptical about this finding). 
Second, Wing and Gould’s account omits some cognitive advantages often 
associated with autism. Most of these are related to perceptual differences: they mainly 
appear in tasks like visual search and block design (Kaldy et. al., 2016). However, 
advantages are also reported on measures of rule-based or systematic reasoning, like 
folk physics tests (Baron-Cohen, 1997b). 
Third, restricted and repetitive interests and behaviours are now often 
understood more broadly. For instance, in a recent study by Spiker et. al. (2012), 
restricted interests are taken to include: unusually intense interests in learning about 
particular topics, like comic books or the inner workings of washing machines; the 
development of imaginary worlds; and devoted attachment to particular favourite 
objects. Significant evidence now suggests autistic people tend to have intensely 
focused interests in this broader sense, with interests especially likely to concern rule-
governed domains (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 1999). 
Fourth, more recent research highlights a wider range of language differences. 
In particular, researchers emphasise many difficulties with pragmatics, such as 
deriving word meaning from context, and interpreting extralinguistic cues like facial 
expressions and body language (Parsons et. al. 2017). Difficulties with conversational 
discourse, like turn-taking are also commonly reported (e.g. Capps et. al. 1998), as are 
difficulties with figurative language comprehension (Happe, 1995a). (Again, see 
chapter 4 for a critical evaluation of some of these results.) 
 Fifth, in the past few years, an important conceptual shift has begun to occur 
with intersubjective accounts of social difficulties (e.g. de Jaegher 2013; Bolis. et. al. 
2017). On these accounts, the only adequate way to understand social difficulties in 
autism may be to go beyond the individual level, and treat them as a coordination 
problem between individuals. For instance, an autistic person and a non-autistic 
person may struggle to understand each other if they do not share the same 
understanding of social conventions. By contrast, the traditional framework 
emphasizes difficulties experienced by autistic people in interpreting the behaviour of 
others.  
Finally, sixth, it has become increasingly clear that autism is heterogeneous in 
multiple domains, with language comprehension (Kjelgaard and Tager-Flusberg, 2001) 
and category learning (Mercado et. al., 2015) to name just a couple. It is also 
22 
 
heterogeneous across multiple levels of description, with significant genetic, cognitive 
and behavioural variation (Masi et. al., 2017). In this context, some researchers have 
concluded that no universal explanation of autism may exist (e.g. Happe, Ronald and 
Plomin, 2006). Instead, it is sometimes argued, a pluralistic strategy is more 
appropriate: researchers should fractionate autism, seeking distinct explanations for 
different subgroups.  
Overall, the three broad groups of traits first observed by Kanner and 
confirmed by Wing and Gould still form the core of our best current picture of autism. 
These are: social difficulties, language differences, and various behaviours which can 
be characterised as repetitive or as highly structured. Alongside this, we now know 
that autism often involves sensory differences, and a number of cognitive advantages. 
Emphasis is also increasingly being placed on pluralistic and intersubjective accounts 
of autism. Against this background, I turn to some of the most influential theories of 
autism developed so far. 
  
1.2 Social-First Theories 
 
1.2.1 Background and Theory of Mind Deficits 
 
In the 1970s, Premack and Woodruff (1978; Premack, 1976) introduced the notion of 
Theory of Mind (ToM): an ability to infer the mental states of other organisms. They 
characterised this as a “theory” for two reasons. First, they argued, mental states are 
not directly observable. Instead, they must be inferred indirectly, much like some 
objects posited by scientists (e.g. electrons). Second, like scientific theories, ToM allows 
us to make useful predictions: namely, about how other organisms are likely to act. 
Importantly, however, unlike scientific theories, few researchers think ToM is 
deliberately constructed, or consciously deployed. Instead, inferences about mental 
states are taken to be implicit and automatic (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1997a). Premack and 
Woodruff argued that our ability to recognise specific categories of mental states 
(beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) underwrote many everyday social abilities. For 
example, in order to lie, and to recognise deception, I need to recognise the beliefs of 
another person. Reflecting these assumptions, ToM researchers in the 1980s focused 
on identifying when these capabilities first emerge in children (e.g. Wimmer and 
Perner, 1983).   
Over time, the notion of ToM has been developed and interpreted in a number 
of ways. Most pertinent to autism research, one variant combines it with a (somewhat 
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loose)6 version of the modularity of mind proposal advocated by Fodor (1976, 1983). 
On this view, the mind contains several specialised modules, evolved for distinct 
purposes.  In this context, it is often argued that there is a distinct ToM Module (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen 1997a; Scholl and Leslie, 1999), exclusively dedicated to representing 
mental states. Another related development has been Simulation Theory (e.g. Gordon, 
1986; Heal, 1986). This approach denies that we employ anything structurally similar 
to a theoretical framework. Instead, we understand others by running a simulation to 
predict their behaviour, making “offline” use of the same mechanisms that determine 
our own emotions. Simulation theory positions itself as a competitor to Premack and 
Woodruff’s original “theory-theory” of mind, but shares the assumption that an ability 
to represent mental states plays a central role in our ability to understand others. It 
also assumes that this involves a specialised mechanism, going beyond general 
intelligence and world knowledge. 
Against this theoretical background, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-
Cohen et. al. 1985; Baron-Cohen 1997, 2009) have developed what is probably the 
most well-known family of autism theories: social-first theories. On their view, autism 
involves a Theory of Mind deficit (ToMD) or “empathy” deficit: autistic people cannot 
represent the mental states of others, or are less able to do so. In light of Premack and 
Woodruff’s claims, such a deficit would arguably make it impossible to recognise 
deception, to understand how people around you are feeling, and to make useful 
predictions about how people are likely to act. This could plausibly explain both the 
social difficulties and the difficulties with understanding language in autism. 
Empirically, ToMD theory is motivated largely by evidence from false-belief 
tasks, which ostensibly test the ability to infer mental states. The best-known task, and 
the first set for autistic children, is the Sally-Anne task, adapted by Baron-Cohen et. al. 
(1985) from Wimmer and Perner (1983). In the classic version, each child is 
introduced to two dolls, Sally and Anne. Sally is shown hiding a marble in a basket 
before leaving the room. Anne then moves the marble to a different basket. When Sally 
comes back, the child is asked where Sally will look for the marble. If the child says 
Sally will look in the basket where the marble originally was, this is taken as evidence 
that the child can correctly represent a false belief. Wimmer and Perner found that 
typically developing children begin to pass this test between the ages of 4 and 6. In 
Baron-Cohen et. al.’s 1985 study, 85% of typically developing children (mean age 5) 
                                               
6. Fodor’s version involves further claims about the nature of mental modules: especially, that 
they are informationally encapsulated structures with a narrow, predetermined set of inputs. 
However, these commitments are not usually emphasised in the modular account of ToM. 
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passed. However, only 20% of children with autism (mean age 11) passed. This, they 
argued, couldn’t reflect general intellectual impairment, since 86% of children with 
Down’s syndrome (mean age 11) also passed. 
The finding that autistic children have difficulty with this task has now been 
replicated several times (e.g. Leslie and Frith, 1988), and other similar findings have 
since been reported. For instance, in the Smarties Box experiment (Perner et. al., 1989), 
children are shown that a smarties tube actually contains a pencil. When asked, autistic 
children incorrectly guess that other children who have not seen it will know it is there. 
Another paradigm (e.g. Sodian, 1991, Sodian and Frith, 1992) shows that autistic 
children can usually lock a box in order to prevent a villainous puppet from stealing 
their sweets, but are less likely to lie in order to do so. (Unlike locking a box, lying is 
assumed to involve attending to another person’s beliefs.) 
 
1.2.2 Difficulties for Social-First Theories 
 
Over time, social-first theories have come in for some heavy criticism. Here I will begin 
by considering criticisms of the ToM framework itself. Significantly, a core assumption 
of the framework is that mental states are distinctively unobservable, in a way other 
things are not: this is why a special mechanism is thought to be needed. Leudar and 
Costall (2009) argue we should be sceptical of this assumption. For one thing, as they 
note, it cannot be an empirical claim. How could the claim that mental states are not 
observable ever be tested? Second, arguably, it would actually contradict the ToM 
account, because it would imply nobody can know anything at all about mental states. 
Either there is some observable cue (or cues) which I can directly see or hear—in 
which case the situation seems no different to one where I hear the roar of an engine, 
and infer that there is a car outside—or there is not. If not, then unless I am a mind 
reader in the supernatural sense, I am out of luck.7 
Defenders of the ToM framework have generally not responded to such 
criticisms. However, one way they might do so would be to point again at the empirical 
picture. As they might argue, studies of ToM reveal a distinctive set of correlated 
                                               
7. More generally, going back to Helmholtz (1867), and arguably to Kant (1781), it is widely 
argued that there can be no perception without inference. On such views, whenever I recognise 
an object as a dog, or a lamp, I draw on prior knowledge to interpret what I see. Like the social 
inferences posited in ToM, psychologists generally take perceptual inferences to be rapid, 
automatic, implicit, and routine. If this long-standing approach to perception—which I develop 
at more length later and in chapter 2—is correct, more will need to be said about why exactly 
social inferences are supposed to be unique. 
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abilities. Moreover, they seem to appear at a particular stage of development, and are 
specifically impaired in certain populations (like autism). Don’t these findings reveal 
the existence of a specialised mechanism for recognising mental states, observable or 
otherwise? Sharrock and Coulter (2009) argue otherwise, critiquing a variant of the 
false-belief test employed by Astington (1996). In this test, 3-year old children are 
shown the contents of two boxes. One box is labelled as if it contains plasters, but it is 
empty. The other is an unlabelled box, which actually contains plasters. When asked 
where a puppet with a cut on his hand will look for the plasters, the children tend to 
predict he will look in the unlabelled box. According to Astington, this shows they 
cannot attribute a false belief to the puppet, indicating that they have not developed a 
theory of mind.  
 As Sharrock and Coulter argue, however, this study presupposes the very 
abilities which it purports to measure. If these children did not have a highly developed 
ability to understand others, they would not be able to participate in the study at all, 
not even in order to fail. Among other things, they are expected to understand that the 
puppet wants a band aid in order to cover the cut.  They are also expected to assume 
other people will interpret the markings on the box in a certain way. Furthermore, they 
are meant to understand that the puppet represents an agent, and that the researchers 
expect them to engage in that pretence. Finally, they must understand that the 
researcher wants a response to their queries and instructions. If they weren’t already 
able to do all this, the entire situation would be basically incomprehensible. 
Importantly, none of this implies the children already have a specialised ToM 
mechanism, independent of other abilities. Instead, as Sharrock and Coulter point out, 
understanding a situation like this involves drawing on wide-ranging general world 
knowledge, including about typical uses of plasters, the functions of box labels, typical 
reactions to injuries, and so on. A priori, there is no reason to treat this as different 
from knowledge about other regularities. Plausibly, when children fail this test, it is 
because they have only acquired some of this knowledge. For instance, perhaps they 
have learned that people typically look for things where they actually are, but not that 
they look for things where they last saw them. (I return at length to the link between 
social competence and world knowledge in chapter 3). 
Another attempt to defend the ToM framework might be as follows. I can easily 
learn that the roar of an engine is associated with a car. I often hear this sound when I 
see a car, and never otherwise. By contrast, when I see another person flinch, I do not 
experience pain, except by chance. Therefore, I can never learn that a flinch is 
associated with pain, unless I have some special innate knowledge. This argument has 
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been well addressed by, among others, phenomenological critics of ToM (Gallagher, 
2004; Zahavi, 2004; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2013, 191-208). On their view, we learn to 
understand other people through a dual experience of our own embodiment. To 
paraphrase in psychological terms, we experience ourselves interoceptively, 
introspectively, and proprioceptively, and simultaneously using the external senses 
(see Husserl, 1973, p.57). This duality allows us to learn the correlation between pain 
and flinching. 
On this account, I might learn about mental states just as I learn about other 
things that tend to co-occur, without any special mechanism. When I feel pain and 
witness myself flinch, it is as if I simultaneously see a car and hear the engine, and learn 
that the two are associated. Later, when I see someone else flinch and infer they are in 
pain, it is as if I hear the engine, and infer that a car is nearby. It would be a distraction 
to pursue this in any detail here, but one point bears emphasis. As Zahavi points out, 
there is significant evidence young children can respond rapidly and selectively to 
emotions and body language in others (e.g. Rochat 2001; Stern 1985). Inconsistent 
with core claims of the ToM framework, this happens well before the age of 3. 
 One final line of defence for (parts of) the ToM framework might be the 
following. Perhaps, not all aspects of my social competence rely on a ToM. 
Nevertheless, people often talk about “beliefs” and “desires”. This talk is not nonsense, 
so these terms must refer to something. Doesn’t this suggest I still have something like 
a ToM, which I use to understand other people at least some of the time? Against this 
sort of argument, Hutto (e.g. 2007; Gallagher and Hutto 2012) advances the Narrative 
Practice Hypothesis. As Hutto argues, routine social interactions are governed by 
implicit conventions and habits. To this extent, I can readily understand people without 
recourse to mental states. If I am at a party and my friend leaves at the same time as 
everyone else, it probably doesn’t occur to me that there is anything to explain. 
According to Hutto, mental state language only kicks in when this implicit 
understanding fails. If my friend leaves the party ten minutes after she arrives, I may 
want an explanation.  
Even now, however, just being able to attribute a belief doesn’t furnish me with 
much understanding. For example, perhaps I learn my friend thinks the host has 
insulted her.  To understand this properly, I need to draw on a broad background of 
world knowledge: about how people typically react when they have been insulted, 
about the role of the host at parties, and so on. On this basis, Hutto (2007) argues the 
primary role of mental state terms is to contextualise people’s actions into narratives, 
situating them against a background of general knowledge about social situations and 
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norms. I do not need to defend this account at much length here8, since it only needs to 
be minimally plausible to undercut the argument for ToM. If there is any account of 
how we use terms like “belief” and “desire” other than a theoretical one, the use of 
these terms is not, itself, evidence for a ToM. 
To conclude, what do these criticisms of the ToM framework mean for the 
ToMD account? Firstly and most obviously, if there is no good evidence that our ability 
to understand others requires a specialised social mechanism, then the social 
difficulties that occur in autism cannot be caused by a malfunction of this mechanism. 
Instead, it may be more appropriate to look for changes in the structure of general 
world knowledge. Secondly, Sharrock and Coulter’s (2009) criticism of false-belief tests 
would naturally extend to those tests as applied to autistic children. For instance, to 
participate in the Sally-Anne test, one must understand the experimenter’s 
instructions, etc. If autistic children can do this, it would speak to the presence, rather 
than the absence, of an ability to understand others (at least to some degree). 
This line of argument leads to a natural question about false-belief tests in 
autism. If these are not measuring the ability to make mental state inferences, what are 
they measuring? One possible answer has been suggested by Gernsbacher and 
colleagues (e.g. Gernsbacher and Frymiare, 2005, Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit, 2012). 
As they point out, even in the most rigorously difficult versions of the test, some 
autistic participants pass (e.g. Happé, 1995b; Ozonoff et. al., 1991a). In Baron-Cohen’s 
original 1985 study, the pass rate was about 20%. Indeed, in some studies, the rate is 
as high as 50% (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 1994). Meanwhile, some groups of 
children without autism, and who are not usually assumed to have ToM deficits, also 
fail false-belief tests. These include deaf children (Peterson and Siegal, 1995), blind 
children (Peterson et. al., 2000), and (notably) children with specific language 
impairment (Miller, 2001), who by definition have no impairments in any other areas. 
Bracketing the theoretical concerns for a moment, arguably these findings are 
not outright inconsistent with ToMD. Perhaps, ToM deficits hinder false belief 
detection in autistic individuals, but other factors come into play in other populations. 
Meanwhile, as Frith (e.g. 2004) has suggested, it could be that some autistic study 
participants use explicit inference processes to pass false-belief tasks, despite lacking a 
mechanism that would allow them to infer mental states automatically and rapidly. 
This is consistent with the social difficulties autistic participants display outside the 
                                               
8. Having said that, in chapter 3 I argue that most of the social difficulties experienced by 
autistic people can be understood in terms of changes in the structure of general world 
knowledge. This is very consistent with Hutto’s hypothesis. 
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lab, though it is arguably slightly ad hoc. (It also implies that false-belief studies cannot 
be evidence for theory of mind deficits.) 
However, Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit (2012) take their criticisms further. 
Typically, in false belief tests, participants are matched for language ability using 
vocabulary tests or verbal IQ9. Autistic children who are typical on these measures can 
have serious impairments on other language measures. In particular, autistic subjects 
with normal VIQ can perform very poorly on measures of structural language 
comprehension (i.e., they struggle to understand sentences with complicated 
grammar) (Landa and Goldberg, 2005; Kjelgaard and Tager-Flusberg, 2001). 
Controlling using measures of structural language, like subtests of the Clinical 
Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (Semel et. al.; 1995), autistic children commonly 
do no worse on false belief tests (Capps et. al., 1998; Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 
1994; Norbury, 2005a). Hence, as Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit argue, false-belief 
studies may actually be revealing difficulties with the instructions and the test 
questions, not with other minds. This suggestion is especially plausible given the 
grammatical complexity of the questions used in these studies. For example, in the 
classic Sally-Anne task, children are asked “What do you think that Sally will think is 
inside the box before I open it?”10 
Finally, in addition to the theoretical and methodological concerns, the ToMD 
proposal also faces two problems of explanatory scope. Firstly, as I’ve noted, a 
satisfying theory of autism should explain why autism traits tend to occur together. 
Meanwhile, ToMD is mainly meant to explain social difficulties, and some difficulties 
with understanding language. It can’t naturally explain the sensory differences, the 
interest in “sameness”, the narrowly focused interests, or the repetitive behaviours. 
Second, it does not predict the differences very precisely. For instance, language 
differences in autism include pronoun reversal, difficulties with pragmatics, echolalia, 
and idiosyncratic word use. The unanswered question is: why these specific difficulties, 
as a result of difficulties with mental states? Likewise, little is said about exactly what 
kinds of social difficulties would be caused by ToM deficits, and no attempt is made to 
show that these are actually the difficulties which occur.  
                                               
9. VIQ test batteries typically assess vocabulary, basic general knowledge, working memory, and 
the ability to judge similarity between word pairs. None of the measures directly assess 
structural language. 
10. Admittedly, this debunking explanation may not be completely successful. Some ToM studies 
use simpler test questions, there are nonverbal measures of ToM, and so on. Nevertheless, it 
convincingly undermines a lot of the data, including many studies that continue to be cited 
regularly as evidence for ToMD. 
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1.2.3 Later Social-First Theories 
 
Over time, many variants on the original ToMD idea have been developed, mostly also 
by Baron-Cohen and colleagues. Among these, the most influential are the 
Empathising—Systemising theory (E—S) (Baron-Cohen 2009), and the closely related 
Extreme Male Brain theory (EMB) (Baron-Cohen, 2002). The first of these, E—S, adds 
an additional dimension to ToMD. Alongside difficulties with attributing mental states 
(re-framed here as an “empathising” deficit), ToMD posits that autism involves a 
preserved or superior capacity for “systemising:” for making sense of highly 
predictable, rule-governed domains. This addition helps explain some of the non-social 
characteristics of autism: the preference for repetitive (construed as systematic) forms 
of play, the preference for predictability and sameness, and enhanced performance on 
some experimental tasks. These include physics tests (e.g. Baron-Cohen et. al., 2001), 
and rule-based problem-solving tasks like block design (e.g. Shah and Frith, 1993).  
By itself, E—S makes no claim about why these two tendencies might occur 
together. The Extreme Male Brain theory of autism (EMB) (Baron-Cohen, 2002) 
attempts to address this question, suggesting that the pattern may reflect a typically 
male processing style. Baron-Cohen (2002) defends this claim with some brief 
demographic evidence. For instance, there tend to be more men in professions dealing 
with systems, and men are also more likely to commit murders (suggesting a lack of 
empathy). Autism is also diagnosed in men more commonly than in women. 
Additionally, EMB introduces a speculative explanation of why these two tendencies 
might occur together: elevated fetal testosterone. However, despite some promising 
early findings (e.g. Chapman, 2006), later studies have not borne this out (Kung et. al., 
2016a, 2016b).  
 Ultimately, these later developments of ToMD do little to address the basic 
problems with its underlying framework. In particular, they do nothing to help show 
that a specifically social mechanism is implicated in autism. Arguably, they also 
introduce some additional difficulties and ambiguities. For instance, from a processing 
perspective, the nature of “systemising” is left obscure. A more satisfying account 
would situate empathising and systemising within a more general account of cognition. 
It is also hard to see how one could prove that traits like “empathising” and 
“systemising” are innately gendered, since the entire surrounding culture will be a 
confounding factor. Presumably, nobody has ever completed a block design test or a 
physics test without being exposed to the gender norms of a culture first.  
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1.2.4 Social-First Theories: Conclusions 
 
Overall, ToMD and its variants face extensive and fundamental problems. There is no 
evidence that there is anything mechanistically unique about the inferences human 
beings make in understanding each other, nor that autism involves the impairment of a 
specifically social mechanism. Instead, key studies presuppose the abilities which they 
are allegedly testing, and they only reveal deficits in autism with inappropriate 
language controls. The ToMD proposal also lacks sufficient scope: it does not account 
for key features of the autism syndrome, like sensory differences and a preference for 
order, and it is unclear that it predicts social and language difficulties in the right form. 
Finally, although later developments expand the ToMD proposal in interesting ways, 
they do so without addressing most of these concerns, and introduce additional 
complications. 
 
1.3 Perception-First Theories 
 
 1.3.1 Theoretical Background and Weak Central Coherence 
 
The hallmark of perception-first theories of autism is a distinction between “local” and 
“global” processing.11 This distinction originates in Gestalt psychology, especially in 
research on visual perception (e.g. Navon, 1977). On this framework, “global” 
processing concerns large-scale features: gross structures like walls and trees, and 
whole images. Meanwhile, “local” processing concerns component details like leaves 
and bricks, or colours and edges. Gestalt psychologists like Navon held that global 
information is processed first, drawing mainly on relatively low-resolution retinal 
input, alongside input from other modalities. Details are processed later, and 
frequently not at all, unless they are key to identifying larger objects or they become 
the target of selective attention. Part of the theoretical motivation for this claim was 
the insight that accurate local processing may depend on global knowledge. For 
instance, I might not be able to figure out whether an edge is concave or convex unless 
I already know the location and orientation of the object it belongs to. Navon (1977) 
also famously provided some early empirical evidence for the claim: test subjects 
shown a larger letter composed of smaller letters are usually able to name the larger 
                                               
11. Arguably, Bayesian theories could also be characterised as “perception-first,” and do not 
employ this distinction. But they are quite different in character and it will be more useful to 
consider them separately. 
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letter more quickly. 
In this context, it is often argued that the relationship between local and global 
processing is different in autism. The first proposal along these lines was Weak Central 
Coherence (WCC) theory (Frith, 1989, 2003). According to this theory, global 
processing is impaired.12 Frith’s specific version of global processing, central 
coherence, generalises the visual gestalt account to other domains. In addition to 
playing a key role in perception, central coherence is also meant to support abilities 
like processing language in context, generalising, producing broad conceptual 
frameworks for understanding the world, and abstracting the gist from details.  
Empirically, WCC is motivated by a number of intriguing experimental findings 
which had emerged by the end of the 1980s, especially on perception and language in 
autism. For instance, Shah and Frith (1983) found autistic children were better at 
picking out details from a distracting background, suggesting less global interference. 
Similarly, Langdell (1978) found they had less relative difficulty with recognising 
upside-down faces, indicating less attention to the overall configuration. Meanwhile, 
language studies found they were less likely to use meaning to remember sequences of 
words (Hermelin and O’Connor, 1967), and to disambiguate homographs in context 
(Frith and Snowling, 1983). Frith argued these findings revealed a tendency to process 
specific words and concrete visual details, at the expense of the overall meaning. 
Alongside accounting for experimental findings, WCC was also designed to 
explain many common autism traits. This included the triad traits, as well as some 
perceptual differences, and the unique skills of autistic savants. One important strength 
of the WCC proposal here, especially relative to ToMD, is a fairly tight link with proper 
descriptions of the phenomena. First of all, in language, a tendency to focus on the 
meanings of specific words rather than on context would clearly predict the “tendency 
to be literal” described by Kanner: a tendency to associate specific words and phrases 
with concrete details, rather than with their intended meaning. Meanwhile, pronoun 
reversal could be understood as a difficulty with noticing the context in which personal 
pronouns vary (i.e., the identity of the speaker).  
Second, WCC would explain inflexible or repetitive behaviours. For instance, 
Wing and Gould (1979) described a tendency to engage in repetitive forms of play, like 
organising and categorising groups of toys. Meanwhile, WCC would imply a focus on 
                                               
12.  Strictly speaking, this is not originally Frith’s idea. Similar suggestions go at least as far back 
as Polan and Spencer (1959), and even Kanner (1943) mentions an “inability to pay attention to 
wholes without full attention to the constituent parts.” Arguably, Frith’s main contribution was 
to develop an old idea in more detail, linking it with contemporary experimental findings and 
giving it a name. 
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concrete physical properties of toys, rather than the characters or objects they are 
meant to represent. Along slightly different lines, it would also account for a preference 
for sameness and routine. If smaller actions are conceptualised as “details” or “parts” 
that go to make up larger ones, a tendency to focus on these parts and not organise 
them into sequences could easily appear repetitive (Frith, 2003, pp.176-177). 
Third, arguably, WCC could account for social difficulties. Frith (1989, p.174) 
originally suggested that it did, although she retracted the claim later (2003, pp.166-
167). As she initially argued, social cognition involves integrating large quantities of 
information from different sources (e.g. gesture, body language, context) in order to 
determine the overall meaning. WCC would make this particularly difficult. 
Importantly, Frith did not frame WCC as a direct alternative to ToMD (which she also 
helped to develop). Instead, she argued, WCC might inhibit the development of ToM, 
which might characteristically involve lots of global integration. 
Fourth, WCC would account for some perceptual differences in autism. 
Consistent with later findings, Frith presented anecdotal evidence that many autistic 
individuals experience the sensory world as intense and unpredictable. As she argued, 
a direct consequence of WCC would be a need to interpret sense input piece by piece, 
and fit it into a unified whole (Frith, 1989 p.176-181). This could make sensory 
processing overwhelming, especially in busy environments. 
 Fifth, and finally, WCC is meant to account for “islets of ability” in autism: skills 
which appear preserved or even enhanced, despite other difficulties. At the extreme, 
these include the notorious savant skills of a small minority of autistic people 
(Hermelin, 2001). However, there are many reports of autistic people with isolated 
strengths in specific areas, like maths, music and art, despite serious difficulties in 
everyday life. As researchers like Baron-Cohen (2009) have noted, these skills 
commonly tend to be in rule-governed domains. Frith (2003, pp.146-153) speculated 
this might reflect a focus on details rather than gist: an analytical or deconstructive 
tendency might facilitate the development of complex, systematic knowledge, with 
particular attention to how the different elements fit together. 
 
1.3.2 Difficulties for WCC and Later Developments 
 
Despite its promisingly broad scope, WCC is no longer widely seen as a plausible 
general explanation of autism. This is mainly because standard measures assumed to 
assess WCC, like the homographs task and the embedded figures task, do not correlate 
well with standard measures of ToM, like false-belief tests (e.g. Happé, 1997; Jolliffe 
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and Baron-Cohen, 1999). Meanwhile, ToM deficits are now widely believed to explain 
the social difficulties. On this basis, many researchers, including Frith, have concluded 
that WCC cannot explain social difficulties (e.g. Happé and Frith, 2006). This objection 
is clearly unwarranted if, as I argued earlier, false belief tests are not testing what they 
purport to. Nevertheless, the upshot is that WCC is now mostly seen as an exclusive 
account of autistic perception. This also goes for later perception-first theories, which 
often adduce similar data. 
  Even so, there are other reasons to wonder about the scope of WCC. In 
particular, the notion of “central coherence” is asked to play an extremely broad 
explanatory role, accommodating diverse data from perception and language studies, 
alongside wide-ranging clinical findings. It is not obvious a priori that there should be 
one mechanism for processing gist and context, operating across all of these domains. 
The explanation would be much more compelling if it were anchored in a more fully 
developed account of human cognition, with clear implications in all of these areas.  
The other main challenge to WCC has been the rise of alternative 
interpretations of the perceptual data. Here, the leading competitor has been the 
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) account (Mottron and Burack 2001; Mottron 
et. al. 2006). This proposal is at odds with WCC in a number of ways, two of which are 
especially important. First, EPF posits that superior performance on local-processing 
tasks like embedded figures and visual search is not the result of global impairments. 
Instead, it reflects a primary local advantage, specifically in discriminating between 
similar percepts. Second, perhaps as a consequence, autism involves a bias towards 
local processing over global processing. 
Mottron and colleagues point to a number of findings to support this account. 
For instance, Mottron et. al. (2000) found autistic study participants had no difficulty 
distinguishing between melodies which differed in global structure (e.g. a key change), 
but were better than controls at identifying local changes (e.g. in the pitch of individual 
notes). Furthermore, when they are explicitly told to pay attention to the ambiguity, 
autistic participants can use context to disambiguate homographs (e.g. Snowling and 
Frith, 1986). Mottron et. al. (2006) therefore argue that global processing in autism 
may be optional, but not impaired. EPF also introduces, in tentative outline, a possible 
neuroscientific explanation. On this view, local processing is assumed to occur in 
posterior areas of the brain. Based on a short review of brain imaging data, Mottron et. 
al. (2006) argue that autistic subjects activate posterior areas more during various 
perceptual tasks, and that there may be more connectivity and complexity in these 
areas, accounting for the local advantage. 
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1.3.3 General Difficulties for Perception-First Theories 
 
Unfortunately, the debate between WCC’s “weak global” explanation and EPF’s 
“enhanced local” explanation has proven difficult to resolve. This reflects a number of 
general obstacles for perception-first theories. One of these obstacles is simply 
evidence quality. As Simmons and Todorova (2018) note, research on autistic 
perception has produced a lot of highly contradictory evidence, with many failures to 
replicate. This, they suggest, is partly due to methodological mistakes: small and 
unrepresentative samples, inappropriate controls, and miscalibrated equipment. As 
they also note, a recent meta-analysis indicates that research in this domain may have 
been seriously affected by publication bias (van der Hallen, 2015).  
A second obstacle is the ambiguity of the terms “local” and “global.” As 
Stevenson et. al. (2017) note, these are rarely defined explicitly in the autism literature. 
Consequently, there is little detail about exactly how they figure in the experimental 
tasks used to assess them. This means key findings can often be interpreted in multiple 
ways. For instance, EPF can explain enhanced visual search in terms of an enhanced 
ability to distinguish the target from the background. Meanwhile, WCC can explain it in 
terms of a tendency to disregard distracting context. Without a more precise account of 
local and global contributions to visual search, it will be difficult to tease these 
interpretations apart. Complicating things further, as Simmons and Todorova (2018) 
note, the two kinds of processing are not always defined consistently. Often local 
processing is taken to mean processing of small-scale visual or auditory details. 
However, some researchers characterise it in terms of a local area of sensory cortex, 
and the relationship between the two definitions often goes unexamined. 
A third issue is that researchers may be employing the distinction between 
local and global processing in a way that makes poor theoretical sense. As I noted 
earlier, the distinction originates in Gestalt psychology. According to Gestaltists, local 
and global processing are meant to be reciprocally interrelated, with processing at 
each level informed by the other (Navon, 1977). Indeed, optimal local processing is 
supposed to require global processing. From this starting point, one might guess that 1) 
a global impairment would cause a local impairment, and that 2) a local bias would 
preclude a local advantage. Neither of these predictions is consistent with local-global 
theories of autism. Again, a more precise characterisation of the underlying 
mechanisms is needed.  
Finally, fourth, a binary division into global and local processing is simplistic in 
light of up-to-date research on perception. Basically all viable cognitive and 
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neuroscientific accounts of perception now posit a representational hierarchy, with 
many more than two levels (e.g. Serre, 2014). Progressively more specific (or local) 
information is represented at the bottom, and progressively more general (or global) 
information is represented at the top. Any satisfying account of perception in autism 
therefore ought to consider this graded local-global continuum, perhaps with specific 
attention to the interactions between different levels. (As we will see later, this is what 
some Bayesian accounts of autism set out to do.) 
 
1.3.4 Perception-First Theories: Conclusions 
 
To sum up, perception-first theories have a number of important strengths. WCC, in 
particular, has broad explanatory power: difficulties with processing gist and context 
would account for autism traits across multiple domains. It is also consistent with a 
relatively precise characterisation of those traits. Additionally, the main objection to 
WCC as a general account of autism is that it is that does not correlate with measures of 
ToM; if these measures are not actually tapping social ability, this objection fails. To 
this extent, WCC is more satisfying that EPF, which focuses more narrowly on 
perception.  
 Ultimately, however, all perception-first theories are unsatisfactory in the 
details, mainly because they rest on a questionable distinction between local and global 
processing. These terms are rarely defined in the autism literature, and are not always 
used consistently. In any case, the theoretical framework originates in Gestalt 
psychology, and core claims in Gestalt psychology seem to contradict core claims in 
perception-first theories. Finally, the local/global distinction is also too simplistic, since 
current accounts of perception assume a graded hierarchy with many more levels. 
Overall, a better theory might seek to preserve some of the explanatory power of WCC, 
but would flesh out the underlying details in a different way. 
 
1.4 Executive Dysfunction Theories 
 
1.4.1 Theoretical Background and Core Claims 
 
“Executive functioning” (EF) is an umbrella term. It encompasses a set of related 
abilities, broadly associated with attention, self-control and planning, and closely 
linked to the frontal lobe of the brain (Fuster, 2015, p.178). EF is generally broken up 
into a range of subcomponents, including working memory, planning, inhibition, and 
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mental flexibility, which are usually understood as interdependent. While there are a 
rather large number of different models of the executive system (Goldstein et. al. 
2014), most encompass these core abilities.  
The idea that autism might involve executive impairments was developed from 
the early 1990s onward (e.g. Ozonoff et. al., 1991b). Initially, some researchers (esp. 
Russell, 1997) argued executive impairments might be the primary cause of the autism 
syndrome. However, this view is no longer popular, for two reasons (Pellicano, 2012).  
First, EF impairments are not reliably found in all autistic individuals (e.g. Liss et. al., 
2001; Pellicano 2010), and, second, impairments are often not autism-specific (Yerys 
et. al., 2007).  Instead, it is more common to consider EF deficits as one possible 
contributor to the heterogeneity of autism traits (e.g. Pellicano, 2012), or perhaps as 
indirect consequences of a primary mechanism (e.g. van de Cruys, 2014). 
 Importantly, nobody argues that all aspects of EF are evenly impaired in 
autism. Instead, researchers typically posit (or try to identify) a characteristic EF 
profile, with impairments on specific EF components contributing to specific autism 
traits (e.g. Ozonoff and Jensen, 1999; Geurts et. al., 2004; Craig et. al., 2016). This 
strategy is usually meant to distinguish autism from other conditions which involve 
executive impairments, especially ADHD. Two specific EF components probably 
receive most emphasis in the autism literature: cognitive flexibility and planning, 
perhaps because they seem best placed to account for real autism traits (e.g. 
Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996; Hill, 2004). However, EF deficits are often found in 
other areas too. Here, it will be most helpful to consider the different components 
separately. 
 
1.4.2 Four EF Components in Autism 
 
Cognitive flexibility can be defined, roughly, as the ability to switch easily from one task 
to another. Normally, when someone is engaged in a task, their sensory and motor 
systems selectively anticipate task-related stimuli and commands, so they can respond 
more quickly and accurately (Fuster, 2015, p.180). They are said to have more 
cognitive flexibility if they can re-prepare more rapidly for a new kind of input. Outside 
the lab, flexibility impairments seem well placed to account for some common autism 
traits (Geurts et. al., 2009). They imply difficulties with stopping one kind of action in 
order to initiate another, which might explain repetitive behaviours. Arguably, they 
would also account for social difficulties: they might make it harder to adjust social 
strategies and goals in response to new information. 
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The most common measure of cognitive flexibility is the Wisconsin Card Sort 
Test (WCST). In this test, four cards are placed on a table. Each displays a number of 
coloured shapes. Subjects are then handed cards one by one, and must match each new 
card to one of the four (by colour, number, or shape). They are not explicitly told the 
sorting rule—only whether their responses are correct or incorrect—so they must 
figure it out by trial and error. After ten correct responses, the rule changes, so they 
must spontaneously identify and switch to the new rule. Autistic subjects are often 
found to have difficulty switching to the new rule, a finding which is widely interpreted 
as evidence of a flexibility impairment (Hill, 2004; Landry and Al-Taie, 2016). 
 
 
 
However, this conclusion needs to be nuanced. As Geurts et. al. (2009) point out, 
performance on the WCST is not just driven by cognitive flexibility. Other factors, like 
stress, uncertainty about task demands, and the ability to sustain attention, also play a 
role. Furthermore, on other measures of flexibility, there is little evidence for 
difficulties in autism (ibid; see van Eylen et. al., 2011, for the same conclusion). So why 
do autistic subjects have trouble with the WCST specifically? Importantly, on most 
other measures, subjects receive an explicit cue when they need to switch strategy. So 
autistic participants may have difficulty spontaneously noticing that they need to 
switch, not with switching per se. As Geurts et. al. (2009) suggest, this could imply 
difficulties with sustaining attention to cues for task switching (i.e. to errors). 
Moving on, planning impairments also seem well placed to account for common 
traits. Indeed, difficulties with time management and planning are themselves 
sometimes described in clinical accounts of autism (Rosenthal et. al., 2013). Planning 
impairments could also be linked to difficulties with stepping outside of predictable 
Figure 1: Wisconsin Card Sort Test 
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routines. Additionally, it has been suggested they might contribute to social difficulties, 
by making it harder to plan and keep track of events (ibid), though problems of this 
sort are not the primary emphasis in most descriptions of autism. 
Experimentally, planning in autism has been assessed using several measures. 
One common (and representative) paradigm is the Tower of London task (e.g. Hughes 
et. al., 1994), of which there are many variations. In the classic version, subjects are 
faced with three pegs. The first peg has a series of differently sized rings stacked onto it 
in size order, with the largest ring at the bottom and the smallest at the top. 
 
 
 
Subjects are asked to move the stack to the third peg in the same order, moving only 
one ring at a time, and never placing a larger ring on top of a smaller one. They score 
more highly if they can complete the task in fewer steps. This requires planning the 
moves that must be made in advance. Most other planning tasks employed in autism 
research are similar: they track the ability to recognise intermediate steps in pursuit of 
a goal. 
Overall, there is a broad consensus that planning difficulties are common in 
autism. Dubbelink and Geurts (2017) review the literature, noting that these occur 
across a wide range of task types, and are associated with autism independently of 
factors like age and IQ (albeit with significant unexplained heterogeneity). Ultimately, 
however, these difficulties are only likely to contribute to a small number of autism 
traits, which are moreover not exclusive to autism. ADHD, for example, is partly 
defined by difficulties with time management and planning (APA, 2013). Ultimately, 
planning impairments are probably best seen as one trait commonly associated with 
autism, unlikely to play a deep causal role. 
A third important component of EF is working memory. This encompasses the 
ability to hold information in mind over the short-term, and is usually assessed in 
terms of capacity. For instance: what is the longest string of numbers a study 
participant can remember? As with the other EF components, it is argued that working 
memory impairments could contribute to social difficulties in autism. As Barendse et. 
Figure 2: Tower of London Task 
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al. (2013) point out, to properly understand what is currently going on in a social 
situation, I need to keep in mind what I have previously seen and heard. I also need to 
accurately remember what someone has just said to me in order to respond 
appropriately. Several reviews of the literature have reported working memory deficits 
in autism, both for spatial and verbal information (e.g. Barendse et. al., 2013; Wang et. 
al. 2017). Once again, however, these only seem positioned to explain a relatively small 
set of autism traits, not exclusive to autism. Likewise, again, they do not predict the 
precise kinds of social difficulties generally emphasised in descriptions of autism. 
 Finally, fourth, inhibitory control is essentially the ability not to respond to 
stimuli when doing so would be counterproductive. Yet again, some autism traits can 
be attributed to difficulties in this area (Geurts et. al., 2014). For instance, some social 
difficulties might reflect a reduced ability to inhibit inappropriate remarks or actions. 
Once again, however, this does not tally with standard descriptions of the social 
difficulties in autism: standard accounts stress difficulties with understanding what is 
appropriate, not difficulties with acting on that understanding. Meanwhile, somewhat 
more plausibly, some repetitive behaviours might be understood as a result of 
difficulties inhibiting a repeated response to a stimulus (e.g., spinning an object round 
and round). Additionally, the “tendency to be literal” can be construed as an inability to 
inhibit highly salient word meanings in context. 
Experimentally, inhibitory control can be subdivided into (at least) two 
categories: response inhibition and interference control (Geurts et. al. 2014). In studies 
of response inhibition, participants must respond rapidly to a series of stimuli, but 
occasionally inhibit responses in accordance with a rule. For instance, in a standard 
go/no-go task, participants might be asked to click on a green button as fast as possible 
when it appears on a computer screen, but not to click if a yellow button appears. If 
they accidentally click on the wrong button, this is treated as evidence of poor 
response inhibition. By contrast, interference control tests look at the ability to 
disregard distractions. For example, in the flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), 
subjects are shown a central letter surrounded by other letters. They are then asked to 
raise their left hand if (e.g.) S or C is displayed in the centre, and their right hand if 
(e.g.) H or K is displayed. In some trials the surrounding letters will be the same as the 
central letter, but in others they will be letters associated with the opposite response. 
When the letters are different, subjects usually respond more slowly. The more they 
are slowed down, the worse they are said to be at interference control.  
As Geurts et. al. (2014) note, evidence suggests autistic subjects have difficulty 
on both of these sorts of tasks. However, the implications of these findings are up for 
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debate, largely because there is limited agreement about the mechanisms involved. In 
particular, given the significant differences in task structure, it is not obvious that 
interference control deficits and response inhibition deficits should occur for the same 
reasons. Geurts et. al. also note that there is significant variation across measures 
within each subcategory. These may speak to further differences which have not yet 
been teased out. 
Arguably, perceptual differences in autism complicate these findings further. 
For instance, one might plausibly expect a local bias or a global impairment to confer 
immunity to distractors. Alternatively, enhanced discrimination might make it easier to 
discriminate a go stimulus from a no-go stimulus. Both of these predictions are 
opposite to what is actually found. One way to interpret these findings would therefore 
be as counter-evidence to perception-first theories of autism. Alternatively, one could 
conclude that perceptual differences do convey an advantage, but that control 
impairments outweigh it. Without a robust account of the role of perception in these 
tasks, it will be difficult to differentiate such possibilities. 
 
1.4.3 EF Explanations of Autism: General Limitations 
 
Moving on, there are two more general problems for EF deficit accounts. First, although 
EF test performance often correlates with autism traits, and EF impairments can 
plausibly explain some of these traits, there may not actually be a causal link. In this 
vein, Jones et. al. (2018a) report that EF does not predict autism traits independently of 
other measures, especially false belief tests. This does not rule out a causal role for EF 
in explaining autism traits, since it can be argued that: 1) EF deficits directly explain 
difficulties with false belief tests; 2) EF is a developmental precursor to false belief 
understanding; 3) EF and false belief understanding draw on the same underlying 
capacities; or 4) EF and false belief understanding overlap conceptually. All of these 
suggestions have some supporters (Devine and Hughes, 2014). However, given the 
widespread lack of agreement, the precise role of EF deficits in autism is an open 
question. (This is doubly true if the false belief tests do not show what they are 
supposed to.) 
 Second, it is well known that many autistic people find unpredictable situations 
stressful and disorientating. Meanwhile, most EF tests require rapid decision-making 
under uncertainty. Autistic subjects may therefore do worse because they find the 
tasks more stressful. There is some evidence consistent with this possibility. Bodner et. 
al. (2012) compared autistic and neurotypical performance on a working memory 
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measure, with and without administering the anti-anxiety drug propranolol. Autistic 
participants, but not controls, received a performance boost from the drug.13  
 
1.4.4 Executive Dysfunction in Autism: Conclusions 
 
In summary, autistic study participants have difficulties with a wide range of EF tests. 
These include measures of (spontaneous) task switching, planning, interference 
control and response inhibition. However, the implications of these findings are 
seriously unclear. Perhaps most significantly, it is hard to show that EF deficits actually 
cause the autism traits they are purported to explain. Some important findings are also 
equivocal due to a lack of clarity about the mechanisms involved in the tasks. In 
particular, an adequate understanding of response inhibition in autism will require an 
account of how perceptual differences might affect performance on standard measures. 
More generally, for three reasons, EF deficits are unlikely to play a central 
explanatory role. First, no specific EF component is either necessary or sufficient to 
predict autism diagnosis. Second, specific EF deficits generally cannot account for more 
than a small subset of autism traits, and often do not predict difficulties of quite the 
right sort. Third, even EF deficits across the board would not account for the full range 
of autism traits (for instance, they would not account for perceptual differences). 
Overall, it is probably best to think of EF deficits as secondary traits which are 
commonly associated with autism, and which perhaps account for important 
heterogeneity (Pellicano, 2012). 
 
1.5 Bayesian Theories of Autism 
 
1.5.1 Bayesian Inference: Background 
 
According to Bayesian inference accounts of cognition (e.g. Knill and Richards, 1996; 
Hohwy, 2013), the nervous system processes information using an approximation of 
Bayes’ rule. On these views, I continually attempt to infer the causes of my sense input. 
I do so by estimating the precision of the input, and weighing this against prior 
knowledge about what kinds of situations are actually likely to occur. The idea can be 
illustrated by an expectation-driven visual illusion like the Kanizsa triangle: 
                                               
13. Bodner et. al. offer a strictly neurological interpretation of this in terms of norepinephrine 
modulation, and do not mention anxiolytic effect, but norepinephrine is heavily implicated in 
stress and anxiety. 
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This figure is roughly consistent with multiple interpretations. It can be seen as a 
collection of individual shapes: three chevrons, and three “pac-men” or unfinished 
pizzas. Alternatively, it can be seen as a white triangle resting on top of another 
triangle and three circles. Arguably, the raw image is more consistent with the first 
interpretation, since the edges of the triangle on top are not shown. However, since 
sense input is often noisy and incomplete, I will often have cause to disregard details 
like this. More formally, assuming a certain amount of noise, I will treat sense input as a 
probability distribution over its most likely interpretations. Here, the multiple shapes 
interpretation is most likely, in the sense that I need to disregard less noise. 
 Nevertheless, neurotypicals generally perceive this figure consistent with the 
second interpretation, and often experience edges where none are depicted (Kanizsa, 
1976). On Bayesian inference accounts of perception, this is because the second 
interpretation is more consistent with past experience. Circles and triangles are more 
common than chevrons and pac-men, so my perception will be more reliable if I tend to 
see circles and triangles, whenever there is room for doubt. Bayesian theories 
generalise this principle to perception at all levels of complexity: I will bias towards 
seeing whatever is most probable, given what I already know. (This includes the full 
contents of long-term semantic memory,14 which, as I will argue in chapter 2, can be 
understood as a statistical model of the world.) Formally, my prior knowledge is 
construed as another probability distribution, over the states of the world most 
consistent with my past experience.  
 In Bayesian inference, then, I combine statistical world knowledge (priors) 
with noise-adjusted sense input (sensory likelihood), to infer the most likely cause of 
                                               
14.  ...but is not exhausted by it. See the discussion below on structural and contextual priors. 
Figure 3. Kanizsa Triangle. (Fibonacci, 2007). 
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my experiences (Hohwy, 2013). What I infer (the posterior) is not a fixed value, but 
another probability distribution: one more tightly constrained and informative than 
either the raw sense input or the prior. Importantly, on standard accounts of Bayesian 
inference, I can adjust the weighting of sense input in different contexts, based on my 
expectations about how informative it is likely to be (Friston, 2010). For instance, 
vision is less useful in heavy fog, so I will treat what I see less precise under those 
conditions. Formally, this amounts to a context-specific broadening or narrowing of the 
probability distribution representing sense input, reflecting estimated noise. 
 
1.5.2 Weak Priors 
 
Over the past 5 years or so, Bayesian inference theories of autism have received 
growing attention. The main point of departure for this development was a hypothesis 
advanced by Pellicano and Burr (2012): weak priors. In spirit, the weak priors 
hypothesis can be understood as a Bayesian successor to WCC; like WCC, it posits that 
autistic people draw less on context and general knowledge to interpret new sense 
input. However, where WCC relies on the distinction between local and global 
processing, weak priors distinguishes between top-down (prior) and bottom-up 
(sensory likelihood) contributions to processing. Specifically, Pellicano and Burr argue 
that autistic people have weaker prior expectations about the most likely causes of 
sense input. (Formally, prior knowledge is represented by a broader, flatter probability 
distribution.) As a consequence, they end up with a relatively raw, de-contextualised, 
interpretation of what they see and hear. 
The weak priors hypothesis is inspired mostly by the finding that autistic 
people are relatively immune to expectation-driven visual illusions (e.g. Happé, 1996; 
Mitchell et. al., 2010). It also explains their superior performance on a range of other 
tasks where giving undue weight to prior experience might be detrimental, like 
copying images of physically impossible objects (Mottron et. al., 1999). Additionally, 
they are less likely to exploit prior knowledge about patterns of light and shadow to 
disambiguate objects (Becchio et. al., 2010). More broadly, the proposal is a good fit for 
much of the same evidence marshalled to support WCC. Quite often, one can interpret 
the data in nearly the same way, replacing a difficulty with global processing with a 
tendency not to make use of priors. 
As formulated, the weak priors account mostly aims at explaining sensory 
differences. However, Pellicano and Burr (2012) also suggest that reduced top-down 
effects might contribute to a preoccupation with “sameness”, and to inflexible 
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behaviours. As they argue, prior knowledge helps us predict what will happen next, so 
weak priors would make the world feel unpredictable and unfamiliar. Meanwhile, 
repetition and sameness-seeking would reduce uncertainty. Difficulties with predicting 
the world might also account for the tendency to find busy environments 
overwhelming. Finally, though it is not mentioned by Pellicano and Burr, it is easy to 
see that a difficulty with drawing on prior knowledge might make it hard to 
understand social situations correctly. To take just one example, if I cannot make use of 
prior knowledge, I might struggle to see how an unfamiliar social situation is similar to 
a familiar one. 
Overall, weak priors is an elegant hypothesis with broad explanatory power, 
and is relatively well-linked to the phenomena which it aims to explain. However, it 
also faces some difficulties. Firstly, as van de Cruys et. al. (2017) note, it does not 
distinguish between structural priors, stored in long term memory, and contextual 
priors, representing short-term expectations derived on the fly. Meanwhile, different 
studies of perception in autism involve different kinds of priors. For instance, 
expectation-driven visual illusions are driven by structural priors: by general 
knowledge about how space is usually organised. By contrast, in visual search and 
image disambiguation tasks, most of the work is done by immediate short-term 
expectations which may not be stored in memory. To be properly satisfying, the weak 
priors hypothesis would need to specify the relationship between these different kinds 
of priors. This would mean answering questions about their underlying 
representational format.  
Second, some recent studies indicate that autistic participants are equally able 
to draw on priors in some perceptual tasks. For example, Manning et. al. (2017a) 
report autistic subjects are equally sensitive to the Muller-Lyer illusion, controlling for 
test response strategies. Meanwhile, van de Cruys et. al. (2017) report they are equally 
able to use (contextual) priors to interpret ambiguous (Mooney) images. Difficulty on 
the disambiguation task might be explained fairly easily, by limiting the weak priors 
hypothesis to structural priors. However, the Muller-Lyer finding is more challenging, 
since on most accounts this is an expectation-driven illusion. In this context, one might 
ask: are structural priors straightforwardly broader and shallower in autism, or are 
they perhaps altered in some more specific way? 
 Finally, third, although Pellicano and Burr (2012) suggest the weak priors 
account might generalise beyond perception, further implications have not yet been 
explored in detail. In particular, the discussion of social differences and repetitive 
behaviours is brief, and there is no discussion of language differences. A fuller account 
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is required to show that weak priors can account for these phenomena, both as they 
are found experimentally, and as they appear in qualitative accounts of autism. (I 
accomplish this directly in chapters 3 and 4, since the SFD hypothesis will turn out to 
be a more specific version of the weak priors hypothesis.) 
 
1.5.3 Predictive Coding and HIPPEA 
 
The leading Bayesian competitor to the weak priors hypothesis is High, Inflexible 
Precision of Prediction Errors in Autism (HIPPEA). Before turning to the details, a brief 
overview of the theoretical foundations is necessary. The predictive coding framework 
(Friston, 2010) is currently the leading account of how Bayesian inference is 
implemented by the brain. It develops the general Bayesian idea in various ways. 
Arguably most importantly, it posits that we each possess a hierarchical statistical 
model of the world. Higher levels, in anterior brain areas, model more general and 
abstracted regularities, while lower levels, closer to the sensory system, model specific 
details. On this view, the information stored in the models can be equated to my long-
term structural priors. Meanwhile, the inferences I make at any given time function as 
my short-term, contextual priors. 
On this account, information is passed between levels in both directions. At 
each level, I use my model to make predictions: I anticipate what I am likely to 
experience next. These signals are sent down the hierarchy and play an inhibitory role: 
I suppress any incoming input which I can successfully predict. Only input I fail to 
predict is signalled upwards; this is therefore conceptualised as prediction error. I can 
then exploit this information in two ways. First, I can make new inferences about my 
current situation. Second, if input is both precise and inconsistent with my current 
model of the world, I can update my model to accommodate it. A better model of the 
world means better predictions and better suppression, so by keeping the model up to 
date I can minimise the error I experience over time. Critically, to optimise learning, I 
must give less weight to input that may be uninformative or noisy (for the neurological 
implementation, see Friston, 2009). This ability to optimise the weighting of errors 
(reflecting their estimated information value) is assumed to be the mechanism of 
attention (Hohwy, 2012). 
 The HIPPEA hypothesis (van de Cruys et. al., 2014, 2017, see also Lawson et. al., 
2014) is advanced in this context. In spirit, HIPPEA can be seen roughly as a Bayesian 
successor to EPF, since it also implies a heightened sensitivity to small differences 
between percepts. More specifically, the claim is that autistic individuals do not adjust 
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their estimates about the precision of prediction errors (i.e. sense input). Instead, 
precision estimates are fixed high. (Formally, the bottom-up (sensory likelihood) 
distribution is inflexibly narrow, across levels of the representational hierarchy.) 
HIPPEA is proposed to account for a wide range of empirical findings. First, like 
weak priors, it would predict a reduced vulnerability to visual illusions. Following 
Brock (2012), van de Cruys et. al. (2017) note that both weak (broad) priors and high 
(narrow) estimates of sensory precision would each bring the posterior estimate closer 
to the decontextualized input. The main difference, as van de Cruys et. al. note, is that 
HIPPEA would predict high confidence in the final interpretation (a narrow posterior 
probability distribution). This would also imply stronger contextual priors, since my 
contextual priors just are my short-term beliefs about what is currently happening. 
Second, HIPPEA would account for some other perceptual phenomena which 
are less obviously accommodated by weak priors (van de Cruys, 2014). For instance, in 
visual search tasks, subjects need to pick out (e.g.) a grey cross against a background of 
blue crosses and grey squares. According to HIPPEA, when I see some of the shapes in 
the background, this generates a contextual prior: I will expect more blue crosses and 
more grey squares. In this context, the grey cross produces a salient error signal. In 
autism, the error signal will be weighted more highly, and so will be noticed more 
quickly. HIPPEA would likewise account for evidence of enhanced pitch perception in 
autism (Mottron et. al. 2010). If a note is slightly “off”, an enhanced error signal would 
make the error easier to detect.  
Third, HIPPEA predicts difficulty with assessing the relative informativeness of 
different cues. Van de Cruys et. al. (2014) suggest this accounts for difficulties with the 
Wisconsin Card Sort Test. To do well on that test, I must be able to flexibly assign my 
attention to different cues (Bishara et. al., 2010). For instance, I might need to switch 
from colour cues to shape cues, or vice versa. Inflexible estimates about the 
information value of different cues would directly make this harder. This would also 
explain why autistic subjects do better when clear, overt cues are available to aid 
switching.  
Alongside the data, HIPPEA is also meant to account for various real-world 
autism traits. First, treating bottom-up error signals as highly precise might predict 
language differences: an inflexible weighting of errors might predict difficulties with 
distinguishing relevant and irrelevant acoustic cues in order to disambiguate 
phonemes, which could account for auditory processing differences or difficulties with 
acquiring language (van de Cruys, et. al. 2014). This account does not explain the 
pragmatic difficulties which lie at the core of standard accounts of autism. However, 
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HIPPEA could plausibly contribute to these as well. If I take (bottom-up) salient word 
meanings to be particularly precise relative to (top-down) contextual expectations, I 
will be more likely to focus narrowly on literal meanings, and miss the context. 
Second, HIPPEA would account for increased sensory sensitivity, and a 
tendency to be overwhelmed by some stimuli. On the predictive coding framework, 
error signals (representing sense input) are inflexibly turned up. Since these signals 
can only be suppressed by means of predictions, this would amplify sense input, 
especially in busy or volatile environments. Arguably, it would also predict a pervasive 
sense of uncertainty in these environments (as we will see in chapter 3, this is 
commonly described by autistic autobiographers). As van de Cruys et. al. (2014) point 
out, an important role of prediction error is to indicate that there are still learnable 
regularities in the environment. It would therefore make sense for errors to evoke 
subjective uncertainty. 
Next, third, HIPPEA would account for some repetitive behaviours. On the 
predictive coding scheme, I update my model of the world to anticipate and minimise 
prediction errors. As I’ve noted, one way I can do this is by learning: adding new 
information to the model. The other way I can do so is by planning my actions, so that I 
can expect to remain in relatively familiar situations.15 The best way to minimise error 
over time will therefore be a trade-off between exploration and routine. If my error 
signals are inflexibly high, however, I will be less able to minimise error by learning 
(especially in busy or noisy environments). This means my best bet may be to revisit 
the same places and repeat the same actions over and over (van de Cruys et. al., 2014).  
Finally, fourth, HIPPEA would explain social difficulties via two distinct 
mechanisms. One would be a reduced ability to track the information value of different 
kinds of social cues (van de Cruys et. al., 2014). If I take all cues to be equally 
informative, I will not be able to guide my attention towards what is most relevant. For 
instance, I may not recognise that a raised eyebrow is more informative than a freckle. 
Again, this would be more troublesome in busy or volatile environments, like complex 
social situations, where there are many cues with varying information value. 
HIPPEA would also explain social difficulties in terms of knock-on effects for 
structural priors. The claim is that, if I take random, uninformative variation in my 
environment to be precise and learnable, I will update my model of the world to 
include it. According to van de Cruys et. al., I will end up learning about erroneous, 
hyper-specific categories. For example, rather than learn about “making friends”, I 
                                               
15. An important assumption here is that I include myself in my model of the world, and ‘infer’ 
my own actions from my model. I’ll get back to this in chapter 2. 
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might develop a hyper-specific concept for “making friends at a football match,” 
encompassing some irrelevant aspects of the situation. This would make it harder to 
generalise social strategies across situations. 
Like weak priors, HIPPEA is an elegant and compelling hypothesis. Likewise, 
however, it also faces difficulties. For one thing, again, there are already conflicting 
findings. For instance, Manning et. al. (2017b) presented autistic children with two 
boxes which could be opened and closed repeatedly.  Both boxes could contain 
rewards, but one was more likely to contain a reward than the other. At intervals, the 
reward value of the boxes was switched. Manning et. al. found autistic children were 
equally able to track the changing reward value of the boxes. This implies equal 
sensitivity to the changing information value of different cues. 
 As I see it, another complication comes from autistic advantages on the 
embedded figures task (Horlin et. al., 2016). In this kind of visual search task, there is 
no homogenous background: instead, the target is embedded inside another image. 
Here there can be no error signal for an odd one out, so the HIPPEA account of 
advantages in visual search does not apply. Indeed, one might expect more difficulties 
here: inflexible precision would make it harder to discriminate cues which are linked 
with the target from cues which are not. 
Moving on, van de Cruys et. al. (2014) do not say much about the 
representational format of prior knowledge, nor how this should change in response to 
new experiences. This leaves certain parts of the explanation open to question. For 
example, would high levels of error really lead to hyper-specific category learning, 
incorporating irrelevant noise? Van de Cruys et. al. (2014) predict this by analogy with 
overfitting in machine learning. Typically, in machine learning, an artificial neural 
network must learn how to categorise data from some domain (e.g. identifying words 
from recorded speech). Usually, the network will be trained on a sample from that 
domain. Sometimes, especially if the training sample is too small or training goes on for 
too long, the network will start to treat random, one-off variations in the sample as if 
they were predictable. (For instance, if speech training samples only come from two or 
three speakers, the network might learn to treat idiosyncrasies in their accents as 
informative). In other words, the model will contain erroneous parameters. It will be 
extremely accurate for the training data (low “training error”) at the cost of accuracy 
on new data (high “test error”). On this analogy, autistic individuals would acquire a 
model of the world which is highly consistent with past experiences, at the cost of 
predictive power for new experiences. 
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However, the machine learning analogy is false in an important sense. Few models of 
learning, human or machine, allow meaningful learning to occur on a single exposure. 
Artificial neural networks are only prone to overfitting because they learn using 
multiple cycles of training with the same data: they encounter the same noise dozens, 
even hundreds of times. Back in the real world, a piece of noise is (by definition) a one-
off, unlikely to happen again.16, 17 To this extent, the suggestion that autistic people will 
incorporate random noise into models is questionable, no matter how high the error 
signal might be turned up.18 
 In any case, even if autism did involve something like overfitting, erroneous 
model parameters will not necessarily imply narrower categories, as van de Cruys et. 
al. assume. Possibly, the temptation to think otherwise comes from an analogy with 
logical categories. Clearly, adding criteria to a definition makes the category narrower. 
There are fewer bachelors than there are men, and to say otherwise is to commit the 
                                               
16. Indeed, in machine learning, injecting random non-repeating noise into the training data on 
each cycle is a standard strategy for reducing overfitting (e.g.  Zur et. al., 2009). 
17. It might be argued that some forms of ‘noise’ are repeatable, and are therefore learnable. For 
instance, if I grow up in Aberdeen, I will encounter a large number of people who speak in 
similar idiosyncratic ways. If I then move to Cardiff, I may have difficulties understanding 
people. This would be a better real-world analogy for overfitting: the accents I heard in my 
youth would be like my idiosyncratic training data. However, there is no reason to think 
neurotypicals should be immune to this sort of thing. 
18. In chapter 4, I’ll argue that heightened error signals over time would actually have the 
opposite effect on long-term memory in a natural setting, pruning all but the most reliable 
information out of the model. 
Figure 4. The black line represents a good model of the data. The green line represents an 
overfitted model, accommodating noise at the expense of future accuracy. (Chabacano, 2008) 
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conjunction fallacy. However, typical human categorisation is different: parameters are 
probabilistic, generally only partial information is available, and erroneous parameters 
may weigh for deploying a concept in certain circumstances. (I’ll get back to this point 
at more length in chapters 2 and 3.) 
 In this context, one should not assume a straightforward, Goldilocks-style 
distinction between categories which are too broad, categories which are too narrow, 
and categories which are just right. Instead, it is possible for a concept to get over-
applied in some contexts and under-applied in others. Indeed, if I add erroneous 
parameters to my model of the world, it is likely to cause exactly this. Perhaps my 
erroneous parameter is a strong belief that dogs quack continually, like ducks. If I see a 
dog that doesn’t quack, I might infer that it isn’t really a dog at all (the concept DOG will 
under-generalise). Conversely, if I hear quacking, I might incorrectly think that I am 
perceiving a dog (DOG will over-generalise).  
Finally, one can also ask whether the HIPPEA account of social difficulties—
difficulties with judging the informativeness of different cues, plus overfitted models of 
the world—is a good fit for the social difficulties that autistic people actually 
experience. Arguably, difficulties with suppressing noise would predict erroneous 
inferences, in response to irrelevant cues. Likewise, overfitted models with too many 
parameters would imply erroneous inferences for faulty reasons. By contrast, in 
chapter 3, I will argue that the social difficulties described by autistic autobiographers 
are more consistent with missing inferences, missing parameters, and an insensitivity 
to genuinely relevant cues. 
 
1.5.4 Bayesian Theories: Conclusions 
 
In summary, Bayesian theories of autism have some clear advantages over earlier 
theories. HIPPEA, in particular, specifies the underlying mechanisms much more 
precisely, and both accounts have broad explanatory power. However, important 
questions remain open. Notably, neither account adequately specifies the format of 
prior knowledge, leading to unclear or questionable predictions. Additionally, both 
theories face counterevidence, further suggesting a need for more precise formulation. 
Finally, it is not yet clear whether either theory can account for autism traits exactly as 
they are described. 
 In this context, the next chapter will review a body of research which seems 
well placed to bridge some of the gaps in these accounts: on concept structure in 
semantic memory. Crucially, this research is precisely concerned with specifying the 
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format of world knowledge (on Bayesian theories of cognition, equivalent to structural 
priors). It also bears directly on many autism traits, with direct implications for 
perception, categorisation, context-sensitivity, automatic inference, and action. 
Reviewing this literature will prepare the ground for the subsequent chapters, where I 
will develop and defend the SFD hypothesis. 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
 
I began this thesis by introducing the enigma of autism: why do the traits that make up 
autism tend to occur together, in the same individuals? In this chapter, I began by 
describing autism in more detail. Alongside the three traditional groups of traits—
social difficulties, language processing differences, and a preference for order and 
repetition—I noted that autism is also associated with many unusual sensory 
experiences, especially heightened sensory sensitivity. I also noted that pluralistic and 
intersubjective approaches to autism are becoming increasingly influential. 
I then reviewed the three best-known families of autism theories: social-first 
theories, perception-first-theories, and executive dysfunction theories. I argued that 
social-first theories are deeply flawed: they presuppose a contested theoretical 
framework, and key supporting studies are undermined by inappropriate controls. 
Meanwhile, although perception-first theories and executive dysfunction theories do 
not have these fundamental problems, they are insufficiently precise about underlying 
mechanisms, making it hard to interpret relevant research. They are also insufficiently 
broad to explain the full syndrome. 
 Finally, in the last part of the chapter, I introduced Bayesian theories. These 
theories are probably the most promising on offer: they have broad explanatory power, 
and HIPPEA in particular is much more precise about the underlying mechanisms. 
However, they still omit important details, especially concerning the representational 
format of world knowledge. This means their implications are unclear in a number of 
areas. In this context, I argued, autism theorists would be well advised to turn their 
attention to research on concept structure.  
Importantly, throughout this chapter, I have also noted that many theories are 
not well anchored in proper qualitative accounts of autism. Often, it is not clear if a 
given theory predicts (e.g.) social difficulties in the right form. Meanwhile, many 
experimental findings are equivocal, due to a lack of clarity about the mechanisms 
involved in the tasks. In other words, though there is often a sore need for additional 
constraints to guide the interpretation of data, an important possible source of 
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constraints (qualitative evidence) has been neglected. In chapter 3, I will respond to 
this situation by turning to evidence from autism autobiographies. 
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Chapter 2: Theories of Concepts 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
At the end of chapter 1, I argued autism might involve changes in concept structure. In 
this chapter, I turn at more length to the concepts literature. I begin by assuming 
concepts are mental representations19  or models, which correspond in some sense to 
category members. Effectively, they constitute our knowledge about familiar objects, 
sensations, actions, events, people, places, and so on. I will be arguing that this 
knowledge is largely statistical, and is stored in semantic networks in an overlapping 
fashion. It is also diverse: it concerns typical physical properties, typical causal 
properties, typical subcategories, and typical contexts. Collectively, concepts function 
as a working model of the world. In this role, they underpin virtually all aspects of our 
mental life, serving as the basic scaffold for perception, language comprehension, 
categorisation, inference, prediction, and planning. Roughly, whenever we see or hear 
anything in the world around us, the conceptual system is what allows us to figure out 
what it is, what it is likely to do next, and what we can use it for. 
 In this chapter, I progressively develop this general picture, by discussing 8 
distinct approaches to concepts: 
 
1.  concepts as definitions 
2. concepts as prototypes 
3. concepts as exemplars 
4. concepts as theories 
5. concepts as networks 
6. concepts as simulators 
7. concepts in active inference 
8. concepts in dual process theories 
 
Some of these approaches are often framed as competing theories. However, I argue 
                                               
19. I use this term mostly for convenience, since it is the one used in much of the psychology 
literature. But I want to avoid most of the philosophical baggage. Nothing in my argument (I 
hope) hinges much on philosophical debates about the existence of a mind-independent world, 
the indirectness of perception, whether representations have truth values, etc.  
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many of their key insights are compatible.20 Taken together, they provide a 
comprehensive and integrated picture of how long-term semantic memory works. 
 Importantly, I will mainly be discussing psychological research on concepts. 
Psychologists take concepts to be structures which play a direct causal role in 
psychological processes (Margolis and Laurence, 2007). In philosophy, there are ways 
of thinking about concepts which are fundamentally different. For instance, according 
to Peacocke (1992, 2005), concepts are abstract objects, independent of the 
mechanisms we use to grasp them. Meanwhile, for Dummett (e.g. 1993), concepts are 
epistemological abilities: significant mainly insofar as they can help us identify the 
truth. Neither approach has much to do with psychological accounts of categorisation, 
inference or perception. Since these abilities are precisely what I am interested in, I 
bypass these traditions here. 
 For slightly different reasons, I also bypass the neo-Kantian approach, chiefly 
associated with McDowell (e.g. 1996). Unlike Peacocke and Dummett, McDowell gives 
concepts a crucial role in perception and reasoning. This approach is therefore less 
straightforwardly incompatible with the psychological view. However, psychologists 
draw primarily on experimental data, and treat their claims as contingent empirical 
findings. By contrast, neo-Kantians employ transcendental arguments: they try to show 
that concepts must necessarily function in a particular way, given the nature of human 
experience. Attempting to integrate these two very different strategies would create 
many complications best avoided here. 
 
2.1 Concepts as Definitions 
 
The classical view of concepts was popular in philosophy and psychology from ancient 
times up until at least the 1950s. On this view, concepts are structured like definitions. 
They capture the necessary and sufficient conditions of category membership. Thus, a 
concept like BACHELOR picks out whatever satisfies the conditions “unmarried” and 
“man”, and nothing else. As Laurence and Margolis (1999, pp.9-14) note, the classical 
view provides a simple, intuitively plausible account of many mental abilities. On this 
view, we can learn concepts by learning the defining conditions, and we can categorise 
by checking whether the definitions apply. We can also make syllogistic inferences. If 
                                               
20. Indeed, there is a great deal of explicit overlap. To avoid repeating myself, I discuss them 
illustratively, rather than exhaustively. Many of the important points I make in any given part of 
this chapter could easily have been made in several others. 
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the definition of “bachelor” is “an unmarried man”, and I know that John is a bachelor, I 
can infer that John is unmarried. Above all, the key insight of the classical view is that 
we can, sometimes, learn definitions and use them to reason. Clearly, any plausible 
account of human category knowledge must be consistent with this ability. 
 Despite its simplicity and explanatory power, however, the classical view has 
not been taken seriously in psychology for many years. The main problem, famously 
highlighted by Wittgenstein (1953), is that it cannot be a good account of all concepts. 
Many categories, probably the majority, lack reliable definitions. For instance, there is 
no obvious group of defining features which all games share, and which only picks out 
games. Instead, different games resemble each other much as different members of a 
family resemble each other. Some traits are common in the family, and can help us to 
recognise family members, but no trait is likely to be shared by every family member 
and nobody else. Nevertheless, we can recognise games when we see them. This 
problem for the classical view is also known as the problem of ignorance: it seems I can 
possess a concept like GAME even if I do not know the definition (Kripke, 1972). 
 
2.2 Concepts as Prototypes 
 
In the 1970s, inspired directly by Wittgenstein, Rosch and Mervis (1975; Rosch 1978) 
developed some of the earliest statistical models of concepts. The approach they 
introduced is now commonly known as prototype theory. Instead of treating concepts 
as definitions, prototype models treat them as statistical summaries. The idea is that 
we store information about the typical features of category members, even if they are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for category membership. For example, a BIRD 
prototype would store the information that most birds fly, even though some birds 
don’t, and some other things do. 
 Rosch and Mervis (1975) showed that we routinely use statistical information 
of this kind in categorisation. They began by asking subjects to list typical features of 
familiar categories like vehicles. Unsurprisingly, some features (wheels, engines) were 
listed regularly, even if they were not defining features. Rosch and Mervis found that 
subjects recognised category members with more typical features (e.g. cars) more 
quickly than those with fewer (e.g. blimps). They also categorised them more reliably, 
and rated them as more typical overall. More recently, evidence for typicality effects 
has accumulated for many different kinds of categories, including events (e.g. Lalljee, 
1992) emotions (e.g. Shaver et. al., 1987) personality traits (e.g. Cantor et. al., 1977) 
and situations (e.g. Cantor et. al., 1982). It is also now well known that category 
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membership judgements are often graded in the same way, with ambiguous cases at 
the boundaries (Hampton, 2007). For instance, is a car seat a piece of furniture? Study 
participants will often be unsure, and it is clearly possible to argue either way. Again, 
this is precisely what one would expect if concepts store statistical information. 
 Importantly, these findings do not show that concepts are just summary 
representations, lacking any other kind of structure. Instead, what they demonstrate is 
more specific. First, we store statistical knowledge about common properties of 
categories. Second, we can exploit this knowledge to categorise more quickly and 
reliably. Third, many categories have blurry boundaries. Fourth, category members 
with typical features are rated as more typical. As Rosch (1978) noted, these are crucial 
empirical constraints on any theory of concepts. However, since they allow a great deal 
of room for extra detail, she denied that she had developed a substantive theory of 
concepts herself. 
  With this in mind, I now consider some objections to the prototype view. In 
doing so, I focus mainly on the four specific claims I have just mentioned, making no 
attempt to defend the view that concepts are just summary representations. Following 
Laurence and Margolis (1999), three prominent objections to the prototype view can 
be called the missing prototypes objection, the prototypical primes objection, and the 
compositionality objection. I will argue that none of these objections undermine Rosch 
and Mervis’s findings. 
 First, the missing prototypes objection (Fodor 1981) is that we may not have 
prototypes for certain concepts. These especially include concepts for made-up 
categories where we have no specific knowledge. Such concepts, Laurence and 
Margolis (1999) suggest, might include 4TH-CENTURY SAXOPHONE QUARTETS; FROGS OR 
LAMPS; and OBJECTS WHICH WEIGH MORE THAN A GRAM. According to the missing prototypes 
objection, we cannot produce typicality ratings for members of these categories. 
Therefore, the corresponding concepts cannot have prototype structure. 
 There are two major problems with this argument. The first is that it may be 
empirically false. Barsalou (1983) reports people can make typicality judgements 
about many ad-hoc concepts, like THINGS TO SELL AT A YARD SALE. More generally, the 
claim does not seem to have been tested. The second problem is that it misses the point 
of psychological research on concepts. Ultimately, the aim is to explain how we store 
and access knowledge in long-term memory. Since most people probably haven’t 
remembered anything about weird categories like these, there is no reason to assume 
we will have any corresponding concepts. If I actually became acquainted with a lot of 
4th century saxophone quartets, but remained unable to distinguish between typical 
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and atypical instances, the prototype view might be in more trouble.  
 Next, the prototypical primes objection is that some concepts display both strict 
membership criteria and typicality effects (Armstrong et. al. 1983). These include well-
defined concepts like EVEN NUMBER and PRIME NUMBER. As Armstrong et. al. showed, 
people do consistently rate some even numbers as more typical (8 is consistently rated 
as a more typical even number than 34). Such concepts therefore appear to have 
prototype structure. However, even numbers can be categorised strictly, so EVEN 
NUMBER cannot just be the prototype. 
  This objection is only really a problem if prototypes are meant to be the whole 
story in categorisation, a claim I am not attempting to defend here. But there is another 
more interesting issue with the objection. Logically, statistical membership criteria 
include strict membership criteria as a subset. On prototype theory, different features 
have different weights, reflecting their varying contributions to membership and 
typicality judgements. From this perspective, a defining feature is just a feature that 
happens to have a weight of 1 for membership judgements. With EVEN NUMBER, this 
might be “ends with 0, 2, 4, 6, or 8”. To this extent, prototype structure is not 
incompatible with strict membership. The only necessary qualification is that features 
weighted 1 for membership judgements can’t also be weighted 1 for typicality 
judgements. Otherwise, there could be no typicality effects: all members would be 
perfectly typical, and all nonmembers would be excluded. 
 Of course, sometimes I will need to employ a more sophisticated procedure to 
check a definition. For instance, I can’t instantly see if 1,541 is a multiple of 23; I will 
need a while to think about it. In this context one can ask: what counts as part of a 
concept? Does it include my ability to deploy sophisticated processes like this? Strictly 
speaking, this is not an empirical question: the answer depends on what we want from 
a theory of concepts. One could say, a priori, that a concept is whatever explains the 
ability to recognise members of a category. My strategy will be slightly different. I will 
argue that many psychological abilities can be explained parsimoniously if concepts 
are taken to be the basis of rapid, automatic inference and categorisation processes. 
Having done so, I will then assume that only categories we can deploy automatically 
and rapidly are associated with distinct concepts. My ability to identify multiples of 23 
will therefore not be tied to any particular concept. I return to this point later, in the 
context of dual process theory. 
 It may also be tempting to ask: how can one even number be more typical than 
another? The answer, I would suggest, is that concepts store information about the 
world as we experience it. Evidently, we do not encounter all even numbers equally 
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frequently. Instead, we are more likely to encounter relatively small numbers, and 
multiples of ten. This means we will tend to rate numbers with these features as more 
typical than, for instance, 115,787,992. 
 Finally, the compositionality objection is most famously advanced by Fodor 
(1998; Fodor and Lepore, 1996). According to this objection, prototypes cannot be 
combined to represent composite concepts. Fodor’s favourite example of this is PET 
FISH. As he correctly points out, you can’t find out the typical properties of pet fish by 
combining the typical properties of a pet with the typical properties of a fish. Pet fish 
have many properties that are not typical of either category: they are small and golden, 
and they live in tanks. Since we evidently can combine concepts to produce new ideas, 
Fodor argues concepts cannot have statistical structure. 
 One possible response to this objection is that we don’t actually get PET FISH by 
combining PET with FISH. Instead, as Hampton (1987) suggests, perhaps we get it 
concept more directly, by actually encountering some pet fish and learning about them: 
a process he calls extensional feedback. This suggestion is plausible, but not entirely 
satisfying. Perhaps I have never seen a pet fish before. Still, I might know that fish live 
in water, while pets typically live in houses. From this, I can probably figure out that 
typical pet fish live in tanks. I might even be able to go further, guessing the typical size 
of a pet fish, and so on. If I can reason in this way, I can’t just be adding typical 
properties together.  
Fodor’s objection may work if a prototype is just a summary list of typical 
properties. However, as I’ve noted, this is not the only way to make sense of prototype 
effects, and some alternatives are easier to reconcile with composition. I return to this 
point later, arguing that statistical composition is possible if concepts store information 
about typical context. For now, I move on to the exemplar view. 
 
2.3 Concepts as Exemplars 
 
Exemplar models of concepts (e.g. Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Smith and Medin, 1981) 
were introduced soon after prototype models, and share many important properties 
with them. For instance, they assume concepts store statistical information. Reflecting 
this, they also assume many categories will have graded membership, with some 
members rated as more typical than others. Unlike prototype models, however, 
exemplar models assume we store multiple representations of specific instances, 
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rather than a single summary.21 Hence, a concept like DOG might contain the exemplars 
FLUFFLES and REX. On these models, we categorise by checking how many features 
something shares with some or all of the stored exemplars. Empirically, exemplar 
models can predict typicality ratings for many kinds of categories with a similar 
accuracy to traditional prototype models (Storms et. al., 2000).  
 Exemplar models can also explain important phenomena which the first 
generation of prototype models cannot. Most importantly, they explain how we can 
make judgements involving subcategories and instances. Normally, I can judge whether 
something is a typical poodle, not just whether it is a typical dog. I can also judge 
whether it is similar to my friend’s poodle, Fluffles. It’s not clear how I can do this just 
using a general DOG prototype, but I can do so if I also store knowledge about some 
specific dogs. Likewise, exemplars might explain how we can restrict generalisations to 
subcategories. If I am told that a strange looking dog doesn’t bark, I might expect other 
similar dogs not to bark, but I won’t extend this expectation to dogs in general (Brooks, 
1987). Again, I can’t do this by using a single summary representation, but if I store 
some exemplars, I might compare a new dog to one I have already seen. 
 Finally, exemplars might explain how we can include one highly unusual item 
in a category, but exclude another (Medin and Schaeffer, 1978). For instance, neither 
an ostrich nor a bat is much like the typical bird. So why do we say that an ostrich is a 
bird, whereas a bat is not? One plausible answer might be that we store ostrich 
exemplars under BIRD, but not bat exemplars. Arguably, along similar lines, exemplars 
can also explain why some category members might seem more atypical than others. It 
is hard to think of many properties shared by the typical cat, the typical fish, and the 
typical bird, but not the typical monkey. Nevertheless, we consider a monkey a much 
less typical pet. One plausible way to make sense of this is to say that we store 
exemplars of pet cats and pet dogs which are readily accessible, but few or no 
exemplars for pet monkeys.  
 As these examples indicate, we must have something more than a simple 
summary representation for each category. Clearly, we also draw on knowledge about 
subcategories and instances. Positing that concepts are made up of exemplars is a 
convenient way to explain this. However, the exemplar view also faces objections. 
                                               
21. I am glossing over some ambiguity in the definition of ‘exemplar’. Some self-described 
exemplar models posit abstract subcategory representations rather than instances (Storms et. 
al., 2000), while others use partial instance representations (e.g. Komatsu, 1992). Still other 
models assume a separate representation is stored for every encounter with an individual 
category member (e.g. Nosofsky, 1988). However, the term most commonly refers to instance-
based models of the kind I describe here. 
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Many of these are variants on objections to the prototype view, and I will not repeat 
them here. An additional problem, however, concerns explanatory scope. As Murphy 
(2016) notes, exemplar models are almost solely used to explain categorisation 
phenomena. Meanwhile, for other important properties of concepts—hierarchical 
structure, compositionality, conceptual development, and induction—no exemplar-
based explanations have been advanced. Reflecting this, Murphy suggests exemplar 
models do not constitute a proper theory of concepts. Instead, like prototype effects, 
exemplar effects are probably best seen as one constraint on such theories.  
 Fortunately, as Hampton (2016) notes, exemplars are not the only way of 
explaining subcategory knowledge. Prototype models can also be extended to do this, 
incorporating the instantiation principle. On instantiation prototype models, there can 
be multiple separate prototypes associated with a category, each representing a 
different subcategory alongside the superordinate category. As Heit and Barsalou 
(1996) show, prototype models of this sort can easily capture typicality judgements 
about subcategories. Recognising this, one can take a broader view of how prototype 
and exemplar models might be related. Following Barsalou (1990), categories can be 
understood to have different levels of granularity, reflecting the degree to which they 
can be split up. For instance, TOOL is likely to be granular for most people, with a wide 
range of sub-concepts: HAMMER, AWL, SPOON, AXE and so on. These subcategories will 
share relatively little, and some may be subdivided in turn.  By contrast, a concept like 
RAINDROP will not be granular in most people.  Unless I am an expert meteorologist, I 
am unlikely to know much about different types of raindrops. 
 From this perspective, the exemplar models and the early prototype models 
can be seen as opposite ends of a spectrum, rather than as competing accounts of 
categorisation (Barsalou, 1990). At one end, the early, uninstantiated prototype models 
might best capture how we represent non-granular concepts like RAINDROP: with a 
single summary representation. Meanwhile, exemplar models might best capture how 
we represent highly granular categories like TOOL. Finally, instantiation prototype 
models would capture my ability to store information at multiple levels of specificity, 
and draw on it in different ways for different purposes. For instance, I might use a 
fairly general prototype to answer the question “is she a typical dog?” a more specific 
prototype to answer the question “is she a typical poodle?” and perhaps a specific 
exemplar representation to answer the question “is she much like Fluffles?”22  
                                               
22. Obviously, these representations cannot be completely separate: my knowledge about 
Fluffles is likely to overlap heavily knowledge about dogs and my knowledge about poodles. I 
will return to how this overlap is possible in part 5. 
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2.4 Concepts as Theories 
 
Broadly speaking, theory-theories of concepts claim that human concepts resemble 
scientific theories. Multiple logically independent claims fall under this general 
heading. For instance, many versions of theory-theory involve a commitment to 
domain nativism. On this view, the mind has specialised systems for dealing with 
specific types of things, just as scientists have specialised theories for making sense of 
different kinds of phenomena. Domain-specific systems innate to humans are, most 
prominently, supposed to include the ToM system I discussed in chapter 1 (e.g., Carey, 
1985; Gopnik et. al., 1992).  Some versions of theory-theory (e.g. Carey, 1999) also 
posit that concepts develop and change over time in a similar manner to scientific 
theories, especially as understood by Kuhn (1962).  
 Here, I want to sideline these claims, and focus two others, emphasised by 
(among others) Murphy and Medin (1985). The first is that concepts store information 
about how categories are causally organised. For instance, consider my knowledge 
about SPORTS CAR. I don’t just know that sports cars have statistically correlated 
features, like bright colours, a luxury interior, high speed, loud sounds, a big engine, 
and a high cost. I also understand how these properties are related. I know that a 
sports car is fast and noisy because it has a large engine, that it is expensive because it is 
fast and luxurious, and so on (Weiskopf, 2011).  The second is that concepts store 
knowledge about how members of a category are related to other things. For instance, I 
know that cars are driven by humans, are found near roads, are filled up in petrol 
stations, and so forth. At the subcategory level, I also know something about what 
kinds of people might drive sports cars, and where such cars might be found.  
 As Murphy and Medin (1985) argue, we make inferences based on this sort of 
knowledge almost all the time. For instance, if I learn that my car’s engine is broken, I 
will rapidly infer that it won’t move when the accelerator is pressed. Likewise, if 
someone tells me Mike is driving a car, I will probably infer that Mike is a person, 
rather than a terrapin. Additionally, as Murphy and Medin point out, I can know that 
things are related to each other because I have this organised knowledge. As they note, 
a very small child might think snow, oceans, and clouds are unrelated, since they don’t 
look very similar (Murphy and Medin, 1985; Medin et. al. 1987). I only get to know that 
they have something in common by acquiring an organised network of beliefs. 
 Alongside theoretical arguments of this sort, theory theorists (e.g. Carey, 1985; 
Keil, 1989; Gopnik et. al., 1997) also assembled a large body of developmental 
evidence. Most importantly, they found that young children initially categorise using 
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superficial features, but eventually learn to treat causal and relational properties as 
more fundamental. More recently, psycholinguistic findings have revealed that we 
routinely draw on this organised world knowledge in language processing. For 
example, Ferretti et. al. (2001, see also Moss et. al. 1995) found that verbs commonly 
linked with particular instruments also prime faster responses to the names of those 
instruments: in other words, “stir” facilitates processing of “spoon.” Likewise, a verb 
like “arrest” primes a faster response to stereotypical agents (policemen) and patients 
(criminals). 
 One final point deserves emphasis. The claim I have just been defending is that 
concepts store causal and contextual information. This is not incompatible with the 
view that concepts have prototype structure, since the minimal notion of a prototype 
can be elaborated in a number of ways. As one leading advocate of prototype theory 
(Hampton, 2006) argues, a prototype can be construed as a statistical model of the 
causal relationships that hold within a category. This is more or less exactly the view of 
concepts I will be defending in this chapter. 
 Weiskopf (2011) outlines three possible objections to theory view: the Holism, 
Compositionality, and Scope objections. The Holism objection is as follows. On the 
theory view, concepts contain information about how they are related to other 
concepts: therefore concepts cannot be defined independently. This might pose a 
problem: if my concept changes whenever a concept related to it changes, and all my 
concepts are related to each other, it is hard to see how I could ever have the same 
concepts as anyone else. This might make it impossible for me to use concepts for 
communication.  
 The problem is mitigated, however, if concepts are meant to be statistical. From 
this perspective, concepts might be roughly similar. They might pick out broadly the 
same kinds of things, albeit with some variation in how particular features and 
relationships are weighted. On this view, people will understand each other more or 
less fine. Still, one would expect there to be a small gap between what is intended and 
what is understood, especially between people with rather different concepts (e.g. 
adults and children, people from very different cultures). To this extent, it would be 
true that people do not share the same concepts. However, this is an accurate 
prediction about human communication, not an objection. 
 Moving on, the scope objection is that not all concepts are associated with 
causal knowledge. For instance, I might not know how my computer works, and I might 
not have any understanding of the forces operating inside a raindrop. This objection 
would refute a universalistic version of the theory-theory, on which absolutely all 
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concepts are meant to have theoretical structure.  However, this is not the view I am 
defending here. (I am not sure if anyone has tried to defend such a view.) Ultimately, 
the important finding is not that we always model the causal structure of categories, 
just that we can often do so.  
 Finally, the compositionality objection repeats Fodor and Lepore’s (1996) 
objection to prototype theory. The question would be: how can I get from an 
understanding of the causal structure of pets and fish to an understanding of PET FISH? 
Later on, I will argue that a core tenet emphasised by the theory theorists—that 
concepts contain information about typical context—can precisely account for this sort 
of compositionality. However, it will be convenient to postpone this until after I have 
discussed the network and simulator views. 
 
2.5 Concepts as Parallel Processing Networks 
 
The discussion so far has highlighted at least five core properties of concepts. First, 
concepts store statistical information, allowing for typicality judgements and graded 
categorisation. Second, concepts are the basis of our ability to make inferences. Third, 
concepts store structured knowledge about causal and structural relationships within 
and between categories. Fourth, concepts store integrated information about 
categories and subcategories. Fifth, it must be possible, somehow, for us to produce 
composite categories like PET FISH. The next approach to concepts I consider, parallel 
distributed processing (PDP), developed in the 1980s (e.g. Rumelhart and Mclelland, 
1986). PDP models show that all of these important properties of concepts can be 
explained mechanistically, by a mechanism that might plausibly be instantiated in the 
neural networks of the brain. 
PDP models represent the conceptual system as a group of interconnected 
nodes or units, with each unit representing some feature of the world. The units are 
linked up with connections of different weights, storing information about the 
frequency with which these different features co-occur. (If two features always occur 
together, the connection strength is 1; if they never occur together, 0; if only half the 
time, 0.5.) Once set up in this way, some units can be activated, roughly representing 
sense input. When a unit representing a feature is activated, it will tend to increase the 
activation of any unit it is connected to with a connection weight >0.5, and to decrease 
the activation of any unit it is connected to with a connection weight <0.5. Over time, 
the network will settle into a stable configuration, representing the most probable 
64 
 
situation consistent with the input.  
A classic connectionist model developed by Rumelhart et. al. (1986) illustrates 
the power of the approach. This model stores knowledge about different kinds of 
rooms. Rooms could potentially have any combination of 40 features, including walls, 
ceilings, tables, chairs, windows, and so on. To train the network, Rumelhart et. al. 
asked volunteers to imagine different sort of rooms: they asked whether each of the 40 
features was present in an imaginary kitchen, dining room, and so on. Unsurprisingly, 
features were correlated in reliable ways across the 80 rooms imagined by the 
volunteers. Ovens and cupboards commonly occurred together; ovens and toilets did 
not. The model used 40 units to represent each of the 40 features, and connections 
between units were set to reflect these correlations. Each individual unit was also 
assigned a bias: if the feature it represented was common, its activity would tend to 
increase on its own. If rare, its activity would tend to decrease. 
  Once set up, a network of this sort can implement all of the core properties of 
concepts described above. First, it can support statistical inference. For instance, 
initially, the wardrobe and bed units can be clamped at the maximum activation, 1 
(roughly representing partial sense input). Units representing things typically found in 
the same rooms as wardrobes and beds will then become more active, and units 
representing things never found alongside these will become less active. Over time, the 
network can “infer” the most likely configuration of a room that is known to contain 
both a wardrobe and a bed. This will presumably include windows and curtains, but 
not a sink, oven or toilet. Rumelhart et. al. also conceptualise this as the “simulation” of 
an imaginary room. Importantly, different units end up activated to different degrees, 
not in binary fashion. Consistent with the account of Bayesian inference sketched in 
chapter 1, the result can be interpreted as a posterior probability distribution. A unit 
activated more highly represents a feature that is more likely to be present. 
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Second, the network accommodates prototype structure. Different 
configurations of features can be assessed for goodness-of-fit; this value will be high if 
most of the activated features are well correlated, and low if most of the activated 
features are poorly correlated. From this starting point, there might be an ideal 
bedroom which maximises goodness of fit, and many slightly worse-fitting bedrooms, 
which deviate from it in various ways. Goodness-of-fit is therefore analogous to 
typicality. Consistent with the Bayesian inference account, the goodness-of-fit function 
over different possible states of the network can be equated to a prior probability 
distribution, representing the most likely configurations of rooms, given the 
information supplied by the volunteers.23 This can also be represented visually as a 
landscape of peaks and valleys, with highly probable, prototypical rooms at the peaks, 
and highly improbable rooms in the valleys.  
Third, the network can implement category and subcategory knowledge together, in an 
integrated way. This is possible because some subgroups of units are reliably activated 
together, independent of other subgroups of units. For instance, floor, ceiling and wall 
will be highly correlated across all rooms, reflecting the superordinate category ROOM 
itself, but will be weakly if at all correlated with any specific room contents. This leaves 
other units relatively free to settle into configurations representing the different 
subcategories: bathroom, bedroom, and so on. In other words, the room network can 
be thought of as a schema, with a slot into which the details of various different room 
                                               
23. I have not mentioned sensory likelihood, but it is easy to see how this might fit in. Instead of 
clamping input units at the maximum level of activation, one could clamp them at intermediate 
levels of activation, reflecting estimated sensory precision. 
Figure 5: Goodness of fit landscape (Rumelhart et. al. 1986). 
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types might be fitted. 
 Fourth, an especially interesting property of PDP networks is that they can 
implement a kind of compositional imagination. For example, if both bed and sofa are 
activated, Rumelhart et. al.’s (1986) room network settles into a state that they 
describe as a “large, fancy bedroom”, including a floor lamp and a fireplace. It would 
also be able “imagine” other sorts of composite rooms not included in the training data, 
like kitchen-dining rooms. (Notably, this kind of compositionality does not yet answer 
Fodor’s question about PET FISH, since this composite room only includes features of the 
rooms that go to make it up.) 
 Fifth, by associating organised clusters of features, PDP networks can capture 
aspects of the structure emphasised by theory-theorists. For example, one might have a 
network representing different kinds of cars. The basic framework might include 
wheels and so on, but wouldn’t include anything much more specific. Within this, a 
powerful engine, high speed, and high cost might form a subnetwork representing a 
subcategory. The degree to which these different features are correlated would reflect 
the structural organisation of this knowledge. For instance, it might be easier to 
represent an inexpensive car with high speed and a powerful engine than to imagine an 
expensive fast car with a tiny engine. 
 Moving on, in addition to implementing the core properties of concepts 
described above, some further advantages are worth highlighting. First, network 
models are not limited to perceptual inference: they can also learn to infer optimal 
actions. McClelland et. al. (1986) demonstrate this by describing a network that can 
play noughts and crosses.  This network is divided into input units, hidden units, and 
output units. The 9 input units are clamped on or off to represent the current state of 
the game board. These are connected to hidden units, which come to represent more 
abstract features like enemy pairs and friendly pairs. The hidden units are then 
connected to output units representing possible moves. (Only one move is possible in 
this game, so the strength of the links between output units is fixed at zero.) The 
specific output unit that gets activated is then determined by the activation of the 
hidden units. (An enemy pair will be strongly associated with the output unit in the 
same row to block the enemy win, and so on.) 
 Second, correlations between features need not be entered manually. Instead, 
networks can learn from their mistakes. This is traditionally accomplished by what is 
called backpropagation, in networks with clearly defined input and output units. 
Whenever the network makes a mistake, an error signal is sent backwards through the 
network, reducing the strength of connections which contributed to the mistake, and 
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increasing the strength of connections which might have helped to avert it. Over many 
cycles of trial and error, networks can learn about the structure of a domain with no 
input other than an error signal of this kind. 
 Third, by storing concepts in an overlapping manner, network models account 
for the extremely high storage capacity of human memory. More or less the same point 
has often been emphasised in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff, 1986; Evans and Green, 
2006). As Lakoff (1984) observes, concepts as diverse as CANDLE and PENCIL may share 
important properties, which might be stored in a general category for cylindrical 
objects. Indeed, some information might be stored in an extremely abstract OBJECT 
schema, capturing statistical properties of solid things in general. Overlapping 
hierarchies of this kind can allow a tremendous amount of information to be stored 
with relatively few units. 
 Fourth, network models can account for ways in which human categorisation 
differs from logically normative categorisation. For instance, Hampton (1982) reports 
that human categorization isn’t transitive. As Hampton observes, most people agree 
that car seats are chairs, and that chairs are furniture. However, most people deny that 
car seats are furniture. How might this sort of finding be accommodated by this kind of 
network view? I suggest that in a representation of a typical car seat, some units 
involved in CHAIR are not active. A typical car seat is not found in a house, and cannot be 
freely moved around. It is still just about similar enough to a typical chair that it will 
normally get categorised as one. However, the properties which CAR SEAT lacks just so 
happen to be the same ones typically shared by CHAIR and the superordinate concept, 
FURNITURE. FURNITURE and CAR SEAT therefore have little overlap, though furniture 
overlaps with chair, and chair overlaps with car seat. 
 Finally, fifth, the network approach can be extended to accommodate precisely 
timed processing. This can be implemented, for instance, by simple recurrent networks 
or SRNs (Elman, 1990). These networks operate on similar principles, but with a useful 
twist. As in the model just described, they include input units, hidden units, and output 
units. However, they also include context units, with connections to and from the 
hidden units. SRNs are then run in stages. In the first stage, input units are activated. As 
in the model just described, these contribute to the activation of hidden units, and in 
turn to output units. At the same time, the context units also record the states of some 
or all of the hidden units. In the second stage, the activations of input and hidden units 
are reset, but the context units hold their activation, and the network is run again. 
Context units therefore give the network memory: it is now capable of learning the 
correct response given a previous input. Generalising this approach by adding context 
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units which hold their activation over a variety of timescales, Elman’s innovation 
makes it possible for network models to learn sequences with precise timing.  
 Although powerful, the PDP approach has not been without critics, and I will 
consider a couple of the most prominent objections here. One objection is that the 
approach is not biologically plausible. As Rogers and McClelland (2014) note, this 
objection centres mainly on the backpropagation algorithm. Crucially, this sort of 
learning requires labelled training data: a network might incorrectly categorise a 
carrot as a cabbage, but unless I have already labelled every carrot as a carrot it will be 
impossible to generate an error signal. Meanwhile, neither explicit supervision nor 
labelled data is available to the brain. Another related worry is that human neurons 
only signal in one direction, so could not convey an error signal backwards. 
 As Rogers and McClelland (2014) argue, however, these worries miss the point. 
Ultimately, these are idealised models, and are not meant to correspond in exact detail 
to the processes of human cognition. They are only supposed to demonstrate the 
explanatory power of network-based processing. This is still obvious even if, for 
instance, the error signal turns out to be implemented using separate connections. (As I 
noted in chapter 1, the general principle of error-based learning is now widely 
accepted in neuroscience.) To object that the real world does not contain an explicit 
supervisor is likewise to take the models too literally (McClelland, 2014). On the 
predictive coding framework, more realistic in this respect, the brain effectively 
generates its own error signal, by selectively suppressing sense input which it can 
successfully model (e.g. Friston, 2010). 
 Another common objection can be dispensed with in a similar way (McClelland, 
2014). This worry is that network models cannot always accurately predict human 
categorisation. Again, this is to be expected with an idealised model. Clearly, there a 
range of ways in which the models will differ from actual cognition. One especially 
significant difference is that, in real brains, representations of features like chairs and 
tables will themselves be represented by complex subnetworks for features like legs, 
tabletops, and so on, all the down to extremely fine-grained “micro-features” like 
colours and edges (Rumelhart and Mclelland, 1986). Under such necessary 
simplifications, perfect prediction is not even the goal. Again, the point is just to 
demonstrate the explanatory power of the general idea. 
 Even so, it is worth concluding by noting that more recent machine learning 
models implement the same basic principles in more biologically realistic ways, and 
often improve their predictive power by doing so. Perhaps the most important 
development in this regard has been the introduction of hierarchical generative models 
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(e.g. Hinton, 2007). As in the work described above, these store a model of the world in 
the connection weights between units. However, similar to predictive coding views, 
this is stored in a multi-level hierarchy, and each level aims to predict the state of the 
level below (the lowest level aims to predict the data). Here, world knowledge is stored 
in top-down, rather than horizontal connections, though the same essential properties 
apply. As on the predictive coding scheme, such models can effectively generate their 
own error signals. This means they do not require explicit feedback or labelled data. 
 
2.6 Concepts as Simulators 
 
2.6.1 Basic Structure and Development 
 
Barsalou and colleagues’ work on concepts as simulators (e.g. Barsalou 1999, 2003a, 
2009) explicitly picks up on the notion of simulation used in network models. Like the 
network view, this view assumes that the function of the conceptual system is to 
provide a model of the world, capturing the tendency of specific patterns of features to 
occur together. However, the simulator view expands the picture in several important 
ways.  
 Perhaps most importantly, on this view, the basic feature representations used 
by the network are modally grounded: they are stored in sensory areas of the brain, 
and are engaged directly during sensory processing. More precisely, sensory areas 
keep a record of previous perceptual states, such that they can revisit these states later 
in the absence of direct stimulation. As Barsalou notes, the fact that perceptual systems 
can store records of this sort is a long-standing finding of perceptual neuroscience 
(Barsalou 1999, 2008; McRae and Jones, 2013). Such symbols can be stored across 
multiple modalities, including proprioception, interoception, and introspection, in 
addition to sight, touch, and hearing. Importantly, the basic symbols do not require a 
unique format: they can themselves easily be understood as network models for 
common patterns of sense input, at the lowest level of detail. 
 Drawing on work in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Langacker, 1986), both 
simulations and the symbols that make them up are also assumed to be schematic. This 
means they do not represent perceptual states in their full detail. Instead, they 
represent selected aspects: shapes, colours, and textures. For instance, I might develop 
a perceptual symbol for the general overall shape of a tree, or the texture of its bark. As 
Barsalou (1999) notes, the schematicity of mental representations is a core finding of 
perceptual neuroscience. The idea is that we can isolate portions of perceptual states 
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using selective attention, and store information about those portions in memory 
(Logan, 1997). Notably, if perceptual symbols are understood as very low-level 
network models, their schematicity would also follow logically from the schematicity of 
those networks.  
 Once stored, perceptual symbols can become organised hierarchically into 
simulators (e.g. Barsalou, 2009).24 This is a rather general notion, which would 
encompass the sort of room schema described by Rumelhart and Mclelland (1986), but 
would also include many other kinds of categories: objects, actions, events, situations, 
and so on. As on the network view, the assumption is that associations between 
symbols will capture the typical features of the environment. Building on work by 
Damasio, however (e.g. 1989, Damasio and Damasio, 1994), the simulator view also 
adds some further biological realism. On this view, connections are not horizontal, but 
are stored hierarchically in sensory association areas (Simmons and Barsalou, 2003). 
As on most models of perception, progressively more abstracted regularities are 
modelled in progressively more anterior areas of the brain. 
 These simulators are assumed to develop implicitly in the course of routine 
perception. For instance, a simulator for a car will develop over time, as a result of 
repeated encounters with lots of different cars (Barsalou, 1999). On a first encounter, I 
might establish and store some specific perceptual symbols. This might include a 
representation of the overall shape, as well as the shapes of some specific parts, 
colours, patterns, and so on. Simultaneously, association areas will capture the co-
occurrence of these components. When a second car is seen, symbols and relationships 
common to both cars will be reinforced, and new symbols may be added that didn't get 
stored the first time around. Connections between features that co-occur more often 
will be reinforced more regularly, so this will ultimately result in an abstract model of 
the features most often shared by typical cars. Once set up, simulators can then 
specialise progressively over time, incorporating further detail (Barsalou, 1999). For 
instance, more specific symbols may become associated with specific parts of the car; 
with the typical shape and position of the tyres; with headrests on seats, and so on. The 
schematic nature of these simulators allows any amount of information to be stored 
recursively, to an arbitrary level of detail. 
 Importantly, however, not all of the information associated with the simulator 
needs to be directly tied to spatial regions (Barsalou, 1999). After all, some of our 
knowledge is only loosely spatial. My sense of where the ingredients are likely to be 
                                               
24. Barsalou (1999) calls these ‘frames’ but the idea is the same. 
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printed on food packaging is much less strict than my expectations about where the 
wheels will be on a car. Nevertheless, such knowledge can be stored. At the network 
level, units representing the list of ingredients might be strongly associated with the 
simulator for the box, but not so strongly with any particular region.  
 Finally, simulators are also assumed to integrate information temporally. If a 
sound usually follows the slamming of a car door or the turning of the key, these 
experiences will become associated with each other within the car simulator (Barsalou, 
1999).  As I noted earlier, this kind of precisely timed modelling can be accommodated 
by network models using the principles introduced by Elman (1990). 
 
2.6.2 Online and Offline Simulation 
 
Once developed, simulators are thought to provide the basis for all forms of automatic 
inference and categorisation (Barsalou, 1999, etc.). On this account, simulation is the 
fundamental process of cognition, underwriting diverse abilities including imagination, 
perception, reasoning, and planning. This process, which Barsalou and colleagues 
describe as pattern completion, can be understood as equivalent to the statistical 
inference performed by network models. As there, if one feature is represented as 
active, representations of features that commonly occur alongside it will also tend to be 
activated, while incompatible feature representations will be suppressed. Again, 
however, Barsalou’s account adds some important additional points pertinent to 
human cognition. 
 First of all, on these views, simulation should not be equated to conscious 
visualisation. Indeed, it is typically assumed to be unconscious. If I hear a car engine 
roar, I know what to expect when I turn round, but I do not have a concsious mental 
picture of a car at the forefront of my mind. Likewise, if I duck to avoid a flying tennis 
ball, I am not explicitly conscious of simulating the object’s trajectory.  More generally, 
since we are constantly perceiving objects, we will constantly and routinely use the 
conceptual system to interpret them, generate predictions, and integrate them into rich 
simulations we can use to navigate the world. This will often, perhaps typically, not 
involve conscious or reflective awareness. 
 Second, not all knowledge about a particular category will be activated during 
simulation. Instead, simulations will always be partial, in multiple senses (Barsalou, 
1999).  Perhaps most importantly, what I end up representing will depend to some 
extent on situation context. In particular, I will tend to simulate aspects of the 
environment that are directly linked with my current goals, a process also called goal 
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priming (e.g. Chartrand and Bargh, 1996). For instance, my knowledge that cars have a 
catalytic converter will not be activated in my usual dealings with cars. It may be 
activated if a cloud of worrying black smoke causes me to focus on a specific part of the 
car, simulating it in more detail. 
 Human simulations might also be partial if not enough information is available 
to identify the relevant subcategory. If I see a vague shape moving in the distant fog, I 
might be able to identify it as an object, inferring some general traits that are common 
to most objects, but not much else. If I move closer, more visual detail will be available, 
and a broader range of perceptual symbols will become active, allowing me to identify 
it as a vehicle, as a car, and perhaps eventually as a Citroën Berlingo. In line with the 
network approach described above, I might say that progressively more detailed 
subnetworks are activated alongside the basic car schema as I approach. 
 Third, once established, simulators allow us to simulate things offline, in the 
absence of the relevant stimulus. For instance, I might simulate throwing an egg at a 
wall (Barsalou 1999, etc.). This sort of processing will be detached from anything I am 
actually perceiving at the moment. It might be activated by an executive process, when 
I am (consciously or otherwise) trying to plan what I want to do next. Running a 
simulation of this sort can help me infer the likely results of my actions, and decide 
whether throwing eggs about is likely to be a good idea. Importantly, the schematic 
nature of simulators means I am not limited to imagining things I have seen before: I 
can put familiar elements together in new ways and see how they might unfold. This 
allows simulation to underpin flexible and imaginative planning.25 
 
2.6.3 Concepts as Situated and Embodied 
 
Two important further claims are that concepts are situated and embodied (Barsalou, 
2008). These properties reflect what is presumably the evolved purpose of human 
memory: not to store and reproduce information, but to support effective action in 
context. Glenberg (1997) takes a similar view. As he notes, for this to be possible, we 
don’t just need to know about the characteristics of our environment; we also need to 
know about our own bodily position and capacities, and the effects our actions might 
have on the environment. We also need to know what the things around us might tell 
us about our environment. 
 Barsalou’s (2008) view helps explain how this is possible. On this view, 
                                               
25. Some simulation will only be partially offline, combining real and hypothetical elements. I 
might imagine a gnome dancing on my real desk. 
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concepts are situated because they are learned in real situations. Whenever I 
encounter a bicycle, I will encounter it in some context, so I won’t just learn things 
about the bicycle itself. Over multiple encounters, I will also learn about its typical 
environment: where it is typically found, how it is typically used, and so on. 
Consequently, when I simulate a bicycle, I will tend to infer things about where it is 
most likely to be: certainly on the ground, perhaps on a road or in a garage. Conversely, 
if I see things in my environment like bike locks or tyre marks, I will be able to infer 
that bicycles are nearby. 
 At this point, it is possible to answer Fodor’s question about PET FISH. As I 
suggested earlier, we might reasonably expect someone to figure out that pet fish live 
in tanks, even if they had never seen or heard of a pet fish before. If a network only 
represents information about internal properties of objects, it is not clear how this can 
be possible: living in a tank is not a typical property either of fish, or of pets. But a fully-
fledged conceptual system, which contains information about contextual properties, 
allows this, exploiting what Barsalou (2017) calls situational constraint. This might 
explain PET FISH in the following way. First, fish are reliably found in water. Second, pets 
quite reliably live in houses. Third, bodies of water in houses are reliably kept in 
containers. The conceptual system will store all these expectations among others, and 
the simulation of PET FISH which best satisfies all these constraints is likely to involve a 
fish tank. 
 Concepts are also embodied as an upshot of the fact they are learned in real 
situations (Barsalou, 2008). As records of previous sensory states, they do not 
represent objects in the abstract, but as we encounter them. For instance, I will store 
detailed representations of what it is like to ride a bicycle, including the sensation of 
my feet pressing against the pedals and so on. I will also associate all this with 
interoceptive and proprioceptive sensations. Additionally, I will store temporally 
organised knowledge about how this experience typically changes when I act on the 
pedals in a certain way, and so on. Indeed, these habitual expectations will largely 
constitute a skill like riding a bicycle (but see part 8 of this chapter for some important 
additional details about action). They will also allow me to simulate offline what it 
might be like to ride a bicycle, including my own bodily state, feelings, and so on. 
  More generally, my knowledge of these regularities can help me recognise the 
actions open to me in different situations, generating appropriate affordances 
(Glenberg, 1997). When I encounter a door handle, I will infer possibilities for turning 
and pulling the door, but probably not for pulling the handle off. To some degree, this 
will come from my knowledge about typical door handles: that they tend to respond to 
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pressure in a certain way and so on. In a similar way, I will know what I can expect to 
happen if I approach a street corner and turn right: typically, another street will lie 
beyond it where I can walk on. This will help me build up a general sense of being 
situated in space. 
 Of course, the properties of my environment are not the only constraint on the 
actions I can take. I am also constrained by the capabilities of my own body. As 
Glenberg (1997) points out, I will only know what it is possible for me to do if I can 
model both of these things in relation to each other. We can now understand this more 
precisely in terms of a network model, integrating my representation of myself with 
my representation of the world. (My model of myself will include the possible 
configurations of my limbs in relation to each other, the forces I can exert with my 
muscles, and so on.) Somewhat abstractly, this might be understood as another 
schema, with a space for all of the possible configurations of the world in which my 
body might appear. The mutual constraints imposed jointly by my body schema and 
my model of the world will help me ensure that I only tend to simulate actions which 
are actually possible for me. 
 
2.6.4 Simulation in Language Comprehension 
 
One final benefit of the simulator view is that it adds a helpful way of thinking about 
language. Specifically, to understand language is to simulate the thing which is talked 
about. Like the notion of simulation itself, this idea is partly rooted in parallel 
processing models, which have long been used to model various aspects of language 
comprehension (e.g. McClelland and Elman, 1986; Elman, 1990; Elman, 2009). 
Barsalou et. al.’s (2008) take on this is the language and situated simulation (LASS) 
account, which treats language processing as similar to perceptual processing. On this 
view, linguistic input is treated analogously to input in other modalities.  At the lowest 
level, I will store information about typically co-occurring phonemes, representing 
words. As with other cases of perceptual inference, this will make it possible for me to 
infer missing phonemes if I do not hear the entire word. 
 At a slightly higher level, words can then be associated with other words and 
phrases they often occur alongside, consistent with extensive research on semantic 
priming (McNamara, 2005). These will also be integrated in an organised way with 
wide-ranging knowledge about familiar events and situations. This is backed up by 
much evidence from psycholinguistics, for instance by the finding that “snow” primes 
“jackets” (Metusalem et. al., 2010) and that “director” and “bribe” prime “dismissal” 
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(Chwilla and Kolk, 2005). Consistent with the view that simulation is situated and 
embodied, word primes are known to directly activate motor areas, and to prime 
actions associated with category members (e.g. Pulvermüller et. al., 2014; Masson et. al. 
2011). On this view, interpreting a statement like “the boy threw the ball” will involve 
constructing a situated simulation, bringing together diverse knowledge about the 
agent, the action, the object, and the likely context. 
 Of course, there are many possible questions about this approach, which it will 
not be possible to do justice here. Perhaps the most obvious is: how does the syntax of 
the input constrain how these simulations unfold, and how do we become sensitive to 
these constraints?  It will not be possible to do justice to this issue here, but it is worth 
noting that simple recurrent networks of the sort described earlier can capture some of 
the most important properties of syntax (e.g. Elman 2004, 2009). On these models, 
context units can simultaneously store information both about semantic and about 
syntactic properties of previous words (which are not sharply distinguished). Indeed, 
these networks are arguably more powerful than classic approaches to syntax, since 
they can naturally accommodate the contribution of semantic meaning to phenomena 
like syntactic ambiguity resolution. 
 
2.6.5 Objections to the Simulator View 
 
Perhaps the most common objection to the simulator view has been that certain 
concepts that do not fit into the framework, especially abstract26 concepts like NUMBER, 
NEGATION, TRUTH and DEMOCRACY. These, it is often argued, cannot be modal (e.g. Dove 
2009, 2016; Chatterjee, 2010). Notably, the standard way of explaining abstract 
concepts like DEMOCRACY on the simulator view is to point out that they are associated 
with a number of concrete experiences. These might include voting, listening to 
political debates, talking to campaigners on the doorstep, and so on. Abstract concepts 
might also get associated with characteristic emotional responses (Prinz, 2005).  
 Dove (2009) objects to this explanation on the grounds that I might not have 
much knowledge about the concrete details of elections in an unfamiliar country like 
Moldova. This means I might not be able to simulate an election in Moldova 
particularly well. Nevertheless, I can still make some inferences about what Moldova 
                                               
26. The notion of abstraction should be treated carefully. In this thesis, usually mean abstraction 
away from, or generalisation (i.e. disregarding differences between things to focus on what they 
share). However, as Barsalou (2003b) notes, the term can refer to at least six different things. In 
the objections I discuss over the next few paragraphs it is meant to mean something more like a 
lack of concreteness. 
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must be like if it is a democracy. Dove therefore argues that these inferences must 
involve something other than perceptually grounded simulation. Specifically, he 
suggests they might involve amodal, linguistic representations, representing the 
abstract links between ideas like GOVERNMENT and FREEDOM. 
 Dove’s objection fails for at least three reasons. For one thing, Barsalou’s 
approach already assumes that simulation is partial: whenever I simulate a situation, I 
will always omit some of the details. Second, if I simulate an election in Moldova, I will 
probably infer that it is similar to elections I am familiar with elsewhere. I can infer the 
details by analogy, even if I know little about Moldova. (Perhaps I will get it wrong, but 
I can still hazard a guess.) Third, if my inferences about democracies are based on 
linguistic representations, this would precisely make them perceptual. As Borghi and 
Zarcone (2016) point out, verbal representations are sensory and motor 
representations, associated with actions of the lungs, mouth, and throat. Reflecting this, 
they show that words for abstract concepts reliably prime mouth movements.  
 Despite these possibilities for DEMOCRACY, one might still struggle to see how 
logical concepts like TRUTH can be accommodated by the simulator view. Barsalou and 
Wiemer-Hastings (2005) address this concern. As they note, in certain environments 
(e.g. trials, some social situations), there are clearly perceivable differences between 
situations where the truth is told and situations where it is not. We might also 
associate TRUTH with the experience of testing a claim, or perhaps with the speech of 
people we trust. In rather rarer circumstances, a philosopher might associate it with a 
set of formal operations for deriving a conclusion from a premise. These diverse links 
to real experiences should make it possible to run many kinds of situated simulations 
involving TRUTH. (For further discussion of some possible differences between abstract 
concepts and other concepts, see ibid). 
 
2.7 Concepts in Active Inference 
 
In the previous section, I described how conceptual models of body and world might 
interact to constrain the action plans we can simulate. Still, one key question remains 
unanswered: why do we take one action rather than another? To answer this question, 
I introduce the notion of active inference, developed as part of the predictive coding 
framework (e.g. Friston, 2010; Friston et. al. 2013, 2015). 
 The predictive coding framework is broadly compatible with the view of 
concepts I have been developing here. Predictive coding also assumes a hierarchical, 
network-based model of the world, with progressively more abstract and general 
77 
 
representations at higher levels (Friston and Kiebel, 2009). Likewise, it assumes this 
knowledge is equivalent to a probability distribution, representing the states of the 
world most consistent with prior experience. The main thing it adds to the picture, as 
described in chapter 1, is an account of how information is passed between different 
levels of the hierarchy, and how error signals are adjusted for estimated precision to 
optimise perception and learning. 
 In this context, active inference is based on the premise that living things must 
stay within a limited range of states, compatible with their continued survival. The 
better an organism can keep itself within familiar states, the better it will be able to 
control entropy, and prevent itself from falling apart. It isn’t possible for an organism 
to have complete, direct knowledge about internal states (e.g. blood sugar), but it can 
track this to some degree with sensory mechanisms (e.g. hunger). If it can keep its 
sensory states within a certain range, it can therefore limit the overall range of states in 
which it is likely to find itself. In other words, in order to stay alive, organisms must 
minimise (expected) sensory surprise. 
 On this view, my expectations about future sensory states come from two 
sources (Friston et. al. 2015). The first source is what I have already learned about the 
way the world is structured. I must have a predictive model of the world, of the sort 
described in the last few sections of this chapter. One way for me to minimise sensory 
surprise is to maintain the accuracy and reliability of this model. If I open a door and 
expect to see a blue room, I will not be surprised when I do. If I lack a good predictive 
model, anything might behind the door, perhaps even a pit of sharks. The better my 
model is, the better I will be able to anticipate what will happen next, so I will be less 
vulnerable to such unhappy surprises. 
 Of course, just predicting future sensory states accurately is not enough. I also 
need to choose actions that keep me in particular sensory states if I want to survive. I 
need some way of choosing the door to the blue room over the door to the shark pit, 
even if I know perfectly well what is behind both. As I noted earlier, the set of actions I 
can represent as available to me is constrained both by my model of the world and by 
my model of my own bodily capabilities. This still leaves lots of possibilities open. In 
principle, I might try to figure out what to do by simulating every possible action I 
might take. I could try to figure out what I would experience in each case, then choose 
whatever plan would best maximise pleasure and minimise pain.27 However, this 
would be very time-consuming and computationally intractable: an almost infinite 
                                               
27.  …or optimise some other cost/benefit function. 
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range of subtly different actions might be possible. 
 Active inference bypasses this problem by introducing a second set of 
expectations, in addition to acquired knowledge (Friston et. al. 2015). These might be 
described roughly as optimistic assumptions. I assume I will tend to experience 
pleasure rather than pain, that I will be sated rather than hungry, warm rather than 
cold, and so on. The idea is that some of these expectations are fixed innately, prior to 
any learning (e.g. by evolution), and correspond to states which I need to seek out in 
order to survive. Since I will necessarily remain in these states while I am alive, these 
expectations will also tend to be self-reinforcing. 
 From this starting point, active inference inverts the intuitive understanding of 
action. Rather than choose the action I think will work out best, I infer the action I will 
take from my expectation that things will work out well. For instance, I might assume 
that I won’t feel cold, then infer from this that I plan to go indoors. In other words, 
evolutionary goals are encoded as fixed expectations, and by pursuing my goals I 
ensure that these expectations are met. These optimistic expectations provide the third 
constraint, in addition to world and body, on the actions I can plan. Just as my (learned) 
prior knowledge that I can’t walk through walls will prevent me from attempting to do 
so, my (innate) prior ‘knowledge’ that I will not be hungry will prevent me from leaving 
the house without breakfast. 
 The next natural question is how I get from these representations to more 
sophisticated plans. At this point, the framework begins to mesh well with some 
accounts of executive functioning (see also Pezzulo, 2012, Pezzulo et. al., 2018). As 
research on executive control emphasises, I don’t just represent a plan of action for the 
immediate short term. Instead, I represent a hierarchy of progressively more complex, 
long term action plans (Barkley, 2012). For instance, in the short term, I might plan to 
open the fridge to get cheese out and make a sandwich. In the medium term, I might 
plan to make a sandwich so I have something to eat at work later (on the assumption 
that I won’t go hungry). In the longer term, I might go to work because I want to finish 
my PhD.  
 Broadly, the constraints on my long term plans can be understood by analogy 
with the constraints on my short term plans. Much as my short term plans might be 
constrained by a sense of my own bodily capacities, my medium and long term plans 
might be constrained by what I have learned about my own intellectual and social 
abilities, my willpower, and so on. Likewise, just as my short term plans will be shaped 
by my immediate circumstances, my long term plans will be shaped by more general 
circumstances, like the social, educational and work opportunities I know are available 
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to me. 
   In this context, I might learn that certain very general outcomes are linked 
with the states in which I expect to find myself. For instance, I might learn that having 
money gives me the power to stay well fed and warm. If I assume I will achieve these 
things, I might infer that I plan to apply for some postdoc funding.28 As Pezzulo (2012) 
describes, very high-level action plans can be implemented by being translated down 
the hierarchy into more short-term expectations. For instance, if my high-level plan is 
to have dinner, I might infer that I will walk to the shops. Between this and my 
expectation that I will not be cold while doing so, I might infer that I plan to get my 
coat. This hierarchical translation of long-term goals into short term ones can also be 
conceptualised as self-control. I will forego staying quite so narrowly within my 
expected states in the short term, so that I can better minimise surprise in the long 
term. 
 In this way, my plans can be implemented all the way down through the motor 
system, from general plans in higher executive areas down through to progressively 
smaller actions in lower motor areas, and ultimately into expectations about individual 
muscle movements (Friston, 2011). At each level, top-down commands will interact 
with progressively more local constraints, ensuring actions get implemented in an 
optimal way. Notably, consistent with the predictive coding scheme, commands are 
only fed forward if they countermand what lower areas of the motor system are 
already doing; otherwise, they get suppressed. 
 Finally, one indirect consequence of the active inference framework is that I 
will act to improve the information available to me (Hohwy, 2013; Friston et. al. 2015). 
In other words, I will seek learning opportunities. Again, this is a consequence of the 
idea that I seek to minimise sensory surprise over the long term, relative to fixed 
expectations. Over time, I will learn that I can only do this by taking action to minimise 
uncertainty. For instance, perhaps I am lost in the jungle. I might learn that if I move to 
a higher vantage point, I will tend to experience fewer surprises over time. Likewise, I 
might minimise surprise over the long term by exploring my environment. In other 
words, I acquire a meta-model for learning about the world, which helps me regulate 
and update my first-order model to better anticipate new experiences. 
 
 
                                               
28. Sometimes, there might be multiple action plans that are equally good. This might seem to 
raise a question: how do I choose between these options? However, if all of them are good, there 
is no need for an answer: it might be no more than random noise in the brain. 
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2.8 Concepts in Dual Process Theory 
 
Near the start of this chapter, I mentioned a criticism often levelled against statistical 
theories of concepts. The charge is that they cannot account for categories with strict 
boundaries. As I argued, this objection fails partly because statistical criteria include 
strict criteria as a subset. Nevertheless, as I noted, I can sometimes employ more 
complex procedures like dividing by 23. The general view of statistical inference I have 
developed so far does not obviously accommodate this. I now respond to the worry by 
discussing dual process theories. 
 As the name suggests, dual process theories distinguish between two kinds of 
processes (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 processes are normally defined by two 
criteria. First, they do not use up working memory capacity. Second, they are 
autonomous: they are self-governed and, once initiated, cannot be stopped. Typically, 
type 1 processes are also fast, unconscious, and effortless (ibid). They include 
recognition, heuristic estimation, and stereotype-driven inference (Kahneman, 2011). 
If I quickly guess how long it might take to swim across a lake, or if I assume someone 
is dangerous because of the expression on their face, these will be type 1 processes. 
Such processes are often fallible; indeed, they predictably lead us into error in certain 
circumstances (Fischer and Engelhardt, 2016). But they can also help us to make useful 
snap decisions. For instance: should I get away from this angry-looking guy? 
 By contrast, type 2 processing does depend on working memory capacity 
(Evans and Stanovich, 2013).  Typically, type 2 processes are slow, conscious, 
controlled, and effortful (Kahneman, 2011). They include inferences according to 
explicit rules, and principled categorisation procedures. If I deduce that the pope is a 
bachelor by considering the legal definition, or if I infer that “Rex barks” from the 
premises “all dogs bark” and “Rex is a dog”, I am likely to be using type 2 processes. 
Type 2 processes are also typically normative, in the sense that there are standards for 
checking whether the process has been carried out correctly (Evans, 2012). 
(Importantly, not in the sense that the process will always get carried out correctly.) 
 On this basis, it makes sense to equate type 1 processes with the automatic 
inference and simulation processes described above. These processes will not involve 
explicit rules; nor will they (typically) provide strict category boundaries. Meanwhile, 
our ability to employ strict definitions, normative rules, and complicated chains of 
reasoning, can be understood in terms of type 2 processes. This will encompass 
complex abilities like dividing by 23. It is therefore not necessary to provide a 
straightforward statistical inference account of such abilities. 
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 There is still one outstanding question. How do type 2 processes relate to the 
broader picture developed in this chapter? Answering this question properly would be 
a diversion, but three things ought to be noted. First, since they are controlled, type 2 
processes would be implemented by active inference, similar to actual actions. For 
instance, I might expect to answer a question, and infer I will carry out a type 2 process 
to get the answer. Second, though type 2 processes implement normative rules, it is 
perfectly possible for PDP and SRN networks to learn to implement rules (McClelland 
and Patterson, 2002). Third, I might learn normative logical rules by abstracting over 
various regularities in my environment. Overall, the prospects for integrating type 2 
processes into the overall picture seem good. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, semantic memory can be understood as a network of probabilistically 
associated feature representations. It is a hierarchical network, with more general, 
abstract, and temporally extended representations at the top, and more local, short-
term representations at the bottom. Within this, at each level, the strengths of the 
connections between feature representations encode a model of the statistical 
structure of the world. This makes it possible to store integrated information about 
subcategories, causes, contexts, and embodied practical possibilities. I can also learn by 
updating my model when I encounter anything surprising or unfamiliar. The activation 
state of my conceptual system at any given time serves as a structured representation, 
or simulation, of my current environment (more strictly, a probability distribution over 
multiple possibilities). It embodies a cluster of interconnected inferences about the 
most likely causes of my current sense input, and allows me to predict what is likely to 
happen next. Within this system, specific concepts can be understood as stable 
subnetworks: clusters of feature representations that tend to be activated together or 
in predictable sequences. Through active inference from optimistic assumptions, the 
system also supports flexible action in context, helping me to avoid entering states that 
would be incompatible with my survival. 
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Chapter 3: Autism as Semantic Feature 
Dissociation 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
In chapter 1, I suggested research on concepts in semantic memory might speak to 
important ambiguities in existing theories of autism, especially Bayesian theories. 
Given the long history of equivocal findings in autism research, I also suggested that 
serious attention to qualitative data might help distinguish competing theoretical 
proposals, or motivate new ones. In chapter 2, I moved on to review the literature on 
concepts. I argued the conceptual system can be understood as a statistical model of 
the world, bringing together diverse knowledge about subcategories, causes, contexts, 
and embodied possibilities. 
 This chapter now introduces and develops the core claim of this thesis: the 
Semantic Feature Dissociation (SFD) hypothesis. The claim is that in some cases of 
autism, connections representing low-strength correlations between features are 
weakened. Importantly, the goal of this chapter is not to provide strong evidence for a 
general claim about autism. Instead, there are three more modest objectives: first, to 
illustrate the range of effects SFD would have; second, to show this is consistent with 
the distinctive experiences of some autistic people; and third, to highlight some key 
differences between SFD, HIPPEA, and weak priors. To accomplish this, I outline 
findings from a qualitative study of autism autobiographies.  
 In part 3.1, I begin by introducing the hypothesis. I then describe how the two 
main analytical categories employed in my study—concept narrowing (CN) and 
concept specialization (CS)—would follow from it, and summarise the major 
differences between SFD and other Bayesian theories of autism. In part 3.2, I describe 
the methods. Finally, in part 3.3 I describe my findings. These show that SFD can 
plausibly account for a broad range of autism traits, and is generally a better fit for the 
autobiographical data than other proposals. 
 
3.1 Autism as Semantic Feature Dissociation 
 
3.1.1 Outline of the Hypothesis 
 
The Semantic Feature Dissociation (SFD) hypothesis is the claim that some autistic 
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individuals do not represent weak correlations in semantic memory. In the rest of this 
chapter, I explore the consequences of this change using two analytical categories: 
concept narrowing (CN) and concept specialization (CS). CN is a tendency to make 
fewer inferences when a concept is activated, while CS is a tendency to only activate a 
concept if specific, narrow criteria are met. I developed these categories as part of the 
qualitative study I describe below, formulating the SFD hypothesis afterwards in order 
to clarify the link between them. For clarity, in presenting them I reverse this order, 
beginning with SFD and describing how each would result from it.  
The basic mechanism of SFD, spanning both CN and CS, would be a tendency to 
make fewer inferences from the same cues. As described in chapter 2, if I know two 
things commonly occur together, and I perceive one of them, I will often infer the 
presence of the other (when one feature representation is active, it will increase the 
activation of the other). More generally, multiple statistically weighted cues might 
work together to motivate an inference where no one of these cues would be sufficient 
alone. On the SFD hypothesis, connections representing statistically weak correlations 
are weaker or absent in autism. Consequently, autistic people may miss29 inferences 
that others would make: concepts may not get activated, or may only be partially 
activated. 
From this starting point, CN and CS represent two contrasting ways of 
understanding the effects of SFD. Ultimately, they are not logically independent 
mechanisms, but descriptive categories, founded on a pragmatic distinction. As I 
suggested in chapter 2, a concept can be understood as a group of feature 
representations in the semantic network which are reliably activated together. 
However, activation is typically only partial: some features will only be activated in the 
context of a relevant goal, and subcategory details will not always be specified. At the 
same time, given the systematic overlap and situatedness of concepts, there is no 
principled way to distinguish features that are part of a concept from features that are 
merely associated with it. Strictly speaking, this means there is no precise way of 
distinguishing cases when a concept is deployed from cases when it is not. Instead, it 
will be a matter of degree, with more or fewer associated features activated at any 
given time. 
Nevertheless, it is descriptively compelling to distinguish between two 
                                               
29. Throughout this and chapter 4, when I refer to “missing” inferences, I mean relative to a 
neurotypical norm. The term is therefore not strictly evaluative. Although missing inferences 
often create difficulties, they can be a good thing at times. To take one example (discussed in 
chapter 4) there is some evidence that autistic individuals “miss” stereotype-driven racist and 
sexist inferences. 
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different kinds of situations: one in which I recognize an object or situation as familiar, 
but fail to notice one or two important things about it; and one in which I simply do not 
recognize it. In the first case, I might say roughly that I activate the concept, in the 
sense that I represent most of the key features of the category. In the second case, I 
might say roughly that I do not. 
Assuming this pragmatic distinction, CN is a tendency for autistic people to 
activate concepts, but miss certain inferences that others might make. Under SFD, this 
would occur because features which are weakly associated with the concept in 
neurotypicals are not associated with it at all in autism. Hence, when the rest of the 
concept is activated, they do not get inferred. (In autobiographies, as I’ll note later, 
inferences based on weak correlations seem particularly likely to get missed.) 
Technically, CN encompasses cases where most of the features associated with a 
category are activated, but a small number are not. Practically, it corresponds to a set 
of traits easiest to interpret as difficulties with making pragmatic social inferences. 
Meanwhile, on the same distinction, CS is a tendency for autistic people not to 
activate certain concepts unless very specific criteria are satisfied. Under SFD, this 
would also occur because certain features are no longer strongly associated with the 
concept. Hence, when these are the only available cues, the concept will not get 
activated at all. In an extreme case, redness and roundness might still be cues that an 
object is a tomato, but other cues, like leaves, shininess, texture, and so on, might no 
longer work. Someone with a concept of tomato like this would have a less flexible 
category: they might struggle to recognize a green tomato, because one of the only two 
cues they can use to ascertain its identity is missing. (In autobiographies, as I’ll note 
later, low-reliability cues seem particularly likely to get missed.) Technically, CS 
encompasses cases where a small number of cue features get activated, but most of the 
features making up the concept do not. Practically, it corresponds to traits easiest to 
interpret as a tendency to be less flexible in categorization. 
 Finally, one further point of clarification is necessary. Since concepts 
systematically overlap, it is often possible to reinterpret an example of CS as CN (or 
vice versa) by considering a different concept. For instance, WHEEL is not represented 
independently of CAR. In a hypothetical extreme case of missed inference, I might see 
the top half of a car and fail to infer that it has wheels. This can be understood equally 
easily as a failure to activate WHEEL or as an incomplete activation of CAR. Even so, as I 
hope the rest of this chapter will indicate, it is useful to retain both descriptive 
categories. Sometimes, the CN explanation seems illuminating where the CS 
explanation seems obtuse, and vice versa. The distinction will also make it easier to see 
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how SFD is related to accounts of categorisation and of pragmatic inference in autism. 
 
3.1.2 SFD vs HIPPEA and Weak Priors 
 
Before turning to the results proper, I will sketch how SFD would differ from the two 
other Bayesian proposals, weak priors and HIPPEA, so I can compare the predictions as 
I go on. First, SFD would amount to a specific version of weak priors, more precise in 
important respects. As described in chapter 1, the weak priors hypothesis is a general 
claim about prior knowledge of all kinds.  However, one can distinguish between 
structural priors, equivalent to knowledge stored in long-term memory, and contextual 
priors, equivalent to short-term inferences made on the fly. The SFD hypothesis is 
solely a claim about structural priors. Furthermore, these are not weakened uniformly: 
knowledge about weak correlations is selectively lost. Of course, this will have indirect 
consequences for contextual priors, since contextual priors are derived from structural 
priors during perception. As expressed by CN and CS, contextual priors will be 
preserved when they can be derived in a conceptual system which only represents 
strong correlations. Otherwise, they will be absent. 
The relation of SFD to HIPPEA is slightly more complicated. As I noted in 
chapter 1, HIPPEA makes various predictions about priors. First, it is meant to predict 
stronger contextual priors (since greater confidence will be placed in sense input). By 
contrast, SFD predicts weak or absent contextual priors (missing inferences), when 
these cannot be derived from rule-based models. (Significantly, to this extent, SFD and 
high prediction error are not incompatible. If both hypotheses were true, one would 
expect strong contextual priors, but only when they can be derived exclusively from 
knowledge about strong correlations.) 
Second, HIPPEA should make it harder to distinguish informative from 
uninformative cues. Instead, all cues will receive an equally high weighting. This is 
meant to have both short-term and long-term consequences.  In the short term, it 
implies particular difficulties in volatile environments, where there are many cues with 
different information values. SFD predicts difficulties in similar situations but for a 
different reason: an inability to make inferences from cues which are actually 
informative. This would not be, contra HIPPEA, because the cues are weighted less 
highly. Instead, it would be because the conceptual model can make no use of them. 
(Significantly, again, this does not make SFD incompatible with highly precise, 
inflexible prediction errors. However, if both hypotheses were true, the SFD prediction 
would trump the HIPPEA prediction. It doesn’t matter how precise I take my sense 
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input to be, if I don’t know how to infer anything useful from it).   
Finally, third, over the long term, HIPPEA is supposed to predict that autistic 
individuals end up with overfitted models of the world: models which contain 
erroneous parameters. As a result, it is argued, they will learn categories in an 
inappropriately narrow form. By contrast, SFD would predict difficulties with 
generalisation for the opposite reason: because all but the most reliably informative 
parameters are stripped out of the model. In CS, as described above, concepts will only 
be deployed when a specific set of highly reliable cues are available.  
This contrast may seem puzzling. How can HIPPEA and SFD make similar 
predictions for effectively opposite reasons? As I noted at the end of chapter 1, 
properly understood, extra model parameters should predict both overuse and 
underuse of concepts. If my model contains too many parameters, I will be sensitive to 
irrelevant details. Sometimes, this means I will over-generalise, because I will have 
some erroneous reason for thinking a category applies. However, sometimes I will also 
under-generalise: I will have some erroneous reason for thinking a category does not 
apply.  
 In this context, it is easy to see how the two accounts might predict superficially 
similar effects. If my model contains too few parameters, I will be less sensitive to 
relevant nuances. Sometimes, again, this means I will under-generalise. In this case, 
however, it will be because I fail to notice a positive reason to employ a category. 
Likewise, sometimes I will over-generalise because I fail to notice a positive reason not 
to employ a category. In summary, erroneous parameters imply erroneous inferences 
for erroneous reasons, whereas SFD predicts missing inferences, and insensitivity to 
relevant reasons. (Significantly, one can ask whether high, inflexibly precise prediction 
errors really do predict overfitting, as I did in chapter 1. If they do not (or mostly do 
not), HIPPEA and SFD are not incompatible. I will argue at the end of chapter 4 that 
high, inflexible prediction errors would mainly predict SFD.) 
 
3.2 Methods and Materials 
 
3.2.1 Materials 
 
Typically, qualitative research on autism autobiographies (e.g. Hacking, 2009; van 
Goidsenhoven, 2017) focuses on identity and representation: it asks about how autistic 
writers understand themselves, about the significance of autism narratives as a genre, 
and so on. In contrast, the goal of the present study was to investigate autistic 
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cognition. This novel approach also contrasts with the standard way in which new 
hypotheses about autism are developed: usually, they are motivated by an analysis of 
quantitative data. One motivation for this strategy was that qualitative evidence might 
provide important new constraints on theorising about autism, since the experimental 
literature is often equivocal. Another motivation was the possibility that autism is 
heterogeneous, such that no single explanation is possible. Against this background, 
quantitative group studies may not be the best starting point for new theory. 
I began with the general, provisional hypothesis that changes in concept 
structure might account for some common autism traits. To explore this possibility, I 
analysed 8 autobiographies, each produced by a writer diagnosed with autism or 
Asperger’s Syndrome.30 I chose autobiographies as my source material for two main 
reasons. First, in contrast with interviews, writing gives people more time to think, so 
they can articulate their experiences as clearly and precisely as possible. Second, 
though a lot of written autobiographical material is available online (in blog posts, 
forums, and so on), it isn’t always possible to confirm who the writers are, or whether 
they have a formal autism diagnosis. 
To assemble the corpus, I used google search to obtain a preliminary list of 
candidate texts. I then excluded texts obtained using facilitated communication, since it 
is widely argued that some of these are generated by the unconscious influence of the 
facilitator, rather by the ostensible author (Travers et. al., 2014). Finally, I excluded 
texts by writers who did not explicitly report a formal diagnosis of autism or 
Asperger’s Syndrome. The following table contains demographic information for the 
remaining authors. 
  
                                               
30. AS no longer exists as a diagnosis in the DSM-V. Prior to that, it was defined by the absence 
of significant language impairment. It is fairly safe to assume that published autobiographers 
are also linguistically competent (excluding some difficulties with pragmatics which would be 
consistent with AS). Hence, I do not distinguish between AS and autism here. 
88 
 
 
 
Author  Book Year  Age 31 Diagnosis Occupation Education Nationality 
Daniel 
Tammet 
Born on a 
Blue Day 
2006 27 AS Author, 
Translator, 
Professional 
Savant 
BA 
(Humanities) 
UK 
Liane 
Holliday 
Willey 
Pretending 
to be Normal 
1999 40 AS Author, 
Educator, 
Autism 
Consultant  
PhD 
(Education) 
United 
States 
Wenn 
Lawson32 
Life Behind 
Glass 
1998 46 Autism Psychologist, 
Counsellor 
PhD (Psychology) Australia 
Donna 
Williams 
Nobody 
Nowhere 
1992 29 Autism Author,  Artist, 
Autism 
Consultant 
BA (Linguistics) 
PgDip (Education) 
Australia 
Mark 
Fleisher 
Making 
Sense of the 
Unfeasible 
2003 36 AS Author MsC (Maths) UK 
Dominique 
Dumortier 
From 
Another 
Planet 
2004 28 AS Author, 
Educator 
BA (Education) Belgium 
Temple 
Grandin 
Thinking in 
Pictures 
1995 48 Autism Professor PhD (Animal 
Science) 
United 
States 
John Elder 
Robison 
Look Me in 
the Eye 
2007 50 AS Author, Autism 
Consultant 
High School United 
States 
 
Since only a relatively small number of autism autobiographies are available, I made no 
attempt to seek a representative sample. Indeed, the material is unrepresentative in 
significant ways.  First, relative to autistic people generally, these writers are highly 
educated, with more than half holding postgraduate qualifications. Second, as 
published autobiographers, they are likely to have particularly strong language 
abilities.  Third, more of the writers are female; by contrast, people diagnosed with 
autism are around three times more likely to be male (Loomes et. al., 2017). Fourth, the 
                                               
31. At publication. 
32. Published Life Behind Glass as Wendy Lawson. 
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texts were published across a span of 12 years, by authors who were themselves 
diagnosed over an even wider span of time. During this time, diagnostic criteria and 
practices relating to autism have changed significantly.  
Finally, fifth, the quantity of relevant material varied across texts, especially 
with the authors’ goals. Some writers (e.g. Dumortier) focused primarily on describing 
their autism traits, while others (e.g. Robison), placed more emphasis on telling a life 
story. In the more narrative texts, material relevant for the purposes of this study was 
sparser. More material was also naturally available in longer texts. As a result, though I 
have sought a broad range of evidence from across the corpus, I have inevitably relied 
more on some texts than on others in the final analysis. Overall, the present study is 
emphatically not intended to support any strong general claims about autism. Instead, 
it is a preliminary plausibility study, motivating a new hypothesis with scope for 
further development. 
 
3.2.2 Coding and Analysis 
 
In the first phase of coding, I selected 8 chapters, one from each text. I picked out 
chapters which discussed a wide range of experiences linked to standard categories of 
autism traits: social difficulties, language difference, repetitive behaviours and intense 
interests, and unusual perceptual experiences. On a sentence by sentence basis, I 
identified any passages that could plausibly be interpreted as examples of traits in 
these four domains. However, since I anticipated that relevant mechanisms might cut 
across domains, I did not group them on this basis. Instead, I interpreted each passage, 
as far as possible, by considering how these writers deployed categories, attended to 
sensory cues, and made or missed inferences. Adopting a technique from grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2014), I generated memos throughout this process to keep track of 
emerging commonalities and themes. 
At the end of the first phase, I was able to develop in outline the two descriptive 
categories described above: CN and CS. At this stage, many difficulties with social 
conventions and pragmatic language could already be attributed to CN, and many 
difficulties with understanding emotions and with classifying objects to CS. However, 
two prominent themes remained unexplained. These included a specific pattern of 
difficulties with social norms in unstructured situations, and several unusual sensory 
differences. 
In the second phase of coding, I deployed the two subcategories developed 
during phase 1 to analyse the whole corpus. I sought to identify passages consistent 
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with the patterns identified during phase 1, as well as possible exceptions and 
counterexamples. I also looked for passages that might shed light on the difficulties 
which remained unaccounted for during phase 1. In addition, I sought examples of CN 
and CS that might fall outside traditional categories of autism traits. During this phase, 
it became clear that a more specific version of CN (where inferences based on less 
regular patterns, like flexible social norms, were more likely to be missed) could 
provide a more satisfying account of social and language difficulties. It also became 
clear that CN and CS together could help to explain some common sensory differences. 
At the end of phase 2, I formulated the SFD hypothesis as a way to account for these 
effects. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Concept Narrowing and Social Difficulties 
 
To recap, concept narrowing (CN) encompasses a tendency to make fewer inferences 
from the same concepts. This could account for a wide range of difficulties with social 
norms reported by autistic autobiographers. For example, Willey (2015, pp.108-109) 
describes leaving a beauty salon early, her hair still completely covered in red dye, and 
arriving to pick up her children at school. Here, she reports being completely unaware 
that she was acting in a way others might see as odd. She writes:  “I never thought for 
an instant that anyone would be so shocked.” 
 As I noted in chapter 2, many of our concepts are schemas which represent 
familiar categories of situations. The function of these structures is precisely to store 
knowledge about how we expect things to be in these situations, including how people 
typically act and dress. This would include, for instance, a schema representing the 
school playground, with parents arriving to pick up their children in the afternoon. 
Difficulties with inferring from this schema that certain behaviours are expected would 
clearly make it harder to act in accordance with those expectations.  
A similar tendency would also explain some difficulties experienced by 
Robison, who reports having trouble learning conversational norms: 
    
[At the age of 9] I suddenly realized that when a kid said “look at my 
Tonka truck, he expected an answer that made sense in the context of 
what he had said (Robison, 2008, p.20). 
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Again, a fairly high-level schema will store knowledge about the typical pattern and 
structure of conversations, making it possible to infer what sort of response is likely to 
be expected, and to prevent us from deviating too far from it. Missing these inferences 
would make it harder to socialize skilfully.  
Significantly, these are difficulties with appreciating things that most 
neurotypicals would find intuitively and pre-reflectively obvious, not with explicit 
social reasoning. I assume most neurotypical children do not need to explicitly and 
reflectively learn the maxim of relevance before they can understand other children. 
Nor do most adults need to consciously think through the implications of arriving at 
school covered in dye in order to anticipate how people might react. Instead, we can 
draw rapidly and automatically on a schema for public places, which will include 
knowledge about typical norms of dress. Since concepts are the basis for these implicit, 
automatic inferences, difficulties with making them would clearly point to changes in 
concept structure. These two examples also already seem more consistent with SFD 
than with an overfitting interpretation. It is relatively easy to understand Willey’s 
actions in terms of missing inferences, but much harder to understand them in terms of 
unwarranted inferences. Evidently, she does not turn up covered in red dye because 
she positively and erroneously concludes this is a useful thing to do. Instead, she 
misses a reason not to; she fails to appreciate the likely consequences. 
Importantly, autobiographers did not describe a consistent difficulty with 
social norms of all kinds (as might be predicted by universally weak priors, or by 
ToMD). Instead, they reported particular difficulties in informal and unstructured 
situations, governed by intersecting and individually unreliable norms. For instance: 
 
During the informal period before a meeting starts, I feel awkward and 
self-conscious. Yet during the meeting I can usually handle myself quite 
well, often better than the average participant, but only if the meeting is 
well structured, with a clear agenda and when people stick to the 
subject (Dumortier, 2004, p.78). 
 
[at work] breaktimes are often opportunities for work colleagues to 
socialize and talk, or to order a round of coffee, each taking his turn to 
get the drinks. This is exactly the sort of grey area that the affected 
individual is likely to struggle with. He may miss his turn to make the 
drinks, not on purpose but because it has not been written or specified 
in the work tasks (Fleisher, 2003, p.117). 
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As these quotes suggest, Dumortier and Fleisher have no special difficulties when there 
are clear rules governing what is said and done. Dumortier clearly has a useful meeting 
schema, which helps her know how to act when people stick to the plan, but she 
struggles when things go off track, and when the expectations are less explicit. 
Likewise, Fleisher understands he is expected to carry out tasks which are specified for 
his job, but looser norms like knowing whose turn it is to make the coffee are more of a 
challenge.  
In line with this, several autobiographers report being frustrated and 
disorientated by the fact that most social behaviour is not predictably rule-governed: 
 
There are days when trying to make sense of the rules for social 
interaction is just too difficult. It is especially so when we take into 
account that individuals often write their own rules! For example, it’s 
fine to take off your clothes to have a bath, but only a model takes off 
her clothes for the photographer; or you can laugh at that story, even 
though it’s about the fat lady, because it’s a joke (Lawson 2008, p.98). 
 
rules are maps that lead us to know how to behave and what to expect. 
When they are broken, the whole world turns upside down. … But as I 
have discovered, most rules fade the moment they inconvenience 
someone (Willey 2015 p.46-47). 
 
Overall, autobiographers report particular difficulties in situations governed by weak 
correlations, like malleable social norms. To this extent, SFD is also a more precise 
explanation than weak priors, which would imply a generalised difficulty with drawing 
on all kinds of situation knowledge. 
SFD also ought to be distinguished from another possibility. As I’ve argued, 
concepts are the basis of our rapid, automatic, intuitive ability to recognise and 
understand familiar kinds of situations. This can be contrasted with explicit, conscious, 
rule-based type 2 processing. Indeed, autobiographers often described trying to 
improve their social skills by learning to apply explicit rules. For instance: 
 
I copy what it says in [social science textbooks]. I was unable to 
discover all those rules of behaviour by myself (Dumortier 2004, p.76).  
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I was very conscious of the rules my friends set for themselves and the 
group, particularly as they applied to behaviours and other social skills. 
As if I had a Rolodex in my mind, I would categorise the actions of 
people, noting their differences and subtleties with a mix of abstract 
appreciation and real curiosity (Willey, 2015, p.45). 
 
Arguably, these passages might suggest Dumortier and Willey find structured 
situations easier because rule-based type 2 strategies work better there. This would be 
consistent with Frith’s (2004) suggestion that autistic individuals often become skilled 
at making explicit social inferences, to compensate for difficulties with making them 
implicitly. Such a possibility might cast some doubt on the SFD interpretation. Perhaps, 
instead of having difficulties with inferences based on weak correlations, Dumortier 
and Willey have difficulties with implicit social inferences of all kinds, and prefer 
rigidly structured situations because they are more able to rely on type 2 processes.  
Indeed, in light of these quotes, explicit strategies are likely to be part of the 
story. However, autobiographers also describe being relatively at ease in more familiar 
or highly structured situations. This is not consistent with a total reliance on explicit, 
high-effort type 2 processes. Even in relatively structured situations, using explicit, 
learned rules to figure out everything that is happening, and what actions are likely to 
be most effective, would be highly time-consuming and effortful, probably impossible. 
On balance, it is more plausible that Willey and Dumortier can make more useful 
automatic inferences in these situations. 
Finally, CN would also account for some social difficulties via over-
generalisation.  For instance, Robison describes an attempt to make friends with a girl 
at his school: 
 
At recess, I walked over to Chuckie and patted her on the head. My 
mother had shown me how to pet my poodle on the head to make 
friends with him. And my mother petted me sometimes, too, especially 
when I couldn’t sleep. So, as far as I could tell, petting worked (Robison, 
2008, p.9). 
 
Here, Robison is over-generalising a strategy that works for animals to a situation 
involving humans.33 Dumortier’s remarks about her eating habits also reveal over-
                                               
33. As a slight aside, a few autobiographers seem to experience the difference between humans 
and animals as less pronounced than neurotypicals might. For instance, Lawson describes 
94 
 
generalisation: 
 
When I was a child, they asked me to take small bites. A few days ago at 
work I wasn’t feeling very hungry and I watched other people eating. I 
noticed how everyone was taking much bigger bites than me I suddenly 
realised that I still take small bites as I was taught as a toddler. I did not 
adjust the size of my bites while growing up (Dumortier, 2004, p.36). 
 
Significantly, in both of these cases, over-generalization can easily be understood in 
terms of missing inferences, but not in terms of overfitting and erroneous model 
parameters. Had Robinson been more sensitive to the fact that people don’t like to be 
touched by strangers, he might have been able to restrict the petting strategy to the 
right context. It is less clear what extra, positive parameter could have motivated the 
over-generalisation. Likewise, Dumortier over-generalised the strategy of taking small 
bites because she didn’t infer that this advice is specifically aimed at children. Clearly, if 
I think people in general eat with small bites, my model of eating contains fewer 
parameters than it does if I think children eat with small bites and adults do not. 
Both cases can also easily be understood in terms of CN, since both can be 
understood as the narrowing of related concepts. For instance, the knowledge that 
people don’t like to be touched by strangers might be stored in a general schema for 
interacting with new people. Robison’s difficulty can be understood as a narrowing of 
this schema. Similarly, Dumortier can be said to have a narrower eating schema. 
Importantly, consistent with SFD, both autobiographers are insensitive to malleable 
social norms, but have no difficulties with more predictable patterns. None of the 
autobiographers describe over-generalising in ways that would violate strict rules, like 
physical laws. 
 
3.3.2 Concept Narrowing and Language Processing 
 
The passages in the previous section indicate that some autistic people struggle to 
draw rapidly on implicit world knowledge to understand social situations. This means 
they often find it harder to conform to social expectations and to understand others. 
Meanwhile, a ubiquitous argument in linguistics is that we must draw on background 
                                                                                                                                    
befriending her pet dog as a child, joining in with behaviours like barking and drinking from 
bowls of milk. Meanwhile, Grandin is famously attentive to the experiences of animals, and has 
become a distinguished designer of livestock facilities as a result. Plausibly, as a result of CN, 
some autistic individuals might be less sensitive to the differences. 
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knowledge to fully understand language. It has also been argued (especially in the 
context of WCC) that an inability to do so may underlie the difficulties with figurative 
language and pragmatics often reported in autism (Vulchanova et. al., 2013).  
 It is therefore unsurprising that autistic autobiographers described many 
difficulties with pragmatics. Consistent with CN, these did indeed seem to reflect a 
reduced capacity to draw on background knowledge. For instance, some writers 
experienced questions and instructions as incomplete. Two vivid examples of this 
come from childhood experiences in the classroom. Lawson recalls being asked by a 
teacher to “pay attention”: 
 
I was paying attention, I thought. I was paying attention to the tree 
outside the window. Its leaves were all shiny in the sunlight.  Another 
teacher explained that "paying attention" meant to give your thoughts 
and your time to listen and look at something. It was not that I lacked 
the ability to understand events and situations, but rather that the 
explanations of others were incomplete! (Lawson, 2000, p.33) 
 
Likewise, Tammet reports: 
 
[the teacher] would say: "seven times nine" while looking at me, and of 
course I knew that the answer was sixty-three, but I did not realize that 
I was expected to say the answer out loud to the class. It was only when 
the teacher repeated his question explicitly as: “What is seven times 
nine?” that I gave the answer (Tammet 2007, p.97). 
 
In both cases, relevant situation knowledge would normally be stored in a classroom 
schema, capturing how people in classrooms typically behave. For instance, most of us 
know that a classroom is an environment where you should pay attention to what the 
teacher is saying, not to the trees outside. Likewise, a school is an environment where 
answers to questions are often elicited so the pupils can demonstrate their knowledge. 
In this context, it will normally be obvious what sort of response is expected to “seven 
times nine”, and why. 
The difficulties described by Tammet and Lawson suggest they are less likely to 
draw on this knowledge. Lawson did not know what to pay attention to, and while 
Tammet was able to recognize that he was being addressed by the teacher, he could 
only interpret what was said as a question after he was given an explicit cue in the 
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structure of the sentence.34 35  Significantly, these changes should be interpreted as the 
narrowing of, rather than the total absence of, a classroom schema. Tammet and 
Lawson cannot have acted with total disregard for classroom norms, since if they 
routinely left their desks, interrupted the teacher, and so on, they would have been 
unable to remain in a normal classroom. 
In a slightly different way, CN also shed light on the difficulties which several 
autobiographers had with figurative devices. Fleisher writes: 
 
I was... unable to distinguish between remarks and light humour, so 
that when a couple of my workmates teased me by saying "You have to 
come into work every Saturday now" I took their remarks literally, and 
ended up worrying even on the Saturdays I had off in case they had 
meant it, or there had been a change of dates by my boss (Fleisher 
2003, p.48). 
 
Since it is widely argued that autistic people struggle to interpret nonverbal cues like 
tone of voice and facial expressions, it is tempting to assume that such difficulties are at 
the root of this misunderstanding. However, CN could also play a role. If Fleisher is not 
contracted to work on Saturdays, then the surface meaning of the remark is obviously 
false, whatever his co-workers might say about it, in the context of typical background 
knowledge about work schedules. As a result of a narrowed workplace schema, it is 
plausible that Fleisher could not recognize the remark as a joke at least partly because 
he could not draw confidently on this background knowledge.   
This interpretation is supported by other examples of difficulties with 
figurative language.  In another case, Fleisher reports hearing the phrase “drinks on the 
house” for the first time, and wondering for over an hour “why on earth they would put 
a drink on the roof of the pub (Fleisher, 2003, p.9).” Similarly, Lawson describes 
learning, as a child, that she would stay in a “mobile home” on her holiday, and 
worrying for a week that it might start moving around during the night (Lawson, 2000, 
pp.17-18). Since both of these expressions are well-established idioms or dead 
                                               
34. Again, it is not obvious how such difficulties could be explained in terms of erroneous 
inferences or erroneous parameters. 
35. This example also highlights the relationship between the two descriptive tools, CN and CS. 
As I noted earlier, concepts are systematically overlapping and interrelated. So, while I interpret 
this example in terms of CN (as narrowing of a classroom schema), it can also be readily 
interpreted in terms of CS (not activating a question schema). 
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metaphors, there was probably no non-verbal indication that words were being used in 
a special sense.  Nevertheless, for neurotypicals, the non-figurative meaning would 
clearly be false in the context of background knowledge about houses and customs.  
Importantly, consistent with SFD, and contra a standard claim in the research 
literature (Happé, 1995b) these were not difficulties with figurative language per se. 
Instead, they were specific difficulties with drawing on context in order to understand 
it. In a majority of autobiographies, such difficulties co-existed alongside rich figurative 
language. As I will note later, many autobiographers (e.g. Willey 2015, p.83) actively 
relied on metaphors and analogies to understand ambiguous domains.  
Finally, while my main goal here has been to illustrate the effects of SFD and to 
distinguish it from other Bayesian proposals, it is also worth noting that the SFD 
analysis of social and language difficulties I have developed here contrasts sharply with 
the standard ToMD account. According to ToMD, social difficulties and language 
difficulties reflect disruption of a specifically social mechanism, such that autistic 
people cannot infer mental states (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1997a). In contrast, CN explains 
them via a change in the structure of world knowledge. Of course, this raises a 
question: why exactly are social difficulties so prominent in autism? According to SFD, 
the answer is that inferences based on weak correlations are more likely to be missed. 
Meanwhile, social situations are less likely to be governed by strict rules than 
nonhuman systems. Indeed, as some of the quotes above suggest, human behaviour is 
riddled with exceptions. Willey makes this point more or less explicitly: 
 
I am only a good problem solver under two circumstances: if there is no 
real right or wrong answer, for instance when I am writing a creative 
fiction story, and if there are very clear cut answers, for example the 
kind that can be found when I design and conduct research studies. 
When flexible variables affect the situation, things like human emotions, 
social mores, hidden agendas, and personal biases, I am left without a 
clue (Willey, 1999, p. 107). 
 
3.3.3 Concept Specialization 
 
Alongside CN, the corpus also contained significant evidence for concept specialization 
(CS). This is a tendency to only activate concepts when a narrow set of specific, 
concrete cues is available. CS could account for four broad groups of difficulties 
reported in autobiographies. One of these, slightly at odds with the empirical literature 
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(cf. Dawson et. al, 2002), was occasional difficulties with recognizing objects. The other 
three are more familiar: difficulties with understanding emotions (Bird and Cook, 
2013) difficulties with body language and facial expressions (Tanaka and Sung, 2016), 
and difficulties with generalizing across situations (Kanner, 1943). Indirectly, CS could 
also account for a pervasive sense of uncertainty, associated with certain repetitive 
behaviours. 
The first set of difficulties, with identifying objects, were the least common 
examples of CS, occurring in only two autobiographies.  However, they were among the 
most striking. For instance: 
 
The way food is cut is very important to me. If something is cut in 
another way than I am accustomed to, I won't eat it. If I order a portion 
of salami and it has been cut into slices instead of squares, I just can't 
eat it. I no longer regard it as a portion of salami (Dumortier 2004, 
p.36). 
 
I always had difficulty with the conception of something being turned 
into something else. I understood cows, but when they became a herd 
they stopped being cows for me… (Williams 1992, p.76). 
 
For these writers, the identity of objects was sometimes fragile, linked to highly 
specific concrete features like shape, isolation, and physical location. When these 
changed, they could no longer recognize the objects. Often, the concrete cues they 
relied on did not serve as reliable indicators of practically significant core properties, 
like function, origin, and composition. 
 Unlike the cases of over-generalization discussed earlier, these forms of under-
generalisation can perhaps be understood in terms of overfitting. For instance, perhaps 
Dumortier strongly and erroneously associates salami with one particular shape cue, 
so that the absence of this cue weighs against the inference that the thing is a piece of 
salami. Likewise, Williams might erroneously associate the isolation of a cow on a 
grassy green background with its identity. However, SFD would explain the effect 
equally well. On an SFD interpretation, these categories would only be associated with 
a handful of concrete cues. Absent one of these, there might not be enough information 
available to identify the object.36  
                                               
36. Again, on SFD, only rapid, automatic inferences are meant to be missing.  Naturally, I assume 
Dumortier can understand what the salami is after reflection, or she would never have been 
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 Significantly, however, difficulties with object categories were relatively rare. 
There were many more difficulties with categories harder to define in terms of reliable 
concrete criteria.37 Again, this is precisely what one would expect if the difficulty is 
specific to weak correlations. For instance, several autobiographers reported 
difficulties with understanding emotions: 
 
Emotions are not concrete structures that can be seen, held or 
organized. They can be likened to being locked in a maze that has no 
exit: all paths look the same and lead to the same place (Lawson, 2000, 
p.8). 
 
Lawson goes on to suggest it would be easier to understand emotions if they had clear 
practical purposes, by which they could be distinguished. Meanwhile, according to 
Dumortier: 
 
My feelings of anger vary, and so do my feelings of happiness and 
sadness: they are never the same… All the various nuances seem like 
separate feelings to me. To me, there are thousands of feelings that I 
can’t grasp... It would help if I could give each a different name so I 
could get some insight into them (Dumortier, 2004, pp.89-90). 
 
Superficially, Dumortier and Lawson seem to be describing different things. Whereas 
for Lawson, there are no clear distinguishing features, for Dumortier there are too 
many potential distinctions. Both cases, nevertheless, involve a desire for reliable cues 
which might pick out all instances of the same emotion, and difficulty with using 
categories when such cues are absent. Both writers also realize this approach cannot 
be used to group emotions into the kinds of practical categories that the neurotypicals 
around them use to communicate and understand themselves. However, where 
Lawson expresses this as a wish that conventional categories of emotions had clearer 
common properties, Dumortier explores the possibility of breaking those categories 
down and replacing them with a more granular set of categories, each anchored in a 
more tightly specified and predictable set of cues. 
                                                                                                                                    
able to interpret and write about the experience.  
37. Autobiographers often defined such categories as “abstract,” but I deliberately avoid this 
term. See footnote 26 on page 75. 
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 Developing this point, it might be that autistic people sometimes succeed in 
creating a more granular collection of categories, to make sense of a domain where 
neurotypicals would normally only use one or two. This might well lead to advantages 
in some contexts, and an ability to identify fine-grained distinctions which 
neurotypicals would be likely to miss. Indeed, such a situation may be very similar to 
acquired neurotypical expertise (like a skilled designer who can distinguish ten 
different shades of red).38 The only difference is that CS would make it harder to the lay 
concepts; it would be necessary to acquire the “expert” concepts in order to 
understand the domain at all.39 
 These difficulties with emotions are also more consistent with the SFD 
hypothesis than with overfitting. In overfitting, one would expect the usual parameters 
or cues for emotions to be learned fine, but some additional, erroneous distinctions 
would be added. On this basis, emotion categories would be learned confidently and 
then sometimes misused.  This is not what happens in the two quotes above. Instead, 
Dumortier and Lawson find it hard to learn the categories in the first place. (The 
possibility of using granular categories to make sense of a domain would also be 
distinct from overfitting. It would amount to achieving the best possible model using 
only statistically reliable parameters, not to learning extra, erroneous parameters). 
Moving on, CS could explain a third set of difficulties often reported by autistic 
autobiographers, with understanding body language and facial expressions: 
 
By studying an individual’s posture, actions, voice tone, and facial 
expressions, I can now usually work out what they are feeling… When 
someone is receiving praise or encouragement, I have noticed that both 
parties usually wear a smile. Their voices are not usually loud, hands 
are shaken or held and eye contact is maintained. They usually stand 
about a metre apart (Lawson, 2000, p.9). 
 
I mentally recorded the way [people] used their eyes, how they would 
                                               
38. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer at Philosophical Psychology for this example. 
39. Somewhat more speculatively, a similar explanation might account for some intensely 
focused interests in autism. To use a hypothetical example, perhaps I’m interested in learning 
about a historical event like the sinking of the Titanic. If I have relatively thick background 
knowledge about shipwrecks, about how people act in a crisis, and so on, I might be satisfied 
with a brief explanation. I can make inferences for myself to fill in the gaps. Someone affected by 
SFD will be less able to do this. This may mean they need to explicitly learn all of the details to 
feel like they have a full understanding of the event. (In the long run this will mean their 
understanding of the event is likely to be more accurate.) 
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open them wide when they spoke loud and animated, or how they 
would cast them… I watched people like a scientist watches an 
experiment (Willey, 2015, p.45). 
 
As these quotes show, autobiographers often attempted to deal with these difficulties 
by (explicitly) learning the meanings of specific cues. However, this strategy was only 
partially successful. As they were keenly aware, few isolated cues are reliable 
indicators of how another person feels. Again, this response strategy seems to indicate 
a difficulty with more fluid and malleable categories. (Notably, this is not the only way 
SFD would contribute to difficulties with reading body language and facial expressions. 
CN would clearly make it harder to facial expressions in context. However, CS would 
also predict difficulties even when little context is available (i.e., in the lab). I return to 
this point in the next chapter.) 
Finally, CS could account for a fourth set of difficulties. Specifically, several 
autobiographers reported difficulties with seeing why new situations were similar, for 
practical purposes, to situations they had encountered before: 
 
Most things that involve children seem to involve variables I cannot 
readily identify. Unfortunately, this means I am not a very consistent-
minded parent. I approach each new obstacle we come to as if I have 
never met anything like it before (Willey, 2015, p.107). 
 
For me, it is easier to function with a sense of routine and constancy 
than to process complications such as choice and decision. I think this is 
because Asperger people lack the ability to judge change using the same 
cues as non-Asperger people (Lawson, 2000, p.2). 
 
Again, here, the strategy of looking for specific, reliable cues often fails. Few individual 
cues map reliably onto situations that are similar for practical purposes. For instance, 
to use Wylie’s example, situations that are similar for the purposes of parenting are 
unlikely to be associated with specific concrete cues. Some writers explicitly linked this 
to difficulties with generalising about actions: 
 
It’s as if my head is full of pegs. Each peg has a name and there are small 
items hanging from each peg. If I need to do something, I look at a peg 
to see how it should be done. If it is on the peg then I will take it and use 
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it. If it is not on the peg, well, bad luck. It will then have to be added first 
(Dumortier, 2004, pp.59-60). 
 
The significance of what people said to me, when it sank in as more 
than just words, was always taken to apply to that particular moment 
or situation. Thus, when I once received a lecture about writing graffiti 
on Parliament House during an excursion, I agreed that I’d never do this 
again and then ten minutes later, was caught outside writing different 
graffiti on the school wall. To me, I was not ignoring what they said, nor 
was I trying to be funny. I had not done exactly the same thing as I had 
done before (Williams, 1992, p.66).40 
 
These difficulties can be analysed in much the same way as the other cases of CS. The 
only difference is that the relevant concepts are scripts and situation schemas, rather 
than categories of facial expressions, emotions and objects. This would also explain 
difficulties with flexible problem-solving. In one vivid example, Dumortier describes 
having to look up her friend’s number in a telephone book (2004, p.59). Despite 
knowing that the telephone number was in the book, she needed be shown specifically 
how to look it up—she was unable to see how previous situations, where she needed to 
look instructions up in books, were relevantly similar. 
Indirectly, difficulties with generalizing, especially with scripts and situation 
schemas, could account for three other prominent themes in the corpus. First, they 
could account for a common, pervasive sense of disorientation and anxiety about 
change, which appeared in almost all the texts. For instance: 
 
Even a small, unexpected loss of control can feel overwhelming to me, 
particularly when it interferes with one of my routines (Tammet, 2007, 
p.198). 
 
Giving everything its regular place creates the feeling of safety and 
structure that I so desperately need. If that changes, the feeling of safety 
and predictability immediately disappears (Dumortier, 2004, p.68). 
                                               
40. This case is another helpful opportunity to highlight the interplay between the two 
descriptive categories. Interpreting this case in terms of CN, one might say Williams does not 
fully infer the consequences of writing graffiti, so she cannot see why people will regard one 
case as similar to the other. 
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Again, CS would explain this pattern because the identity of situations, routines or 
places will come to be associated with a small number of specific cues. Absent one of 
those cues, the whole situation could quickly come to seem unfamiliar. 
Second, the same kind of explanation links CS with several patterns of 
behaviours that might be characterised as restricted or repetitive. Many of these 
behaviours were explicitly described by autobiographers as strategies for reducing 
uncertainty, in a world they generally experienced as disorientating and unpredictable. 
Writing about an intense childhood interest in encyclopaedias and telephone 
directories, Williams states: 
  
I was looking to get a grip on consistency. The constant change of things 
never seemed to give me any chance to prepare for them. Because of 
this I found pleasure and comfort in doing the same things over and 
over (Williams, 1992, p.45). 
 
Along similar lines, for Lawson: 
 
As far as possible, I will keep some parts of a situation before change 
occurs, and take them with me into the change. This way, the change is 
felt as less powerful, and I am still in control. For example, I might 
choose to wear my leather and canvas runners and my red socks, even 
though the weather forecast is 30c (Lawson, 2000, p.109). 
 
Here, by keeping some aspect of the environment the same, both Lawson and Williams 
retain familiar cues so that they are less disorientated in an unpredictable world. 
Notably, however, this did not account for all of the traits that might be described as 
repetitive behaviours. Sensory differences also played a key role, as we will see in the 
next section. 
 Finally, third, CS could account for a distinctive use of figurative language and 
analogy. As described earlier, autobiographers often found it hard to understand 
figurative expressions (in context). Nevertheless, many of the same autobiographers 
used rich metaphors and analogies. In fact, several writers explicitly said they 
depended on this sort of language. For example, Willey refers to herself as “literal-
minded” on multiple occasions, but writes: 
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I require grand elaborations, well calculated metaphors, and strong 
visual images to understand language (Willey, 2015, p. 83). 
 
A similar tendency is also clear in Fleisher’s autobiography. As I noted, he reports 
major difficulties with understanding figurative devices in context. Nevertheless, 
throughout his book, he compares events in his life—like his progression through 
university and the death of his mother—to military conflicts and political 
developments in an imaginary “parallel world.” Indeed, for Fleisher, this is a crucial 
resource in which he finds “an incredible amount of hidden strength… survival instinct 
and the ability to cope with crises in his actual life.” (Fleisher, 2003, p.107) Indeed, he 
writes: “my way of operating, coping, and sussing out life’s complications is due almost 
entirely to this system.” (Fleisher, 2003, p.110) 
These strategies are highly consistent with difficulties understanding domains 
that cannot be characterised in predictable concrete terms. Typically, they involve the 
use of “concrete symbols to understand abstract concepts” (Grandin 1995, p.17), or 
ideas which are “too vague” (Willey, 2015, p.84), in contrast with concepts with 
concrete, specifiable parts: 
 
When I am unable to convert text to pictures, it is usually because the 
text has no concrete meaning. Some philosophy books and articles 
about the cattle futures market are completely incomprehensible 
(Grandin, 1995, p.15). 
 
Indeed, Grandin places such emphasis on this aspect of her thinking that it provides the 
title of her book: Thinking in Pictures. In it, she describes many occasions when visual 
analogies have helped her to make sense of her life. For instance, she reports struggling 
socially during university because “I didn’t have a concrete visual corollary for the 
abstraction known as getting along with people” (Grandin 1995, p.20). Tammet (2007, 
p.180), likewise describes learning to understand friendship by analogy with a 
butterfly, and emotions by analogy with his synaesthetic experiences of numbers 
(2007, p.8). Williams, who tends to prefer kinaesthetic analogies, describes how her 
habit of lining up collections of objects including buttons and pieces of foil (as an adult) 
helped her learn to understand the notion of social belonging in a “concrete, 
observable, and orderly way”. Three autobiographers (Lawson, Williams, and Willey) 
also include several highly figurative poems in their autobiographies, where they 
articulate their feelings and experiences using concrete imagery. 
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3.3.4 SFD and Sensory Differences 
 
Consistent with the autism literature (e.g. Leekam et. al., 2007), all autobiographers 
described unusual sensory experiences. Heightened sensory sensitivity was one of the 
strongest themes in the corpus, reported in every text. This experience could be both 
positive and negative. On the positive side, at times, mundane or everyday sensations 
were magnified into rich and engrossing experiences. For instance: 
 
Each time I go to the Metropolis cinema I become absorbed in the 
changing colours [projected on] the walls... they fascinate me and they 
are so beautiful. I enjoy how they merge into each other! Sometimes it’s 
the colours that attract me more than the film in the cinema (Dumortier 
2004, p.37). 
 
I find it perfectly exciting to study a nectarine growing on the tree in my 
garden. The smooth almost-round shape covered in red, orange and 
yellow with a green splash in the middle is most exhilarating!... to take 
half an hour to look at one does not seem strange to me (Lawson 2000, 
p.4). 
 
I could sit for hours on a beach watching sand dribbling through my 
fingers. Each grain was different… as I scrutinised their contours, I 
would go into a trance which cut me off from the sights and sounds 
around me (Grandin 1995, p.34). 
 
This sort of rapt absorption was also connected with several behaviours, especially in 
childhood, which might typically be categorized as restricted or repetitive. For 
example, Lawson (2000, p.2) describes spinning the wheels of a bicycle around and 
around in a kind of sensory rapture, and Willey (2015, p.20) reports collecting stacks of 
used ditto worksheets primarily because of a fascination with their smell and texture.  
Unfortunately, for most autobiographers, this heightened intensity often 
became overwhelming and painful. These unpleasant experiences could be grouped 
loosely into three categories. The first category included sensations like scratchy 
textures and piercing sounds—sounds that neurotypicals commonly find painful, but 
experienced with heightened and sometimes disabling intensity. For instance, Tammet 
had severe difficulties with brushing his teeth throughout his adolescence and as an 
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adult is still unable to use a manual toothbrush (2007, p.110). Likewise, Willey writes: 
“I hated stiff things, scratchy things, satiny things... (2015, p. 27). 
 Meanwhile, the second category included unpredictable sensations, like the 
sounds of bells and horns (Lawson, 2000, p.4), and balloons popping (Grandin 1995, 
p.63). Notably, for Dumortier (2004, pp.37-38), the unexpectedness itself is the cause 
of the pain: 
 
Slides are very unpredictable: suddenly you hear their click which is so 
unexpected it hurts my ears… the picture appears, always 
unexpectedly, and both the moment and the image itself are 
unpredictable. I often don’t know what they are going to show and if I 
do know in advance, I don’t know the colour or the size. I don’t know 
how bright it will be, which makes my eyes hurt. 
 
Along similar lines, Willey describes a need to acclimatise herself to unfamiliar voices, 
by mimicking them until they gradually become less painful (Willey 2015, p.39).  
Finally, a third category of overwhelming and intense sensory experiences 
included busy and chaotic environments like shopping centres, crowded trains, and so 
on: 
 
I would regularly switch off and become anxious and uncommunicative 
[in supermarkets] because of the size of the store, the large number of 
shoppers, and the amount of stimuli around me (Tammet 2007, p.276). 
 
The world often scares me because all my sensory perceptions enter at 
once. They all come in at the same time and I simply can’t differentiate. 
One stimulus can be so overpowering that I can no longer concentrate 
on other things… However, if I don’t pay attention to the other stimuli, 
the rate at which they arrive creates chaos and I can no longer cope… It 
often happens in a packed hall, a big shop, or a crowded tram 
(Dumortier 2004, p.31). 
 
This is sometimes contrasted with less busy environments, experienced as predictable, 
safe and reassuring: 
 
Oceans, rooftops, or cliffs... seem constant and non-threatening, offering 
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quietness, calm and reassuring space—a place without interruptions 
and abundant with activities to occupy and satisfy the autistic child’s 
need for repetition (Lawson, 2000, p.6). 
 
Overall, then, autistic autobiographers reported a generally heightened sensory 
sensitivity, sometimes pleasant and sometimes unpleasant, and particularly 
pronounced when stimuli were chaotic or unpredictable.  
The combined effects of CN and CS can help make sense of this. As I argued in 
chapter 2, a key role of conceptual inferences is to help us predict what is likely to 
happen next. By making it harder to deploy concepts, and reducing the number of 
inferences they can support, both CN and CS would make prediction more difficult. As a 
result, stimuli which would be surprising or unpredictable anyway could become 
particularly overwhelming. This sort of analysis would mesh well with the predictive 
coding scheme, but would differ from HIPPEA in the details. On the HIPPEA proposal, 
sense input might be more intense because more weight is given to the prediction 
errors which signal it. By contrast, the SFD explanation would begin with the fact that 
we selectively suppress sense input incompatible with our expectations. In this 
context, a tendency to make fewer inferences would entail difficulties with 
suppression, especially with suppressing stimuli that cannot be predicted using rule-
based models.  
Alongside high sensory sensitivity, several writers reported idiosyncratic 
categories of sensory preferences; another tendency often noted in the autism 
literature (e.g. Schreck and Williams, 2006). A few of them described enjoying smells, 
tastes and textures that most neurotypicals would probably find unpleasant. After 
describing how she has a particularly keen sense of smell, and cannot stand some 
smells that other people find tolerable, Dumortier writes: 
 
I adore sweaty feet, the smell of perspiration and cat pee - delightful 
aromas, enough to make my day a success (Dumortier 2004, p.45). 
 
Willey likewise describes being unable to touch stiff, satiny and scratchy objects, but 
writing about her childhood, states: 
  
I shaved the sand from emory boards with my front teeth. I took great 
delight in grinding the striking strip of a match against my back teeth 
(Willey, 2015, p.27). 
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Willey goes on to recall eating mothballs and toilet bowl sanitizing bars. Lawson (2000, 
p.6) also describes being unable to tolerate the textures of certain foods, but enjoying 
very unusual combinations of flavours. 
Importantly, these quotes do not seem to indicate reduced sensory sensitivity. 
Instead, the valence has changed: these writers actively take pleasure in experiences 
that others might find unpleasant. CN, in particular, would go some way towards 
accounting for this pattern. Presumably, a large part of the reason people do not 
generally find toilet sanitizers and cat pee pleasant is because of situation knowledge—
we know where these things come from and what they are for. Without these implicit 
contextual inferences, they might seem much less unappealing.  
However, CS could also account for idiosyncratic preferences. As I noted, 
autistic writers tended to rely on a handful of specific concrete cues for 
categorisation—cues which did not reliably track practically significant properties. 
This pattern could extend directly to concepts like FOOD. A handful of specific defining 
features, (e.g. colour or shape alone), might be taken into account in determining 
whether something is edible. Consistent with the analysis so far, some food categories 
would then expand to include non-foods, and, simultaneously, would exclude real foods 
that do not satisfy strict criteria (Dumortier’s difficulties with recognising salami are 
consistent with this). 
Finally, another experience reported by a significant minority of writers was 
described by some as fragmentation and by others as a kind of sensory merging. The 
tendency was for perception to break up into concrete parts, with a loss of overall 
meaning. Again, this was particularly common in chaotic and crowded environments, 
though it was not exclusive to them. Dumortier writes: 
 
It is difficult for me to enter crowded areas, because I don’t have a clear 
overview. It often means I don’t dare to enter. This lack of an overview 
takes control of me. Even more perceptions crowd in together, leading 
to more chaos. I see all kinds of things, but can’t identify them. I hear 
sounds that I can’t recognise because of the chaos; simple sounds are 
beyond recognition due to the high number of impressions (Dumortier, 
2004, p.32). 
 
Williams, similarly, talks of “meaning systems” shutting down when she feels 
overloaded by an environment (1992, p.181). At one point, she describes recognising 
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her own father as a kind of fragmented, piecemeal process:  
 
Hands disturbed my vision—a silver knife, a silver fork, cutting up a 
colour. There was something sitting at the end of the silver fork. My 
eyes followed the piece through the fork to a hand. Frightened, I let my 
eyes follow the hand to an arm which joined a face. My gaze fell upon 
the eyes, which looked at me with such desperation. It was my father 
(Williams, 1992, p.58). 
 
She also describes hearing sentences “in bits … the way in which my mind has 
segmented their sentence into words left me with a strange and sometimes 
unintelligible message.” Tammet makes precisely the same point: 
 
I very often hear fragments of [a] sentence, which my brain 
automatically pulls together to try to make sense of. By missing key 
words, however, I quite often do not get the real content (Tammet, 
2007, p.199). 
 
These difficulties with integration would also follow naturally from CS and CN. As I’ve 
noted, concepts are how we represent groups of distinct features as being part of the 
same category. For instance, I might take two adjacent patches of beige to belong to a 
piece of food because, alongside other cues, they activate the concept BREAD. If I do not 
deploy this concept due to CS, the various different sensations will remain unrelated. 
Meanwhile, as a result of CN, it would be harder to infer an unheard phoneme within a 
word, or an unheard word within a sentence, in order to understand the full meaning.  
This might be particularly difficult in busy environments where cues are more likely to 
get missed or drowned out. 
 
3.4 Is SFD an intersubjective account of autism? 
 
On final question may be of interest. Is the SFD account of autism an intersubjective 
account, of the sort advocated by Bolis et. al. (2017) and de Jaegher (2013)? Here, it is 
helpful to distinguish two separate questions. First of all: can autism traits be 
understood without any reference to intersubjectively shared world knowledge? On 
the SFD account, they cannot. The core claim is that autistic people miss inferences, or 
are insensitive to cues, as a result of differences in concept structure. This cannot be 
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understood purely as a failure to identify things about the world. Nobody registers 
absolutely everything in their environment, so by this standard everybody would miss 
inferences endlessly. Instead, autistic individuals miss inferences relative to a 
neurotypical norm; they fail to track regularities which others can. To this extent, SFD 
is defined relative to typically shared world knowledge. 
 The second question is perhaps closer to the kind of intersubjectivity which 
Bolis et. al. and de Jaegher have in mind. Do autistic people experience difficulties just 
because they do not coordinate their concepts with neurotypicals? On the SFD account, 
the answer would vary from case to case. For instance, when Willey picks up her 
daughters from school covered in hair dye, her daughters will be embarrassed because 
she is violating shared expectations about how to behave and appear in public places. If 
nobody had any expectations about this, they would not be so concerned.41 However, 
many effects of SFD are not intersubjective in this sense. As I described, some 
autobiographers describe eating non-food objects, or failing to recognise food objects 
as edible. The harmful consequences of this are largely independent of shared world 
knowledge: mothballs are poisonous and salami is edible, no matter what anyone 
might happen to think about it. 
More generally, many missing inferences and miscategorisations will 
simultaneously lead to both types of consequences. If I eat something which is not food, 
I might get poisoned and commit a faux pas at the same time. This sort of overlap will 
be common: many social conventions are likely to exist partly because violating them 
can have direct negative consequences, which can themselves be understood without 
recourse to intersubjectivity in any interesting sense. To sum up: some of the 
consequences of SFD will need to be understood intersubjectively, but some will not. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to interpret many autism traits in terms of altered 
categorization and inference processes. More specifically, many autism traits can be 
explained by Semantic Feature Dissociation: a tendency not to store knowledge about 
weak correlations in semantic memory. In this chapter, I have illustrated the SFD 
hypothesis using two descriptive categories: concept narrowing (CN) and concept 
specialization (CS). Roughly, CN is the claim that autistic people make fewer inferences 
                                               
41. Of course, it is still potentially a problem for other reasons. Hair dye might stain Willey’s 
clothes, or walls and furniture at the school. But I suspect this is mostly not what her daughters 
will be worried about. 
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when they deploy a concept. This can plausibly explain many difficulties with 
understanding social norms and pragmatic aspects of language. Meanwhile, CS is the 
claim that autistic people tend to categorize less flexibly, deploying concepts in 
response to a narrower range of cues. This can account for difficulties with categorising 
emotions, facial expressions, and situations, alongside a preference for regularity and 
order.  Jointly, CN and CS also have the power to explain a distinctive profile of sensory 
differences. 
Importantly, SFD is a better fit for the autobiographical data than HIPPEA. 
According to HIPPEA, autistic people will tend to make erroneous inferences for faulty 
reasons, and employ erroneous categories. By contrast, SFD explains what is actually 
found: missing inferences; an insensitivity to relevant reasons; and difficulty with using 
categories that cannot be predictably defined in concrete terms. It is also a better fit for 
the data than the weak priors hypothesis. On that hypothesis, autistic people should 
miss inferences from world knowledge more or less uniformly. Meanwhile, again, SFD 
explains what is actually found: inferences based on weak correlations seem more 
likely to get missed. 
 Overall, SFD can plausibly account for a wide variety of autism traits, at least as 
these are described by autistic autobiographers. However, the study described in this 
chapter looked at a small and unrepresentative sample. It should therefore be regarded 
as a preliminary plausibility study, highlighting the power of research on concept 
structure for making sense of autism traits, motivating new ways of interpreting 
experimental data, and indicating new avenues for further research. Ultimately, my 
goal has been not to strongly defend the SFD proposal, but to render it plausible and 
highlight its potential explanatory power. In the next chapter, I show that it would also 
account for key experimental findings. 
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Chapter 4: SFD and Experimental Findings 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, I introduced the SFD hypothesis: that some autistic people do not 
represent weak correlations in long-term semantic memory. In this chapter, I now 
return to the experimental autism literature. In parts 4.1–4.4, I consider key findings in 
three areas: on social cognition, on language, and on perception. In each case, I argue 
that SFD can explain the data better than other proposals. Concerning social cognition, 
I start by arguing that SFD would directly impede joint attention. This might indirectly 
cause difficulties with false belief tests. SFD would also explain why autistic people 
make fewer social-stereotype driven inferences. Concerning language, SFD predicts 
difficulties with exploiting context, but only when context is relatively weak. On this 
basis, it reconciles current evidence for normal context effects in autism with the 
clinical and autobiographical picture. Finally, concerning perception, SFD predicts 
difficulties with drawing on prior knowledge about weak correlations. This would 
explain why evidence for the weak priors account has been inconclusive so far. 
 Importantly, however, SFD is a proposal about long-term semantic memory. It 
says nothing about why semantic memory might be different in autism, or about how 
correlations get learned. This means there are some findings it cannot in principle 
account for. For instance, it cannot explain why autistic people have difficulties with 
prototype learning, or advantages in some visual search tasks. In this context, part 5 of 
this chapter links SFD back to the HIPPEA hypothesis. I argue that an increased 
weighting of error signals, as posited by HIPPEA, would ultimately cause SFD (with 
something like overfitting as, at most, a secondary effect). As I argue, if I cannot 
disregard exceptions during learning, I will only be able to learn about very reliable 
trends. Calling the combination of the two proposals SFDH, I show that it can 
encompass some important outstanding findings, and can do so better that HIPPEA in 
isolation. Furthermore, since SFD is a specific version of the weak priors hypothesis, 
this reconciles the two competing Bayesian theories of autism.   
In the final couple of sections, I return to the bigger picture. In part 6, I 
advocate a pluralistic strategy for testing SFD, noting that it might only explain a subset 
of cases, and might plausibly come about in more than one way. In part 7, I situate the 
hypothesis relative to the three traditional families of autism theories discussed in 
chapter 1. In each case, I argue SFD is an improvement on the older approaches, both 
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because it potentially explains a broader range of data, and because it specifies the 
underlying mechanisms more clearly. 
   
4.1 SFD and Social Cognition Data 
 
4.1.1 Joint Attention 
 
Autistic children are widely reported to have difficulty with joint attention: with 
sharing the same reference point as another person (Mundy, 2016, 2017). Empirically, 
the capacity for joint attention is mainly assessed in two ways: the ability to follow 
another person’s gaze, and the ability to spontaneously solicit someone’s attention to 
an object (Mundy, 2017). These abilities are not present at birth, but normally appear 
in early childhood (Gredebäck et al., 2010).  In children who go on to receive an autism 
diagnosis, difficulties with joint attention often appear as early as 6 months (Ibañez et 
al., 2013). Such difficulties reliably predict autism diagnosis and later performance on 
false belief tasks (Baron‐Cohen, 1989; Mundy and Sigman, 1989; Sodian and Kristen-
Antonow, 2015). Some researchers also argue that joint attention and ToM recruit the 
same brain areas (Mundy and van Hecke, 2017).  
Crucially, on standard accounts, if I want to coordinate attention with another 
person I must interpret and organise three kinds of information: 1) information about 
my own location, affect, and focus of attention; 2) information about the location, affect, 
and gaze direction of the other person; and 3) information about the thing I am 
attending to (Mundy, 2017). On this view, SFD might disrupt joint attention in at least 
four ways. First, it could directly disrupt my ability to process all three kinds of 
information. As described in chapter 3, SFD would make it difficult for me to interpret 
my own emotions, to read the facial expressions of the other person, and possibly to 
identify the object. Second, SFD could make it harder to establish an attention schema 
in the first place. Doing so might require knowledge about weak correlations: for 
instance, gaze direction might not be a reliable cue for attention. Third, CS could affect 
my ability to coordinate attention using shared situation schemas (as in the classroom 
schema example from chapter 3). 
 Finally, fourth, SFD might also make autistic people less likely to look at faces 
in the first place, especially at the most informative parts of faces. In chapter 2, I argued 
SFD would make unpredictable sense input particularly intense. It would also make it 
harder to figure out someone’s feelings from context, tone of voice, and so on. This 
would make the movements of their face harder to predict, especially in highly 
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informative regions like the eyes. Consistent with this, as Gernsbacher and Frymiare 
(2005) point out, autistic people often report finding faces, especially eyes, painful to 
look at. This would also mesh with the hypothesis that aversion disrupts joint attention 
in autism (Kliemann et. al., 2010; Mundy, 2016, p.30). 
 
4.1.2 False-Belief Tests 
 
According to ToMD, autistic people have difficulties with recognising mental states. 
This claim rests, in particular, on false-belief studies like the Sally-Anne study (Baron-
Cohen et. al. 1985). To recap, in this study, children watch a toy character (Sally) hide a 
marble in a box. While Sally is out of the room, another character (Anne) moves the 
marble to a different box. When Sally returns, autistic children tend to predict she will 
look for the marble where it is actually hidden.  This is interpreted as an inability to 
attribute a false belief to Sally. 
 In chapter 1, I already noted some reasons for being suspicious of this 
interpretation. First, arguably, many false belief studies do not control adequately for 
language comprehension (Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit, 2012). Second, arguably they 
presuppose the same abilities they are designed to test (Sharrock and Coulter, 2004). 
Third, a fair proportion of autistic people pass theory of mind tests, even the most 
stringent “second-order” tests (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 1994; Bowler, 1992). This 
may suggest such deficits are not universal to autism. Nevertheless, difficulties on such 
tasks are commonly reported in autism, and it is widely believed they track social 
difficulties. For the sake of argument, it is worth considering what role SFD might play 
if the standard interpretation is even partially correct. 
 Let us assume, then, that such tests really do track the ability to understand 
other people. Autistic children might have more difficulties as an indirect result of joint 
attention difficulties. If I see a marble get moved, and I know that the person with me 
was paying attention to the same thing, I might record their attention to what 
happened in episodic memory. Meanwhile, difficulties with joint attention would make 
it hard for me to recognise what other people have seen and heard. This would have 
nothing to do with the ability to represent beliefs. CS might also make it particularly 
hard to deploy an attention schema in the Sally-Anne test. The characters involved are 
toys, so some important cues normally associated with attention will be missing. 
The same interpretation could also account for normal autistic performance on 
the false-photographs task (Leslie and Thaiss, 1992; Leekam and Perner, 1991) and the 
similar false-drawings task (Charman and Baron-Cohen, 1992). In the false 
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photographs task, children watch while the experimenter takes a photograph of a toy 
cat in a display. While the photo develops, the toy cat is moved, and children are asked 
to predict where it will appear in the photo (i.e. not in the new location, but where it 
was before). Unlike on the Sally-Anne task, autistic children have no particular 
difficulties here. This is meant to show that autism involves specific difficulties with 
representing beliefs, rather than a general difficulty with meta-representation. Again, 
however, joint attention difficulties could explain the finding directly. Passing the Sally-
Anne task involves tracking a character’s attention, but passing the false-photographs 
task only involves learning that a camera can reproduce a scene. 
Moving on, a related case could be made for variants of the false-belief task, like 
sabotage/deception paradigms. These studies find that autistic children are less likely 
than controls to lie, to prevent a villain from opening a box of sweets (Sodian and Frith, 
1992). This task appears to depend still more heavily on the ability to track attention. 
To learn how to deceive, I don’t just need to know what else someone has seen and 
heard, I need to actively manipulate the information they receive, and predict how they 
are likely to respond to it. However, there might be a further reason for difficulties with 
this task. As I noted in chapter 3, autistic people are often disoriented when people do 
not behave consistently, so they often place a high value on social principles and rules. 
Autistic children may therefore be more likely to stick to a rule which they have surely 
been taught: “do not lie.” 
Another standard paradigm is the Picture Stories paradigm (Baron-Cohen et. al, 
1986). Here, children are asked to take images representing sequences of events and 
arrange them in the correct order. There are three different kinds of picture stories. 
The first include sequences governed by clear mechanical laws, like a balloon being 
released and rising. The second set are supposed to show people participating in 
familiar “everyday routines”, intelligible without recourse to mental states. The third 
set are meant to be unintelligible without recourse to mental states. Baron-Cohen et. al. 
found that autistic children had particular difficulty with the third set. Meanwhile, 
typically developing children had relative difficulty with the mechanical sequences, and 
children with Down’s syndrome had difficulty with all sequences.  
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On the account developed in the last couple of chapters, however, understanding what 
other people are doing mostly means employing social scripts and schemas to 
understand the routines and practices they are engaged in. In routine social 
understanding, I may rarely need to go much beyond this. In order to arrange sequence 
(c), I might employ just such a script: people tend to react predictably when things are 
not where they expect them to be. 
More generally, it is hard to see how sequences involving everyday routines 
and sequences involving mental states can be made to differ. The example given by the 
researchers (pictured) does not shed much light on this. For one thing, both sequence 
(b) and sequence (c) seem to involve mental states. Nor is it obvious how (b) contains 
an “everyday routine” of a sort that does not appear in (c). Ultimately, it is hard to 
know what to say without more information. One possibility, consistent with SFD, 
might be that the “mental state” stories involve less reliable routines. Alternatively, 
perhaps neurotypical children were better able to categorise the facial expressions of 
the characters. 
Finally, what about neurobiological evidence? Several studies report that 
distinct brain areas are consistently involved in ToM tasks, on the basis that they are 
relatively more or less active when autistic people carry out the tasks (Schurz et. al., 
2014; Dichter, 2012). It is therefore argued that autism must involve a specific, 
localisable ToM system. Such conclusions are criticised by Gernsbacher and Pripas-
Figure 6: The Picture Stories Paradigm (Baron-Cohen et. al. 1986). 
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Kapit (2012). For one thing, as they note, most areas of the brain, including those 
implicated in ToM tasks, are also implicated in an extremely wide variety of other 
tasks. It is therefore hard to interpret these findings as evidence for any domain-
specific mechanism. In any case, they clearly can’t reveal a specialised ToM mechanism 
if the behavioural tasks do not track ToM. 
Another problem is that neuroscience studies are often interpreted with 
prejudice (Gernsbacher et. al. 2006). In principle, differences in brain activity might 
reflect processing advantages, processing disadvantages, or neither. However, when a 
difference is found in the brains of autistic subjects, especially during a task assumed to 
assess ToM, it is often interpreted as dysfunction (or compensation42) by default. 
Shockingly, this sometimes happens even when autistic participants are faster and 
more accurate than controls on the primary task (e.g. Colich et. al., 2012). Researchers’ 
interpretations of their own data must therefore be approached with some caution.  
 In summary, even if false-belief tests do track the social difficulties that occur in 
autism, SFD is just as good at explaining them as ToMD. Indeed, it has an important 
advantage, since it doesn’t posit a controversial domain-specific mechanism. Instead, 
difficulties with false-belief tests would mainly reflect difficulties with joint attention, 
itself reflecting CN and CS. Importantly, on this perspective, difficulties with joint 
attention would be a common feature of autism, but they would be one possible 
outcome, not the root cause of social difficulties. As described in the previous chapter, 
SFD would contribute to social difficulties in various distinct ways. 
 
4.1.3 Social Stereotypes 
 
Social stereotypes in autism have not been investigated as thoroughly as ToM or joint 
attention, but are worth mentioning since SFD predicts the findings directly.  Consider 
stereotype-driven errors of the sort famously described by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983). In their classic study, participants were presented with questions like the 
following: 
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
                                               
42. This term is frequently used in the autism literature, whenever autistic subjects do 
unexpectedly well on some task. But it is almost never defined, and specific compensation 
mechanisms are almost never posited. It often looks like the term is being used ad hoc, 
whenever study findings contradict the theories favoured by the researchers. 
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discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
 
Which is more probable? 
 
1.  Linda is a bank teller. 
2.  Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
 
Presented with this question, most people conclude that 2 is more probable. However, 
this violates a logical rule: no conjunction can be more likely than its parts. The mistake 
is thought to occur because people choose the answer which best matches a social 
stereotype evoked by the vignette. Morsanyi et. al. (2010) report that autistic 
participants are more resistant to this mistake, though they are not more explicitly 
aware of the conjunction rule. Along similar lines, Birmingham et. al. (2015) find that 
autistic subjects have weaker racist and sexist biases using implicit association tests.43 
 Consistent with the picture of semantic memory developed in chapter 2, it is 
thought that people acquire stereotypes through exposure to representations of 
various social groups in the culture; the properties of these representations are 
learned just as other regularities are learned (Hinton, 2017). However, social 
stereotypes are rarely reliable predictors of anything. SFD therefore implies that 
autistic people will have narrow or missing stereotypes. It would also explain why, 
contrary to the predictions of Birmingham et. al, the difficulty was not specific to 
“social” stereotypes. (It also generalised to stereotypes they classed as “non-social”, 
like the professions stereotypically associated with different kinds of shoes.) Since SFD 
is a purely statistical explanation, one would not expect a sharp social/non-social 
distinction. 
 
4.1.4 Social Scripts and Schemas 
 
Finally, a small number of studies have directly investigated social scripts and schemas 
in autism. Volden and Johnston (1999) assessed autistic children using three tasks. 
First, they asked them to describe what happens in familiar social situations, like a 
restaurant meal or a visit to the cinema. Second, they asked them to predict what 
                                               
43. Somewhat oddly. Birmingham et. al. conclude that social biases are “intact” in autism, on the 
grounds that they are not totally absent and the effect also extends to non-social biases. But 
their actual results are as I describe. 
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would happen next, after watching part of a video representing these kinds of 
situations. Third, they presented picture stories where the usual order of events was 
violated (e.g. with the bill arriving before the meal), and asked whether events were 
unfolding as they should. Importantly, however, Volden and Johnston focused 
exclusively on “core elements” or highly predictable characteristics of the events (e.g. 
that people sit at tables at meals). On this basis, they concluded that script knowledge 
was intact. This is perfectly consistent with SFD, which only predicts difficulties when 
elements are more weakly correlated with those events.  
 Meanwhile, Trillingsgaard (1999) also asked children to describe familiar 
events like baking cakes, deliberately prompting them for as much information as 
possible. Employing a partially qualitative analysis, Trillingsgaard found autistic 
children tended only to describe relatively essential features of the events (that cakes 
are cooked in the oven, that the ingredients include flour, etc.), and generally speaking 
had less to say. By contrast, typically developing children were more likely to add 
information about nonessential features (custard, strawberry jam, oven timers, 
whipped cream). More recently, a range of similar findings, indicating that autistic 
children have specific difficulties with learning about variable properties of familiar 
events, have been reported by Loth and colleagues (Loth et. al., 2008; 2010; 2011). 
 
4.2 SFD and Language Comprehension Data 
 
4.2.1 Preamble on “Pragmatics” and “Figurative Language” 
 
Many researchers argue that autism involves specific difficulties with figurative 
language and pragmatics (e.g. Attwood, 2006; Vulchanova et. al., 2015), with the 
former sometimes seen as a subset of the latter (e.g. in Baron-Cohen, 1988; Loukusa 
and Moilanen, 2009). These difficulties are commonly attributed to one of two general 
mechanisms. Some approaches (e.g. Happé, 1993, 1995a) try to link the difficulties 
directly to ToM deficits, while others (e.g. Frith and Snowling, 1983) point to a more 
general difficulty with using context in language processing.44  
Unfortunately, the standard way of framing the debate is somewhat confusing.  
One issue is that neither “figurative language” nor “pragmatics” refers to a single, 
monolithic capacity. A standard tool for assessing communication in autistic children, 
                                               
44. Since these approaches are not mutually exclusive, some researchers (e.g. Happé, 1997) 
identify a role for both. 
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the Children's Communication Checklist (Bishop, 1998), has 5 different subscales for 
pragmatics: inappropriate social initiation; speech coherence; stereotypical 
communication, use of context; and rapport. Likewise, “figurative language” 
encompasses many distinct devices, including metaphor, simile, sarcasm, irony, idiom, 
and humour. Nor does linguistics offer a consistent definition of literality with which 
these might be contrasted (Gibbs and Colston, 2006). In the last chapter, I also argued 
that it may be unhelpful to talk about figurative deficits per se. In autobiographies, 
difficulties with interpreting figurative expressions in context often coexist with adept 
use of figurative language elsewhere. 
 Another complication is that, from an SFD perspective, there can be no easy 
definition of “pragmatic” impairments. Not, at any rate, if this is supposed to imply a 
clear distinction with semantics. On the SFD hypothesis, pragmatic impairments are a 
direct result of changes in the structure of semantic memory. From this perspective, 
sweeping questions about “figurative language” and “pragmatics” in autism are ill-
posed. My strategy here will not be to answer them. Instead, I will argue that specific 
lines of evidence, often cited in support of these claims, are also consistent with SFD. 
 
4.2.2 SFD and Linguistic Context Effects 
 
After being exposed to linguistic context (e.g. the first half of a sentence), people will 
often respond more quickly or more slowly to a target image, word or phrase. Such 
linguistic context effects can be understood in terms of prior knowledge: people draw 
on what they already know about the context in order to interpret the target. If the SFD 
proposal is right, autistic people should indeed have difficulties with this. As a result of 
CN and CS, previous cues, including the preceding text, should support fewer and less 
confident inferences. This would be consistent with the weak priors hypothesis, which 
also posits a reduced ability to draw on prior world knowledge to interpret new 
experiences.  
 Perhaps the most well-known evidence for weak context effects in autism 
comes from the homographs task, first administered to autistic children by Frith and 
Snowling (1983). Frith and Snowling found that autistic children tend to pronounce 
ambiguous words like “tear” in the same way, regardless of sentence context. The 
finding has now been replicated several times (Happé, 1997; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 
1999; López and Leekam, 2003). Superficially, such findings appear to be consistent 
with SFD. 
Over the past few years, however, the standard interpretation of these findings 
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has been challenged. As I noted in chapter 1, the VIQ and vocabulary-based language 
controls typically used in autism research do not correlate well with other measures; 
many autistic people with normal VIQ still find it difficult to understand complex 
syntax and grammar (Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit, 2012). Meanwhile, controlling 
appropriately for structural language, difficulties with context often disappear. 
Controlling for reading age, Snowling and Frith (1986) found that autistic subjects are 
equally good at disambiguating homographs. More recently, Eberhardt and Nadig 
(2016) report the same finding, controlling on the CELF. Brock et. al. (2017) also report 
that a strong predictor of variation on the task is the picture-naming task: a task which 
explicitly tracks expressive language ability.  
A similar pattern appears using other measures of context effects when suitable 
controls are used. For instance, Norbury et. al. (2004, 2005a) found autistic 
participants were equally able to use picture and sentence context to speed reading of 
related words, unless they also had difficulties with structural language. Brock et. al. 
(2008) found autistic participants were just as likely to look at a target image (e.g. of a 
hamster) after reading a context sentence (e.g. Joe stroked the_____), unless they had 
more general language impairments. In a slightly different vein, Saldana and Frith 
(2007) found that some autistic people are equally able to make bridging inferences to 
understand text, as measured by accelerated reading times. Finally, another apparent 
line of counter-evidence comes from intact N400 effects in autism (Pijnacker et. al., 
2010). The N400 is an EEG response that appears when study participants read or hear 
a word that is unexpected in context. A normal N400 therefore implies a normal ability 
to interpret context. 
 The most straightforward interpretation of all this would be that autism does 
not reduce sensitivity to linguistic context, independent of general language 
impairment. Clearly, however, this would be inconsistent with what I described in 
chapter 3: autobiographers with strong general language routinely have difficulty 
making use of context. Similar difficulties are also consistently described in clinical 
accounts of Asperger syndrome (Attwood, 2006), a diagnosis which by definition 
excludes general language impairment (APA, 2000). 
 Fortunately, SFD can resolve the discrepancy between the laboratory findings 
and the qualitative picture. According to SFD, autistic people will make fewer 
inferences from sentence context, but inferences will not be missed uniformly. Instead, 
inferences based on weak correlations will be selectively lost. Meanwhile, standard 
measures of context effects use highly predictive contexts. For instance, in the 
homographs task, subjects must choose the correct pronunciation of the word “tear” in 
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the sentence “in her eye there was a tear.” Since people’s eyes are almost invariably not 
torn, I can exclude the wrong meaning without knowing about any weak correlations. I 
would only struggle if I didn’t know about the most typical properties of eyeballs. At 
that point, I wouldn’t have anything remotely like the normal concept EYE. I would be 
unable to understand the first half of the sentence, and more generally, if my concepts 
were altered to this degree, I would probably be unable to participate in the test.  
A range of related findings can be explained on the same basis. Again, I need 
only be sensitive to very reliable correlations to be surprised by the test sentences 
used in Pijnacker et. al.’s N400 task. For example, I only need to know the most basic 
features of tulips and climbers to be surprised when I read “finally the climbers 
reached the top of the tulip.” This analysis should generalise to most studies of context 
effects in autism, since the researchers invariably use highly predictive contexts. This is 
presumably done on purpose. In most studies, the only consideration is whether the 
context is actually related to the target, and using a strong context is a good way to 
ensure this. 
It is now possible to venture some specific predictions. SFD should selectively 
reduce context effects, when the context positively, but only weakly, predicts the 
target. Hence, for instance, the N400 effect should be reduced in autism when the 
context evokes a social stereotype, and the target is incongruous with it (e.g. “the boxer 
went to the shop to buy … lipstick”).45 Likewise, one might see less acceleration of 
reading times when the context is a social stereotype.46 To my knowledge, predictions 
along these lines have not been tested. More generally, one would also expect autistic 
individuals to have difficulty open-ended measures of context-sensitivity, like the 
ability to construct engaging narratives. Unfortunately, while such difficulties have 
been reported (e.g. Losh and Gordon, 2014; Lee et. al., 2018), studies so far have only 
matched participants on VIQ. It would be good to repeat these controlling for structural 
language ability. 
Finally, I will forestall a possible objection. Brock et. al. (2008) used context 
sentences like “Joe stroked the____”, where the target was an image of a hamster. 
Autistic participants were more likely to look at the target image, even though HAMSTER 
is not reliably predicted by the context. On standard accounts, however, contextual 
priming only requires some relevant knowledge to be activated (Heyman et. al., 2015). 
                                               
45. Hehman et. al. (2013) have shown that social-stereotype-driven inferences do in fact 
produce an N400 effect in neurotypicals. 
46. Such studies would also directly distinguish SFD from the weak priors hypothesis. On that 
hypothesis, contextual inferences based on all kinds of world knowledge should be missed 
uniformly. 
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In other words, the context “Joe stroked the…” might reliably evoke the superordinate 
concept ANIMAL, even if it does not evoke any particular animal, and this might be 
enough to create the effect.47 More generally, SFD should leave context effects intact 
when the context is a reliable cue for a significant subset of the target’s properties, not 
just when it is a reliable cue for the target itself. 
In summary, when researchers use rigorous language controls to assess 
context sensitivity in autism, they find little evidence for differences. However, in most 
studies, the context is (deliberately) a reliable predictor of the target. Meanwhile, SFD 
predicts a specific attenuation of context effects: only when the context is relatively 
weak. So far, this claim is mostly untested. If borne out, it would explain why current 
experimental findings seem inconsistent with the clinical and autobiographical 
literature.  
 
4.2.3 SFD and Figurative Language Comprehension 
 
A similar analysis would account for key data on figurative language processing in 
autism. In this domain, one of the earliest studies was by Happé (1993, 1995a), who 
explored the link between figurative language and ToM. Happé asked participants to 
complete five sentences, choosing the correct concluding word from a list. She found 
autistic subjects had more difficulty than controls with completing metaphorical and 
ironic sentences, but not similes.48 Since then, a number of other studies have also 
reported that autism involves difficulties with various figurative devices, including 
metaphors, metonyms, and idioms (e.g. Mackay and Shaw, 2004; Adachi et. al., 2004; 
Rundblad and Annaz, 2010; Whyte et. al., 2014). 
Like studies of context effects, these studies have traditionally been treated as 
evidence of a specific deficit in autism. Again, however, most of these studies have 
employed the same unsuitable controls. Meanwhile, again, studies controlling for 
structural language do not find specific difficulties. Using the same metaphor task as 
Happé, but controlling on the concepts and directions subtest of the CELF, Norbury 
(2005b) found no particular difficulties with metaphors. More recently, a meta-analysis 
by Kalandadze et. al. (2016) across 41 studies also finds no evidence for a figurative 
                                               
47. One might argue there still isn’t a reliable link. But substitute any superordinate category 
which includes a hamster and does not include the distractors, and the argument can work the 
same way. Perhaps the relevant category is SOFT OBJECTS (the distractors were pills, a hammer, 
and a medal). 
48. Happé considered similes to be nonfigurative, since they involve a literal usage of “is like.” 
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language deficit independent of overall language ability. Nevertheless, again, the 
conclusion that autistic people have no specific difficulties with figurative language 
seems inconsistent with the autobiographical picture. Likewise, again, clinical accounts 
of Asperger syndrome routinely emphasise difficulties with figurative language, 
despite generally strong overall language ability (Attwood, 2006).  
Once again, SFD can resolve the discrepancy. Consider the metaphor task 
employed by Happé and Norbury. As I noted, subjects must choose the most 
appropriate word to complete a sentence. In one condition, the sentences are similes 
(e.g. “The night sky was so clear. The stars were like… diamonds”). In another, the 
sentences are metaphors (e.g. “Michael was so cold. His nose was… an icicle.”) On the 
SFD hypothesis, autistic participants should have no trouble with either sort of device 
in itself. Instead, they should only have difficulty when the context and the target do 
not reliably share concrete properties. For instance, they might have more difficulty 
with “she was so cross, her eyes were like… daggers”. In this case, few obvious concrete 
properties are reliably shared by angry eyes and daggers. By contrast, they might have 
more success with “the stars were like… diamonds”, since both objects are predictably 
shiny and bright. 
Again, this prediction does not seem to have been tested. Again, however, SFD 
seems to fit current experimental and qualitative data better than other points of view. 
An intriguing finding in chapter 3 was that many autistic autobiographers are adept 
users of figurative language, but simultaneously report difficulties with interpreting 
figurative expressions in context. This is exactly what SFD predicts. There should only 
be difficulties with figurative expressions in context, and then only when the context is 
statistically weak. Since a common function of figurative language is precisely to evoke 
novel inferences, not typically associated with the thing described (Gibbs and Colston, 
2006), this is likely to occur often outside the lab. 
 
4.2.4 SFD, Nonverbal Autism, and Categorisation 
 
The studies above all explore language in autistic people who are actually able to use 
language. However, using current diagnostic criteria, 30% of autistic people are 
minimally verbal or non-verbal (Tager-Flusberg and Kasari, 2015). Somewhat 
speculatively, it might be possible to explain these cases in terms of SFD as well. At the 
extreme, even relatively reliable inferences may start to get missed. For instance, the 
concept BAT might no longer be associated with core features like wings and a head. 
Instead, it might get replaced by an extremely reliable, extremely concrete, and mostly 
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uninformative concept, encompassing all black flapping objects. Putting it slightly 
differently, severe SFD might make it impossible to acquire concepts like BAT at all. 
Instead, someone with profound autism might acquire a stock of extremely thin 
concepts, largely incommensurable with those used by neurotypicals. This would 
preclude the development of a common language.  
More generally, if knowledge about weak correlations is lost first, different 
kinds of concepts should be affected in different ways. In particular, autistic people 
should have more difficulty with categories that capture less strictly predictable 
relationships, and less difficulty with highly regular categories. As the degree of SFD 
increases, flexible categories should become progressively less flexible, and 
progressively less commensurate with those categories as used by neurotypicals. At a 
certain point, it will be more natural to say that they do not get acquired at all. 
Arguably, there is some evidence for this in that autistic people (especially children) 
are more likely to invent neologisms for novel categories (Volden and Lord, 1991). 
Consistent with my findings in chapter 3, autistic people are also reported to have 
specific difficulties with emotion concepts (e.g. Bormann‐Kischkel et. al., 1995). 
 
4.3: SFD and Perception in Autism 
 
4.3.1 Preamble on “Global” and “Local” Processing 
 
As I argued in chapter 1, research on autistic perception often employs a rather 
unsatisfying distinction between “local” and “global” processing. Roughly speaking, 
global processing is the ability to perceive features as part of a unified whole, taking in 
the gist (e.g. a face, a voice), while local processing is the ability to process information 
about sensory details (e.g. tones, volumes, shapes, colours, edges). Most researchers 
would agree that autistic people are relatively better at local processing and relatively 
worse at global processing, but there is a lively debate about why this is. As I argued in 
chapter 1, this is probably because the terms are poorly defined, and the distinction is 
rarely spelled out at a processing level. I will therefore avoid the local/global debate 
here. Instead, as in my discussion of language data, I will relate findings directly to the 
SFD hypothesis. 
 
4.3.2 SFD and Perceptual Advantages in Autism 
 
Using various measures, autistic people tend to perceive more quickly and more 
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accurately than controls. For instance, Shah and Frith (1983) found autistic subjects 
are better at the embedded figures task: at locating a hidden shape within a larger 
image. This was recently confirmed in a systematic review by Horlin et. al. (2016). 
They are also better at tasks like conjunction search: at finding (e.g.) a black ring 
against a background of black circles and white rings (Kaldy et. al. 2016). Likewise, 
they are better at the block design task: at putting coloured segments together quickly 
into a predetermined pattern (Shah and Frith, 1993). As described in chapter 1, some 
studies also report they are more resistant to various visual illusions, including the 
Kanizsa triangle illusion, the Muller-Lyer illusion, the Ebbinghaus illusion, and the 
Shepherd illusion (Happé, 1996; Ropar and Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell et. al. 2010).49 
Several competing theories attempt to explain these advantages. Of these, the 
account most similar to SFD is the weak priors hypothesis (Pellicano and Burr, 2012). 
As described in chapter 1, the explanation begins with a Bayesian account of visual 
illusions: illusions occur because people tend to infer the most likely interpretation of 
the input, in light of past experiences. For instance, according to the classic explanation 
of the Muller-Lyer illusion, the first line is more consistent with the outside edge of a 
rectangular shape. Conversely, the second line is more consistent with the inside edge 
of a rectangular shape. As a result, the second line looks like a longer line, viewed from 
further away. 
 
 
 
According to Pellicano and Burr, autistic people might be more resistant to illusions 
like this because they are less likely to exploit prior knowledge about spatial 
regularities.  
 As I noted in chapter 1, Pellicano and Burr’s proposal can explain a range of 
data. For example, it can explain why autistic people are better at copying impossible 
figures (Mottron et. al., 1999). It can also explain why they find it harder to identify 
                                               
49. Another finding often discussed in this context comes from the Navon task. In this task, 
subjects are presented with larger letters made out of smaller ones (Navon, 1977). Autistic 
subjects are often found to identify the smaller letters more quickly, reversing the neurotypical 
pattern (Wang et. al.; 2007). However, the finding is inconsistent, and is complicated by 
variation in the presentation of stimuli (Baisa et. al., 2018). I will not attempt to unpick the 
literature here. 
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objects from the shadows cast on them, since this depends on prior knowledge about 
how light and shadow typically falls (Becchio et. al., 2010). However, there has already 
been some counterevidence. Manning et. al. (2017a) find autistic people are equally 
susceptible to the Muller-Lyer, controlling for test response strategies. Van de Cruys et. 
al. (2018) also report they are equally able to draw on prior knowledge to interpret 
ambiguous Mooney images. Croydon et. al. (2017) find that they are equally able to use 
information from lighting to judge the shape of objects. Finally, Maule et. al. (2018) 
studied colour afterimages in autism, finding that these were equally affected by prior 
knowledge about the typical colours of objects. 
As I suggested in chapter 3, SFD amounts to a more precise version of Pellicano 
and Burr’s hypothesis, nuancing it in two ways. First of all, it is a hypothesis about the 
structure of world knowledge in long term memory. It therefore concerns structural 
priors, and only has indirect consequences for contextual priors. On this basis, the 
finding that autistic participants are equally able to disambiguate Mooney images 
would be expected. Here, the relevant prior knowledge is short-term, and is evoked 
directly by an unambiguous version of the image. 
Second, SFD does not predict uniformly weak priors. Instead, knowledge about 
relatively strong correlations is preserved. On this basis, SFD predicts a specific profile 
of sensitivity to visual illusions. Most obviously, as on the weak priors hypothesis, there 
should only be resistance to expectation-driven illusions. Additionally, however, this 
should be specific to illusions involving less reliable priors. For instance, arguably, SFD 
is consistent with a normal response to the Muller-Lyer, since arguably the given 
configurations of lines are routinely found on the boundaries of square objects, and 
rarely elsewhere. By contrast, arguably the shapes that make up the Kanizsa triangle 
are much more open to interpretation. 
 Ultimately, however, evidence from visual illusions is likely to be weak. 
Typically, there is disagreement about whether any particular illusion is expectation-
driven, and where there is agreement, there is disagreement about what expectations 
underlie the effect. For instance, Howe and Purves (2005) dispute the classic 
interpretation of the Muller-Lyer, arguing it is driven by knowledge about different 
regularities. Roberts et. al. (2005) likewise argue that multiple factors contribute to the 
Ebbinghaus illusion, such that the effect may depend heavily on how the stimuli are 
presented. Until such issues are resolved, it is likely to be difficult to find clear evidence 
for the profile predicted by SFD. 
 Moving on, SFD would explain the conflicting data about exploiting light and 
shadow information. For instance, when Becchio et. al. (2010) reported difficulties in 
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this area, they continually moved the light source, and thus changed the angle of the 
shadows. By contrast, Croydon et. al. (2016) used light shining from above. Since, in 
everyday life, light generally comes from above, Croydon et. al. are testing relatively 
reliable priors. SFD would account for Maule et. al.’s (2018) finding along similar lines. 
Maule et. al. focused on categories of objects which are reliably associated with specific 
colours, probably on purpose. Meanwhile, SFD only predicts differences when the 
object is positively, but weakly, associated with the colour. 
SFD also makes various predictions about colour diagnosticity effects. A variety 
of studies show that in neurotypicals, colour perception is biased in line with 
expectations (Granzier and Gegenfurtner, 2012). For example, Hansen et. al. (2006) 
asked subjects to adjust the colour of fruits like bananas and strawberries on a screen, 
until they appeared black and white. With familiar objects, they found that subjects had 
to over-adjust (i.e. past black and white, towards a contrasting colour). With unfamiliar 
objects, this was not the case. Adapting the paradigm to test SFD, one might index the 
colour diagnosticity for various categories of objects. For instance, strawberries might 
be more strongly associated with red than apples, since strawberries are more 
consistently red. Again, on SFD, one would expect a reduction of the effect when objects 
positively, but only weakly, predict colours. 
Finally, SFD would account for autistic advantages on the embedded figures 
test. One common explanation of this advantage, consistent with WCC and with the 
weak priors hypothesis, is that autistic people end up with a less robust interpretation 
of the embedding shape. This would make it easier to reinterpret parts of the shape, in 
order to find the hidden picture. 
 
 
 
SFD would predict the same thing. Consider the image of a pram used in standard 
versions of the task, which is relatively simplified and abstract. Most of the components 
Figure 7: Embedded Figures Task.  (Happe 2013). 
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do not strongly predict a pram. The wheels are potentially consistent with a pizza 
interpretation, part of the hood might be a kite, and so on. Autistic individuals may still 
see a pram—this interpretation might be more consistent with prior knowledge than 
any other—but some of the constraints on this interpretation will be weaker or absent, 
so the overall interpretation will be less confident.50  
Importantly, on this explanation, the embedded figures task must be sharply 
distinguished from visual search tasks, where the background is made up of 
meaningless distractors. In those tasks, there is no background image to interpret, so 
the advantage will need to be explained in a different way. I will revisit them towards 
the end of this chapter, when I consider links between SFD and HIPPEA. 
 
4.3.3 SFD and Face Perception 
 
Research on face processing in autism has focused mainly on two abilities: the ability to 
recognise faces themselves, and the ability to recognise facial expressions. 
Superficially, the literature on both topics is mixed. For instance, one extensive review 
of the face recognition literature (Weigelt et. al, 2012) found 46 studies reporting 
difficulties in autism, and 44 reporting no effect. Similarly, although a meta-analysis of 
the literature on reading facial expressions (Uljarevic and Hamilton, 2013) found 
evidence for difficulties in autism, it also identified many studies which contradicted 
this general picture. 
 However, it is possible to tease out some patterns by looking at more specific 
phenomena. Perhaps most significantly, Weigelt et. al. found that autistic people had 
more difficulty with facial expressions when tasks required looking at the eye region. 
Meanwhile, Uljarevic and Hamilton found specific difficulties with specific kinds of 
facial expressions. For instance, they no evidence for any difficulties with recognising 
happiness, and some evidence for greater difficulties with recognising fear. This, as 
they note, would also be consistent with difficulty processing information from the 
eyes: cues from the eyes and eyebrows are known to be more diagnostic for fear, while 
mouth cues are more diagnostic for happiness (Ekman and Friesen, 2003; Smith et. al., 
2005). 
 SFD might explain this pattern in two ways. First, as I argued earlier on, it might 
directly cause aversion to the eye region. However, CS could also play a role. To 
recognise differences between facial expressions, one must attend to a complex variety 
                                               
50. On the network view described in chapter 2, units will be activated more weakly and it will 
take less to change the configuration of the network. 
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of parallel changes in the musculature (Smith et. al., 2005). Some of these cues may be 
more reliable than others. For instance, if the corners of the mouth are turned up, this 
is a relatively reliable indicator of happiness.  By contrast, raised eyebrows might imply 
surprise, or fear, or flirtatiousness. Under CS, less reliable cues would tend to be 
disregarded. One way to test this possibility would be to index the reliability of 
different cues for different emotions. Autistic people would be expected to do better 
when reliable cues are available, and worse when multiple probabilistic cues must be 
used. Importantly, on this view, difficulties with face processing would not occur 
because faces are specifically “social”, while other stimuli are “non-social.” SFD would 
predict a similar pattern of difficulties when non-social stimuli have similar statistical 
properties.  
 A final caveat is that the explanations advanced here concern face processing in 
the lab. Elsewhere, CN could also play a strong role in contributing to difficulties with 
faces. Typically, we can draw on background knowledge to obtain a fuller 
interpretation of someone’s facial expressions and body language and intentions, just 
as we can do so to better understand what they say (Aviezer et. al., 2008; Hassin et. al., 
2013). For instance, people express the same emotions differently in different social 
contexts, and I will only be sensitive to this if I can recognise the norms in play. Under 
SFD, this will be less likely to happen, at least in cases where the social rules are less 
reliable. 
 
4.3.4 SFD and Sensory Profile Questionnaires 
 
Up to 95% of autistic individuals are reported to have heightened or diminished 
sensory sensitivity (Ben-Sasson et. al., 2009; Tomchek and Dunn, 2007). The most 
common way of assessing this is with caregiver assessments, designed to track 
heightened and reduced responsiveness to stimuli in autistic children. These include 
the Dunn sensory profile (Ermer and Dunn, 1998) and the sensory experiences 
questionnaire (Baranek et. al., 2006). Caregivers are asked, for example, whether a 
child “holds hands over ears to protect ears from sound” (assumed to reflect auditory 
hypersensitivity), or “chews or licks non-food objects” (assumed to reflect gustatory 
hyposensitivity). Using these sorts of measures, it is widely reported that heightened 
and diminished sensory sensitivity are both common in autism, with both traits 
regularly co-occurring in the same individuals (Liss et. al., 2006; Kern et. al., 2006).  
 This finding may seem paradoxical, but it is easy to explain in light of the 
qualitative evidence from chapter 3. There, I already outlined an explanation of 
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heightened sensitivity. On the predictive coding scheme, I can modulate sense input by 
suppressing information which I predict in advance. Since SFD would reduce the ability 
to make predictions, it would reduce the ability to suppress new input. This predicts a 
specific pattern of high sensitivity to unexpected and unpredictable input. It is also 
consistent with recent data: a large caregiver survey by Wigham et. al. (2015) reveals a 
strong link between measures of heightened sensory sensitivity and intolerance of 
uncertainty. 
 Clearly, this mechanism does not predict reduced sensory sensitivity. However, 
in light of the autobiographical evidence, there are four reasons to doubt that standard 
caregiver surveys are actually tracking reduced sensitivity. First, many of the questions 
on Ermer and Dunn’s sensory profile refer to traits which are also directly predicted by 
CN and CS.  For instance, consider autistic children who eat non-food items. As I noted 
in chapter 3, autistic autobiographers often report actively liking sensations that others 
might find unpleasant. Arguably, this is due to CN: autistic people may miss contextual 
inferences which would normally make these things seem unpleasant.  CS could also 
make it harder to distinguish food from non-food. Neither explanation involves 
reduced sensitivity.  
 Second, some of the items Ermer and Dunn list as evidence for reduced 
sensitivity can just as easily be explained in terms of heightened sensitivity. For 
instance, if an autistic child “avoids wearing shoes, loves being barefoot,” this is taken 
to reflect diminished sensitivity. Presumably, the idea is that these children are better 
able to tolerate the feel of the ground against their feet. However, it is also possible that 
the child goes barefoot because they find shoes and socks uncomfortable. Indeed, 
Ermer and Dunn explicitly list “becomes irritated by shoes and socks” as a possible 
example of heightened sensitivity. 
  Next, third, in caregiver surveys concerning children, it may be difficult to 
separate changes in sensitivity per se from changes in responses to sensations. For 
example, one of Ermer and Dunn’s test items concerns a reduced sensitivity to 
temperature and pain. It may be tempting to conclude that a child is less sensitive to 
pain if they do not report injuries, or take action to get out of the cold. However, SFD 
might also directly make it harder for autistic children to do these things. For instance, 
as a result of CS, it might be difficult for a child to generalise strategies for staying 
warm across different environments.51 Likewise, via CN, a child might not infer that 
                                               
51. Note that just being cold is not the only relevant cue here. If I am a child trying to figure out 
how to get warm I might also need to know (e.g.) where I can go to get warm, where the coats 
are usually kept, what adults around me can do to help me, and so on. The relevant factors are 
likely to vary a lot. 
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help is available if they have been injured, or might not understand that they are 
expected to tell adults they have been hurt. 
Finally, fourth, one can take issue with a broader background assumption. 
Ermer and Dunn (1998) assume that when autistic children find experiences less 
intense, they will seek out further stimulation. Conversely, when they find experiences 
more intense, they will avoid them. This assumption is clearly contradicted by the 
autobiographical picture. Yes, autistic autobiographers often avoid intense sensory 
experiences. But they often also describe seeking out sensory experiences precisely 
because they are more intense, and so more compelling. This is unsurprising, since 
neurotypicals do exactly the same thing (hence theme parks and thrash metal 
concerts). 
 
4.4 SFD, HIPPEA and Weak Priors 
 
4.4.1 HIPPEA Predicts SFD 
 
In the previous part of this chapter, I showed that the SFD hypothesis predicts many 
key findings concerning autism. However, there are some important findings I have not 
discussed.  For instance, I have said nothing about prototype learning, and I have only 
discussed a subset of visual search tasks. I have left these until last because, strictly 
speaking, SFD is a hypothesis about long term semantic memory. To address these 
outstanding findings, it will be necessary to go further, and consider how SFD might 
come about. I will now argue that an increased weighting of prediction error, as 
posited in HIPPEA, might bring about SFD in the long term. With this idea in mind, I 
will then return to some of the outstanding data. 
To recap, on the predictive coding scheme, prediction errors represent 
unpredicted sense input, and are passed upwards through the brain’s representational 
hierarchy to support inference and learning. According to HIPPEA (van de Cruys et. al., 
2014), prediction errors in autism are treated as more precise than usual, with less 
adjustment for their expected information value. As a result, autistic people will update 
their model of the world in response to experiences which might not actually be 
learnable (i.e. noise, input which one cannot learn to model). More specifically, van de 
Cruys et. al. (2014) suggest that if noise is not disregarded, a new category or 
parameter will be learned for each new unexpected input. However, the format of the 
underlying models is not fully specified. Consequently, it is not quite clear what 
HIPPEA should predict about social inferences, language processing, and so on. In 
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chapter 1, I postponed a proper discussion of this until after my review of concepts. 
We are now in a position to return to the question. As described in chapter 2, 
world knowledge is stored in weighted connections within an overlapping network. 
From this perspective, concepts are groups of interconnected feature representations 
which tend to be activated together. On this view, error signals can drive learning by 
adjusting the strength of connections. If I predict I will experience one thing and I 
actually experience something else, I can reduce the strength of the connections which 
supported the inference, and increase the strength of the connections that weighed 
against it. On the predictive coding scheme, I will not do this in every case, but only 
when I represent the error as precise (i.e. if the probability distribution is narrow). If it 
is uninformative (broad) it is more likely to be consistent with my predictions. 
It is now easier to see why HIPPEA might be meant to predict overfitting. If I 
erroneously take some piece of sense input to represent learnable variation, I may 
erroneously associate it with some other pieces of random variation in the 
environment. Meanwhile, as I argued in chapter 2, a concept just is a set of features that 
are mutually associated. This means that learning an erroneous set of parameters is 
similar to acquiring an erroneous concept. This is analogous to overfitting in the sense 
that I will incorrectly expect random variation in my past experiences to repeat.  
By definition, however, things which are not predictably related will not 
predictably co-occur. This has three implications. First, as I noted in chapter 1, I will 
only encounter the co-occurrence once, so I will be relatively unlikely to learn it.  
Second, the erroneous link will not be reinforced, so it is likely to remain weak, and 
decay quickly. Third, the link is liable to be undermined by new experiences. If I take 
two things to be related, then whenever I encounter one without the other, there will 
be another error signal (and as a result of HIPPEA, this will also be treated as 
learnable). Overall, while it is possible that HIPPEA may sometimes cause erroneous 
learning, it is not likely to do so very often, and it would only tend to do so in the short 
term.  
The long term effects would be different. Crucially, while chance co-
occurrences do not predictably repeat, exceptions to genuine statistical trends are 
common. If I treat these exceptions as learnable, each one will tend to undermine my 
belief in the trend. Later, I might relearn the relationship, but this is liable to be 
undermined yet again, as soon as there is another exception. The weaker the 
correlation, the more often this will happen, and the fewer opportunities I will have to 
re-learn the pattern. This will also have a cumulative effect on what else I can learn. 
Often, I can predict the violation of one (e.g. social) norm by drawing on my knowledge 
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about another norm. Conversely, if I lose my knowledge about one norm, this will stop 
me from predicting the violation of other norms. This would create further prediction 
errors, undermining further beliefs. 
 However, there is one sort of situation where I should have no difficulties. If 
there are never any exceptions to a rule, I will never have to process an error signal. I 
will therefore have no difficulty with learning about strict regularities, regardless of 
how precise I take the error signals to be. I will only have difficulties with learning 
about weak correlations, because there are exceptions. In other words, HIPPEA directly 
predicts SFD. More generally, since the predictive coding framework assumes error is 
exploited in more or less the same way throughout the brain, HIPPEA predicts SFD at 
all levels of the representational hierarchy. 
Significantly, as I argued earlier, SFD can be also construed as a specific version 
of Pellicano and Burr’s (2012) weak priors hypothesis: limited to structural priors, and 
disproportionately affecting prior knowledge about weak correlations. SFD would 
therefore reconcile the two competing Bayesian accounts of autism: it is a specific 
version of one of them, and is directly predicted by the other.  
 
4.4.2 SFD, HIPPEA and Additional Evidence 
 
I now turn to a few lines of evidence that cannot be explained by SFD per se. In each 
case, I argue that SFD as predicted by HIPPEA is just as good as or better than HIPPEA 
alone. For convenience, I refer to the joint proposal as SFDH.  
In some cases, SFDH can just borrow the HIPPEA explanation of experimental 
findings. For instance, on the Wisconsin Card Sort Task, autistic people would have 
difficulty adjusting attention from one kind of cue to another. SFDH also borrow the 
HIPPEA explanation of (some) visual search paradigms. As I described earlier, in 
conjunction search tasks, subjects must identify (e.g.) a blue cross against a 
background of grey crosses. Autistic subjects tend to do better in these tasks (Joseph et. 
al., 2009). As outlined in chapter 1, HIPPEA can explain this directly. If I see a lot of grey 
crosses, I will generally expect to see more grey crosses. In this context, the blue cross 
will generate a salient error signal, attracting my attention. According to HIPPEA, 
autistic people will have stronger error signals, so they will spot the odd one out more 
quickly. However, this explanation cannot account for their advantages on the 
embedded figures task. On that task, there is no homogenous background against 
which the target can be more salient. Only the SFDH hypothesis simultaneously 
explains the advantage on both forms of visual search task: the former (via SFD) in 
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terms of selectively weakened priors, and the latter in terms of heightened error 
signals. 
SFDH also provides a more satisfying account of prototype learning in autism. 
As Mercado et. al. (2015) note, different paradigms tend to produce different results. 
For instance, Klinger et. al. (2007; Klinger and Dawson, 2001) showed children 
drawings of fictional animals, training them to distinguish distortions of a prototype 
animal from animals belonging to a different category. Having done so, they found 
autistic children had more difficulty distinguishing prototypes from non-prototypes. 
However, Molesworth et. al. (2005, 2008) find this effect is limited to a subgroup, and 
is possibly due to task ambiguities. Meanwhile, Soulieres et. al. (2011) report the 
opposite finding. In other studies, when the prototype is a random pattern of dots, 
autistic participants have much more consistent difficulties (e.g. Plaisted et. al., 1998; 
Gastgeb et. al., 2012; Froehlich et. al., 2013; Church et. al., 2010). A reduced prototype 
effect with natural categories has also been found, though only in one study (Gastgeb 
et. al., 2006).  
Rather than address these complications, van de Cruys et. al. (2014) just 
suggest that HIPPEA predicts a general difficulty with prototype learning. As they note, 
since the training items in these tasks are random distortions of the prototype, each 
will be slightly different. In the context of what has already been learned, each 
distortion will produce an error signal. In autism, they argue, the error signal will be 
stronger, so autistic people will find it harder to recognise new items as similar to 
previous ones. This means they will not learn a single overall prototype. Instead, they 
will tend to form a new subcategory representation for each instance.  
There are at least three problems with this explanation. First of all, as I argued 
in chapter 2, we store information in an overlapping manner whenever possible. 
Features shared by multiple subcategories will usually be stored in a superordinate 
representation. Learning about extra, erroneous subcategories will not preclude this. 
Second, in any case, if distortions of the prototype are random, they are unlikely to get 
learned: each particular distortion will only be encountered once. Third, in most of 
these studies, subjects are explicitly told that all instances are members of the same 
category, so they do not have to rely on similarity to figure this out. 
SFDH can provide a more satisfying explanation of the data. Consistent with 
van de Cruys et. al. (2014), unpredictable noise in the training data will tend to create 
an error signal. In autism, this will be weighted more highly, and may induce further 
learning. This might occasionally mean learning erroneous subcategories, but the 
effects of this are likely to be weak and short-lived.  Over the course of the training, the 
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more significant effect will be to undermine knowledge about weak correlations. Only 
features common to every item will be learned without difficulty. This would explain 
why autistic participants tend to have more difficulty with the dot patterns. The key 
difference would lie in how the prototype is distorted in order to generate the training 
items. With the fictional animals, some features vary, (e.g. the length of the feet) but the 
overall shape and configuration remains the same. On SFDH, autistic participants 
should have no difficulty learning about the invariant features.  However, when 
random dot patterns are distorted, every dot is moved in a random direction. This 
means that no distinguishing features are reliably preserved.52 
Before moving on, it may also be helpful to clarify why only SFDH makes this 
prediction about prototype learning, not SFD alone. According to SFDH, the differences 
in concept structure will occur immediately, as part of the learning process, so they 
should be evident immediately after training. However, it is possible that SFD could 
come about in other ways. For example, maybe initial learning is unaffected, but weak 
connections decay more rapidly after learning. In that case, one would expect normal 
prototype effects immediately after training, and reduced effects later on. While this is 
not consistent with the overall picture I have described here, it is possible, for instance, 
that SFD might come about in this way in a subgroup of people. 
 
4.4.3 SFD, HIPPEA, and modelling the world 
 
Finally, there is another important broader difference between SFDH and the standard 
version of HIPPEA. According to HIPPEA, autistic people will tend to end up with 
shallow conceptual models of the world, capturing only superficial regularities. Since 
will they develop a new concept whenever something is not quite what they expected, 
they will be unable to generalise and identify deeper structure. Again, this does not 
seem quite consistent with what was said about concepts in chapter 2. Developing 
erroneous subcategories does not, in itself, preclude generalisation: any features 
shared by faulty subcategories will still be integrated into a more general 
superordinate representation. SFDH predicts difficulties with generalisation for a 
different reason: exceptions to rules will tend to undermine belief in the rule. Concepts 
will therefore be inflexible because they only capture reliable regularities; they will 
include fewer parameters, not more. They will therefore be deployed with less nuance, 
                                               
52. It may seem a stretch to talk about “features” of random dot patterns. What I have in mind is 
(e.g.) that one pair of dots is to the left of another dot, that two pairs of dots are about the same 
distance apart, that three dots are in a line, etc. 
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and categories will sometimes get broader, not narrower. Meanwhile, deep 
generalisation should still be perfectly possible in rule-governed domains. 
 An example may help to illustrate the difference. According to van de Cruys 
(2014), a hyper-specific concept might be MAKING FRIENDS AT A FOOTBALL MATCH. If this 
concept contains erroneous parameters, it may well motivate erroneous inferences in 
that specific situation. However, this should not preclude the existence of a more 
general concept: MAKING FRIENDS.53 By contrast, on SFDH, it will only be possible to 
acquire a version of MAKING FRIENDS that involves relatively strong correlations, and 
which will therefore probably be less useful.  
Overall, SFDH is more precise than HIPPEA about the structure of concepts in 
autism, and about how they change over time. It also predicts a wider range of findings. 
Moreover (since it incorporates SFD) it is a better fit for the qualitative data in chapter 
3. However, the two alternatives might also be contrasted experimentally. If the 
standard version of HIPPEA is right, you would expect autistic people to have 
difficulties abstracting invariances, whenever they co-occur with variation. For 
instance, autistic participants should harder to learn the invariant features of the 
fictional animal stimuli. This would make it harder to distinguish the prototype from a 
non-member. 
 
4.5 A Pluralistic Strategy for Testing SFD 
 
In the last few sections, I showed that SFD predicts many experimental findings. I also 
suggested a few ways it might be tested further, especially via its effects on language 
and perception. However, none of the research I have reviewed in this chapter reveals 
any traits which are exclusive to or universal to autism. Instead, as is typical in 
psychiatric research, studies reveal statistical differences between groups. As I noted in 
chapter 1, autism also involves significant heterogeneity, with some researchers 
concluding that there may be no universal explanation. On this basis, it could be that 
SFD is only implicated in a subset of autism cases. Arguably consistent with this 
possibility, one recent study by Jones et. al. (2018b) identified a specific subset of 
autistic children who seem to perform especially poorly on measures of statistical 
learning.  The hypothesis is therefore best tested along pluralistic lines. 
On this basis, two predictions will be particularly important. First, different 
                                               
53. Since this erroneous subcategory makes faulty predictions, it is also likely to be short-lived, 
especially if error signals are inflexibly strong. 
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measures of SFD should correlate well with each other. Second, measures of SFD 
should predict autism traits. However, autism traits will not necessarily predict SFD. 
These claims could be tested, for instance, by assessing the same group of individuals 
on two tasks: one (e.g.) assessing the influence of (statistically weak) prior knowledge 
about object colours on perception, the other assessing (e.g.) sensitivity to (statistically 
weak) linguistic context. If the measures are correlated, this would validate SFD as a 
general construct. If they turn out to be correlated with an index of autism traits like 
AQ, this would suggest that SFD contributes significantly to autism. 
 
4.6 SFD and Other Theories of Autism 
 
Finally, before I conclude, it may be helpful to consider how SFD would relate to the 
three traditional families of autism theories discussed in chapter 1. In each case, SFD 
would retain some aspects of the traditional approach, but would improve on it in a 
significant way.  
First, like the social-first theories, SFD predicts particular difficulties with 
making useful inferences in social situations. However, unlike those theories, it does 
not explain this in terms of mental states. Instead, the difficulty would reflect a reduced 
ability to draw on general knowledge about weak correlations. SFD also plausibly 
predicts difficulties on the standard false-belief studies used to assess ToM, but does so 
for entirely different reasons: mainly, as a secondary consequence of difficulties with 
joint attention. This is more satisfying than a direct explanation in terms of ToM, given 
the many reasons to be sceptical of the ToM framework I outlined in chapter 1. 
Consistent with the Empathising—Systemizing variant of ToMD, SFD would 
also explain why autistic people tend to be better at dealing with rule-governed 
domains. Partly, this is just because knowledge about the structure of those domains 
will not be lost. But it is possible to go further than this. If I only make inferences based 
on the rules, not based on more superficial, apparent regularities, I am less likely to 
make errors. I already noted one example of precisely this: autistic people are more 
resistant to the conjunction fallacy. More generally, however, SFD implies advantages 
whenever it is useful to abstract the underlying rules from the content. This could also 
imply advantages in some artistic domains: if I am less influenced by biases about how 
things typically look and sound, I will be able to copy things more accurately. Lastly, 
the most important advantage of SFD over the Empathising—Systemising theory is 
that it explains why social difficulties and systemising strengths might be related: both 
would follow from the same difficulty with learning weak trends. 
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Second, like WCC, SFD predicts difficulties with drawing on context, both in 
perception and in language. However, where WCC explains this using the rather 
unhelpful notions of “local” and “global” processing, SFD explains this more precisely in 
terms of the structure of the semantic network. Consistent with WCC, SFD also directly 
predicts sensory differences in busy environments. However, it predicts a fuller range 
of sensory differences than WCC, including a specific profile of sensory sensitivities, 
alongside idiosyncratic preferences.54 
Finally, third, the most popular executive deficit accounts tend to focus on 
explaining highly structured, inflexible behaviours. They do so by positing specific 
executive deficits, especially reduced cognitive flexibility. However, as I argued in 
chapter 1, there is no strong evidence these difficulties actually correlate well with 
standard measures of executive deficits. Meanwhile, SFD predicts most of the same 
traits independently of experimental measures of executive functioning. For instance, 
many repetitive behaviours follow sensory differences, and the preference for order 
can be explained as a tendency to become disoriented when situations are not 
governed by strict rules. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
In chapter 3, I introduced the SFD hypothesis: some autistic people may not store 
knowledge about weak correlations in semantic memory. In this chapter, I have shown 
that the hypothesis can explain experimental findings in three domains. First, I looked 
at research on social cognition. I argued that SFD directly predicts difficulties with joint 
attention for a wide variety of reasons. Indirectly, joint attention difficulties might then 
contribute to difficulties with false belief tasks. A few studies of social stereotypes and 
situation schemas in autism also directly support the SFD hypothesis, indicating that 
autistic people are less likely to learn about unreliable properties of groups of people 
and situations. 
 Second, I turned to research on language comprehension. I noted that properly 
controlled studies do not reveal reduced context effects in autism; nor do they reveal 
difficulties with figurative language. Nevertheless, these difficulties are common 
outside the lab. SFD can resolve the discrepancy, since it only predicts difficulties when 
the context is statistically weak: a claim which has not yet been tested. More 
                                               
54. SFD is less consistent with EPF, WCC’s main competitor. However, the extended version, 
SFDH, would make some similar predictions. For instance, like EPF, SFDH explains some 
advantages in visual search in terms of increased sensitivity to differences between the target 
and the distractors. 
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speculatively, I suggested that extreme cases of SFD could prevent some autistic people 
from acquiring language. 
Third, turning to perception, I made a similar case.  According to SFD, 
perception in autism will be less shaped by prior knowledge, but only about weak 
trends. This would explain why the evidence for the standard weak priors account has 
not been consistent. For instance, SFD predicts a specific profile of resistance to 
relatively weak expectation-driven visual illusions, whereas the weak priors account 
would predict difficulties with all kinds of illusions.  
 After reviewing these results, I considered the relationship between SFD and 
the HIPPEA hypothesis. I argued that HIPPEA would primarily predict SFD, calling the 
combination of the two accounts SFDH. This joint proposal would accommodate 
further findings on prototype learning and visual search, fitting the data better than 
HIPPEA in isolation. Since SFD is a specific version of the weak priors hypothesis, SFDH 
would also reconcile the competing Bayesian accounts of autism. 
Finally, in parts 5 and 6, I returned to the bigger picture. In part 5, I argued that 
it would be best to test the hypothesis along pluralistic lines, especially given the 
heterogeneity of autism, and the nature of the evidence available. In part 6, I then 
summarised where SFD would stand relative to the traditional accounts of autism 
discussed in chapter 1. In each case, I noted that SFD would improve on those theories, 
either in explanatory breadth, or in specifying more details, or both.  
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General Conclusions 
 
This thesis has defended the Semantic Feature Dissociation (SFD) hypothesis. The 
claim is: some autistic people do not store knowledge about weak correlations in long-
term semantic memory. I abducted the hypothesis using an innovative qualitative 
study of autism autobiographies, employing research on concept structure as an 
interpretive tool. This means it is a good fit for many autism traits as they appear 
outside the lab. I also argued that it can account for the experimental data better than 
current autism theories, and can reconcile the two leading Bayesian theories of autism, 
HIPPEA and weak priors. I now conclude by summarising the main results at more 
length, and indicating some possible directions for future work. 
 The main consequence of SFD is that some autistic people will miss inferences, 
relative to a neurotypical norm. Inferences based on weak correlations are especially 
likely to get missed. Outside the lab, the effects of this can be illustrated using two 
descriptive categories: concept specialisation (CS) and concept narrowing (CN). CS is a 
tendency to only activate concepts when a specific set of highly reliable cues are 
present; CN is a tendency to make a narrower range of inferences when a concept is 
activated. Jointly, these categories can account for a wide range of autism traits. 
 First, both CN and CS would help make sense of social difficulties. CN would 
make it harder to draw on socially relevant situation knowledge, stored in situation 
schemas. Meanwhile, CS would make it harder to generalise social strategies, and to 
read body language and facial expressions. Social knowledge would be 
disproportionately affected, because social norms and cues are characteristically 
unreliable. Importantly, this explanation challenges the traditional ToMD account of 
autism, since it posits changes in the structure of world knowledge, not difficulties with 
mental states. 
Second, SFD predicts a range of language differences, especially difficulties with 
pragmatic language. CN, especially, would make it harder to draw on (statistically 
weak) situation knowledge to interpret language in context. Outside the lab, this might 
make it especially difficult to understand figurative devices, which will often require 
sensitivity to context. However, SFD only predicts difficulties with understanding 
figurative language in some (weakly informative) contexts. It does not predict 
difficulties with figurative language per se. This is consistent with the finding that 
many autistic writers use sophisticated figurative language, yet simultaneously report 
difficulties with understanding figurative expressions in certain situations. 
Third, SFD predicts the distinct profile of sensory differences found in autism 
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autobiographies. This would occur for multiple reasons. To explain heightened 
sensitivity, SFD would draw on the predictive coding framework, according to which 
we routinely suppress any sense input we can predict. Both CN and CS would prevent 
this suppression by making it harder to predict new input (except on the basis of 
reliable correlations). They would also contribute to idiosyncratic preferences. If I miss 
contextual inferences (CN), I am likely to find many things less unpleasant, because I 
will be less aware of the unpleasant context. At the same time, if I draw on less 
information to categorise (CS) I may over-generalise (e.g.) food categories to include 
non-food objects. Additionally, CS would explain some cases of sensory fragmentation. 
To integrate my sense input, I must recognise that various cues belong to the same 
object. If I fail to infer that a silver patch is the end of a knife, then I will not be able to 
relate it properly to the handle. This will be particularly likely in busy environments, 
where large numbers of cues must be interpreted in parallel in the context of noise. 
Finally, fourth, SFD predicts various behaviours that might be characterised as 
restricted or repetitive. It does so for at least two distinct reasons. One reason is as a 
direct response to sensory differences. Several autobiographers said they found some 
sensations unusually engrossing, so they sought to experience them again and again, or 
for long periods of time. Another reason, also explicitly described in autobiographies, is 
as a technique for mitigating anxiety. SFD implies fewer inferences and predictions 
about the world, and autobiographers reported a great deal of subjective uncertainty. 
Rituals and routines were often described as a strategy for keeping things predictable 
and familiar. More speculatively, a third reason for intense interests might be a 
difficulty with acquiring the usual, flexible folk concepts and folk knowledge about a 
subject. This could make it necessary to acquire more precise, conceptually granular 
knowledge instead, in order to understand the domain. 
Moving on, SFD is also a good fit for experimental findings.  For perception, it 
makes similar predictions to the weak priors account: resistance to expectation-driven 
illusions, difficulties with copying impossible figures, and so on. However, it only 
predicts difficulties with illusions driven by strict environmental regularities. Evidence 
from illusions is somewhat equivocal, but seems roughly consistent with this. A 
selective weakening of priors is also consistent with advantages on the embedded 
figures task. Finally (as described above) SFD is consistent with clinical reports of 
altered sensory sensitivity using caregiver surveys. However, some evidence which is 
often taken to imply reduced sensory sensitivity may actually reveal changes in 
sensory valence, and difficulties with knowing how to respond to unpleasant 
sensations.  
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For language, SFD predicts difficulties with making the usual range of 
inferences from context. Superficially, one might expect to find this in impaired 
homograph disambiguation, reduced semantic priming, and difficulties with processing 
figurative language in context. But actually such results are only found when studies 
use inadequate language controls; with proper controls, context effects and figurative 
language are usually found to be intact. However, these studies are deliberately set up 
so that the context strongly predicts the target. SFD only predicts difficulties when the 
context is relatively weak, a claim which has not yet been tested.  
Finally, for social cognition, SFD explains a range of findings. Most importantly, 
both CN and CS could contribute to difficulties with joint attention. Plausibly, this could 
contribute to difficulties with false-belief tests, though (as I argued in chapter 1) it is 
not actually clear what these tests are measuring. CS would also make it harder to read 
facial expressions in the lab. It would be harder to exploit (characteristically 
unreliable) facial cues, and perhaps more painful to look at more unpredictable parts of 
the face (i.e. the eyes).  A narrowing of social stereotypes would additionally explain 
why autistic people seem to make fewer stereotype-driven inferences. 
As well as being a good fit for qualitative and quantitative data, SFD also 
integrates and improves on a number of ideas from earlier autism theories. Consistent 
with both WCC and with weak priors, it predicts a difficulty with drawing on context, 
but makes this claim more precise. Consistent with Empathising—Systemising theory, 
it predicts relative ease understanding rule-governed domains, alongside social 
difficulties, but it also explains why these would occur together: due to the statistical 
structure of these differing domains. Consistent with EF deficit theories it accounts for 
repetitive behaviours and a need for routine; but it shows how these might occur for a 
range of different reasons, even when autistic people do not have specific difficulties on 
most experimental measures of EF. 
 SFD also builds on the two leading Bayesian theories, weak priors and HIPPEA, 
allowing these theories to be nuanced and reconciled. Notably, SFD would amount to a 
more specific version of the weak priors account, where prior knowledge about weak 
correlations is lost first. Meanwhile, the inflexibly precise prediction errors posited by 
HIPPEA would bring this about (not overfitting, as is claimed). Since I will be unable to 
disregard exceptions to trends, the long-term consequence of overweight error signals 
would be to strip all but the most reliable parameters out my conceptual model of the 
world. At the end of chapter 4 I argued that the combination of SFD and HIPPEA, SFDH, 
can account for more findings than HIPPEA alone. 
Finally, there are several ways in which this thesis opens up avenues for further 
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research. The most obvious next step is to test the hypothesis directly, perhaps using 
one or more of the strategies I described in chapter 4. For example, one could test 
whether autistic people are less sensitive to medium-diagnostic colour cues, or if they 
have a reduced N400 effect when the context is a social stereotype. Importantly, given 
the heterogeneity of autism, the goal would not be to show that SFD occurs in every 
case. Instead, a more suitable and more modest strategy would be to determine if 
different measures of SFD correlate, and if they can be found in a substantial subgroup 
of autistic people. Another possible next step might be to develop computational 
models of SFD, to establish more precise predictions and to compare the current 
version of HIPPEA with the SFDH version. 
To sum up, this thesis has introduced and defended SFD: an original hypothesis 
with important implications for the autism literature. The claim is that some autistic 
people tend not to represent information about weak correlations in long-term 
semantic memory. As I have argued, SFD can explain a wider range of qualitative and 
quantitative evidence than current theories of autism, and can generally do so in finer 
detail. It also represents a step forward in the debate on Bayesian theories of autism, 
indicating a way to reconcile the HIPPEA hypothesis with its main competitor, weak 
priors. Building on the work I have described here, the next step should be to test the 
SFD hypothesis directly: to explore the ability of autistic people to draw on statistically 
weak context during perception and language processing.  
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